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INTRODUCTION
[Former Finance Company Employee:] Finance companies try
to do business with blue-collar workers, people who have not
gone to college, older people who are on fixed incomes, non
English-speaking people, and people who have significant
equity in their homes. In fact, my perfect customer would be
an uneducated widow who is on a fixed income, hopefully
from her deceased husband's pension and Social Security,
who has her house paid off, is living off of credit cards, but
having a difficult time keeping up with her payments .....
To flip [a small unsecured loan] into a ... home equity
loan, we were trained to sell the monthly "savings"-that is,
how much less per month the customer would be paying off
if we flipped the loan. In reality, the "savings" that we were
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trained to sell to the customers were just an illusion. The
uneducated customer would jump for the "savings," thinking
that he would have more money to buy other things. What
the customer would not figure out, and what we would not
tell him, is that he would be paying for a longer period of
time and, in the end, would pay a whole lot more.
. . . Delinquent customers made good flipping candi-
dates, because we could put additional pressure on them....
We knew that these customers would almost always agree to
refinance, because they did not have the money to pay on
their current loan and did not want the finance company to
institute foreclosure....
Our entire sale is built on confusion. Blue-collar work-
ers tend to be less educated.... They can be confused in the
loan closings, and they look to [loan brokers] . . . as profes-
sionals who can handle their bill and their incomes as total
financial representatives .... So they are more trusting to-
ward us....
[People having difficulty meeting their present debt ob-
ligations] are desperate. They will sign at whatever rate you
give them and however many points you give them....
[Senator Breaux:] Is it not required by Federal regulation ...
that.., information be clearly presented to the customer-
that... if you refinance with us, here is how long it is going
to take you, and here is how much you are going to pay-in
simple English?
[Former Finance Company Employee:] It is written in simple
English, and it is on all the loan documents, but I can get
around any figure on any loan sheet.
-1998 Senate Hearing Testimony of
former finance company employee,
testifying anonymously'
1. Equity Predators: Striping, Ripping and Packing Their Way to Profits: Hearing Before the S.
Spec. Comm. on Aging, 105th Cong. 31-37 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 Sen. Hrg.] (statement of
"Jim Dough," former finance company employee). Stories from borrowers, brokers, loan
officers, and others who have been witness to predatory lending practices appear here to
provide some context, to make the data here more "available" than it would be if presented
in only dry statistical form.
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Obtaining a home loan is the most significant, complex, and
long-term economic transaction in which many Americans will ever
engage. Total home-secured debt summed to over $8 trillion at the
close of 2004.2 Yet despite the importance of the transaction to the
households and neighborhoods involved and the nation's economy as
a whole, many Americans are not making optimal home loan deci-
sions in two important respects. First, they are not obtaining home
loans at competitive price terms, prices that a market of borrowers
engaged in effective price-shopping would produce. Second, they are
not obtaining home loans on prudent risk terms, both in that the ben-
efits of the loan are outweighed by the risk of foreclosure posed by the
loan and in that borrowers are failing to take advantage of alternatives
that are preferable, in cost-benefit terms, to shouldering that risk.
The sale of these overpriced and overly risky home loans constitutes
what has come to be known as "predatory lending."3 Two indicators
that predatory lending became a problem in the late 1990s are: (1)
studies indicating that large numbers of borrowers were receiving
loans at prices beyond what the cost and credit risk presented by the
borrower would garner from a competitive market; and (2) dramatic
increases in foreclosure rates, despite economic boom times in the
mid- to late-1990s, with no reason to think that borrowers' preferences
regarding risking foreclosure had changed dramatically, if at all, dur-
ing that period.4
2. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 2006, at 768 fig.1 180. Home loan debt exceeds total domestic nonfinan-
cial corporate credit market debt, which was just over $5 trillion at the close of 2004. Id. at
759 fig.1156.
3. Others have defined predatory lending as fraud, e.g., Robert E. Litan, Unintended
Consequences: The Risks of Premature State Regulation of Predatory Lending 2 (2003)
(unpublished report prepared for the American Bankers Association), available at http://
www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/D881716A-1C75-1 I D5-AB7B-00508B95258D/28871 /PredRe-
port200991.pdf ("'[P]redatory lenders' effectively commit fraud by encouraging borrowers
to take out mortgages on onerous terms that they cannot realistically meet."), or by a list of
lending practices that harm consumers, e.g., Predatory Lending Practices: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Banking and Fin. Seros., 106th Cong. 477-78 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 House Hrg.]
(statement of Margot Saunders, Managing Attorney, National Consumer Law Center) (list-
ing home improvement scams, mortgage broker kickbacks, high interest rates, balloon pay-
ments, negative amortization, credit insurance packing, high prepayment penalties,
repeated refinancings, spurious open end loans, and refinancing unsecured debt), but the
former is incomplete and the latter is doomed to become out of date as lending practices
mutate in response to changed legal or market conditions. Both sets of commentators
have been responding to lending activity that results in two distinct harms to consumers:
(1) paying excessive, noncompetitive prices for home loans and (2) accepting home loans
presenting an excessive risk of foreclosure. In this Article, I develop a new definition of
predatory lending, based on these harms. See infra Part I.B.
4. For evidence of both of these, see infra Part I.A.3.
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From a legal and policy perspective, what is puzzling about this
problem is that borrowers are agreeing to these overpriced and overly
risky home loans against their own self-interest and despite federally
mandated disclosures regarding loan price and, for some loans, risk of
foreclosure. This Article argues that the problem is not so puzzling
when the structure of the subprime home loan market and consumer
decisionmaking within that market are carefully analyzed.
Current federal law governing home lending requires that bor-
rowers be given an avalanche of disclosures, but has few substantive
requirements for home loans. The law is premised on a largely un-
bounded rational actor model of borrower decisionmaking, which as-
sumes that borrowers will take the disclosures and freely choose a loan
available in the market according to the borrower's own internal price
and risk preferences. This model functioned relatively well-or at
least did little harm-in a world of fairly simple uniform loan prod-
ucts, the price and risk of which were hemmed in by usury limits and
credit rationing. But the world has changed. My thesis is that for sig-
nificant borrower segments shopping in today's market of risk-based
pricing and multifarious loan products, the disclosures currently man-
dated by federal law for home loans neither effectively facilitate price
shopping, nor do they result in good deliberate decisionmaking about
risk.
This is an issue about which I became knowledgeable while in
practice: when I was at the Civil Rights Division of the Department of
Justice, I was involved in some lending discrimination matters and was
then sent on detail to the Federal Trade Commission to assist in a
predatory home lending case. I had also represented a couple of
mortgage brokers while in private practice, so I had seen a bit of the
other side. When litigating these cases, we attorneys scoured the fed-
erally required loan disclosures to determine whether every "t" was
crossed and "i" dotted. However, the minute we talked to either bor-
rowers or lenders, it became apparent that the disclosures were a liti-
gation game-the content of disclosures had little to do with
borrower decisionmaking in taking the loan.5
5. An attorney who represents lenders has made the same point:
[I have] spent most of [my] professional life drafting disclosures that I feel are
never read by consumers and, in truth, do very little to educate consumers about
the cost of credit. From my perspective, the people that read the disclosures I
help develop are plaintiffs' attorneys ....
.... Most of the lawsuits that we see involve technical mistakes with disclosures
that have no practical meaning to the consumer.
Re-Examining Truth in Lending: Do Borrowers Actually Use Consumer Disclosures?, A
Panel Discussion at the ABA Section of Business Law, Committee on Consumer Financial
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To understand what does drive borrower decisions, I take the
literature on decisionmaking from the psychology and behavioral eco-
nomics fields and apply it in depth for the first time to the problem of
predatory lending. To do that requires an understanding of both how
the home loan marketplace has historically operated, a history that
continues to "frame" home loan decisions for borrowers in that mar-
ketplace, and how that marketplace has, unbeknownst to many,
changed. Therefore, in Part I of this Article, I explain how the twenti-
eth-century market of standardized home loans at uniform low prices
rationed to low-risk borrowers was largely replaced in the 1990s with
risk-based pricing of a broadened supply of creatively structured home
loans. Next, I provide evidence that loans at noncompetitive high
prices and on quite risky terms are flourishing in this market. Recon-
ceptualizing predatory home lending by reference to its two root
harms, I propose a new, accurate and yet parsimonious definition of
the problem: overpriced and overly risky home loans.
I then narrow my focus in Part II to the price side of the problem,
explaining that the current legal regime of disclosure fails to effec-
tively facilitate price shopping because it is based on an unrealistic,
rational actor model of borrower behavior. In Part III, I set forth a
more realistic picture of consumer decisionmaking, one that recog-
nizes the influence of intangible cognitive and emotional costs on in-
ternal decisionmaking processes and the influence of socioeconomic
context on external decisionmaking outputs. Next, I show how sellers
of home loans exploit widespread cognitive heuristics, biases, and
emotional coping mechanisms to sell overpriced home loans to a sig-
nificant segment of the borrowing population. Here, I work both the
cognitive and the emotional sides of the decisionmaking aisle, and I
delve deeply into the data on how people really make decisions about
their loans. Implicit in my methodology is a critique of those legal
scholars who attempt to apply the decisionmaking literature to legal
problems at a theoretical level, without checking their claims against
real-world data. Part IV explains why the home loan market has not
fixed the problem. I then offer a proposal for using the law to restruc-
ture the marketplace, to increase price competition, and to reduce
the prevalence of predatory overpricing of home loans.
Behavioral decisionmaking research shows that the biases, heuris-
tics, and emotional coping mechanisms likely to be involved in deci-
sions about price differ from those likely to be involved in decisions
Services 1997 Spring Meeting (Apr. 5, 1997), in 52 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 3, 3-4 (1998)
(statement of Robert Cook, Esq.).
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about risk. My methodology of dividing the overpricing problem
from the problem of too much risk is therefore likely to be fruitful in
other areas as well. Much of what is described here is equally applica-
ble to other types of consumer credit, such as credit cards, payday
loans, and auto financing, all of which have been criticized for preda-
tory deployments.6 Federal law governing all forms of consumer
credit is based on the wealth-maximizing rational economic actor
model, and real-world evidence undermines the applicability of this
model to vast segments of the borrower markets for all forms of con-
sumer credit. The suggestions here for bringing the law governing
the home loan borrowing process into alignment with real consumer
behaviors, and reining in the manipulation of those behaviors by sell-
ers of credit, can be tweaked to apply to these other forms of con-
sumer credit as well. Examining home loan borrowing merely
provides a focused look at one site where the effects of the current
gulf between the law's model of borrower decisionmaking and real
heterogeneous borrower behaviors has particularly pernicious effects.
It is theoretically possible to split even the pricing analysis here
into two pieces-one piece on how the structure of the market leads
people to take overpriced loans and another piece on why heuristics,
biases, and coping mechanisms lead people to take overpriced home
loans. Yet the sum of market structure plus consumer psychology is
greater than its parts. There is an interaction effect between the two.
As Arthur Leff in his classic Swindling and Selling explained:
[M]arrying the insights of those who consider the overall
structure of transactions generally with the perceptions of
those who focus attention on the dynamics of particular
transactions may increase the amount of truth available to
the world at large-which world exists, after all, in the midst
of the individual and the mass all at once.7
To understand why the current disclosure regime fails, and to develop
tractable solutions to the problem of predatory home lending, one
must analyze market structure, consumer decisionmaking, and their
interaction.
6. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS: TOWARDS A CURE FOR THE
HIGH-COsT CREDIT MARKET (2004) (describing how cognitive biases lead to the use of high-
cost credit generally); Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1373 (2004)
(explaining how credit card sellers exploit consumers' behavioral biases for profit); Brian
J. Zikmund-Fisher & Andrew M. Parker, Demand for Rent-to-Own Contracts: A Behavioral Eco-
nomic Explanation, 38J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 199, 209-15 (1999) (finding greater degree of
decisionmaking biases in those who use rent-to-own versus those who do not, controlling
for income).
7. ARTHUR ALLEN LEFF, SWINDLING AND SELLING 184 (1976).
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Although this Article is thus focused on the problem of predatory
home lending, it contains valuable lessons about when and how dis-
closure can realistically be used in legal regulation more generally.
Substantive regulation of contract terms or product or service attrib-
utes can create inefficiencies and can be a drag on innovation, both of
which can hurt consumers. But giving consumers more information
in today's information-saturated economy is not enough to assure
good or even truly autonomous decisionmaking.8 We may at times
have to intervene in the market to create the conditions necessary for
consumers to use disclosures to arrive at decisions that are efficient,
autonomous, and good for them, their households, and their
communities.
I. PREDATORY LENDING AND THE HOME LOAN MARKET
A. The Home Lending Revolution
1. The Twentieth Century Marketplace: Standardized Terms, Limited
and Advertised Prices, and Low Risk.-For much of the twentieth cen-
tury, home loans were largely standardized instruments, restricted in
price, terms, foreclosure risk, and supply. The price of home loans
was directly controlled. State usury limits for home loans generally
ranged from 6% to 10%, 9 and the federal government capped rates
and fees for loans insured by its Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) and Veterans Administration (VA) loan programs.' °
Loan structure was shaped by both formal restrictions on terms
and by market incentives. Federal regulation prevented federally
chartered lenders from originating variable rate loans,11 and most
states placed a similar prohibition on state-chartered lenders.' 2 Most
states restricted home loan structure by prohibiting prepayment pen-
8. By truly autonomous decisionmaking, I mean decisionmaking that gives a person
an objective ability to make decisions congruent with her meta-preferences and a subjec-
tive feeling of control over her decisions.
9. William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules
Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction,
70 VA. L. Rv. 1083, 1087 (1984). See generally James M. Ackerman, Interest Rates and the
Law: A History of Usury, 1981 ARIz. ST. L.J. 61.
10. Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime "HEL" Was Paved with Good Congres-
sional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. REv. 473,
480-81 (2000); Kerry D. Vandell, FHA Restructuring Proposals: Alternatives and Implications, 6
Hous. POL'v DEBATE 299, 303-05 & tbl.1 (1995).
11. Diana G. Browne, The Development and Practical Application of the Adjustable Rate Mort-
gage Loan: The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation's Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan
Purchase Program and Mortgage Loan Instruments, 47 Mo. L. REv. 179, 183 (1982).
12. Lawrence J. White, The S&L Debacle, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S57, S63-64 (1991).
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alties and balloons."l Federally chartered lenders were likewise pro-
hibited from offering loans with these terms.14  FHA and VA
insurance were only available for long-term fully amortizing fixed-rate
loans. 15 The Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), the Federal
National Mortgage Association (FNMA or Fannie Mae) and the Fed-
eral Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or Freddie Mac),
established to provide liquidity to the home loan marketplace by
purchasing home loans, only purchased FLA and VA loans or, later,
conventional16 loans meeting similar parameters. 17 As a result, FHA,
VA, and conventional loans all evolved into a predominant standard-
ized product-the thirty-year fixed-rate fully amortizing uniform
monthly payment loan."'
Risk and supply were both constrained, directly and indirectly.
Price controls indirectly hemmed in risk and supply. 9 The "three Cs"
of underwriting standards-capacity, credit, and collateral-imposed
by the government for FHA/VA loans, by the GSEs for GSE-purchased
loans, and by lenders for other conventional loans, directly controlled
risk.z° Capacity was controlled by capping borrower debt-to-income
ratios. Creditworthiness was determined by fairly crude univariate
13. See KATHLEEN E. KEEST & ELIZABETH RENUART, THE COST OF CREDIT: REGULATION
AND LEGAL CHALLENGES §§ 3.9 & 5.8.3 (2d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2004). A balloon is a large
lump sum payment due on a loan; a simple balloon loan would be a loan on which only
interest payments are made over the life of the loan, with the principal due in a lump sum
"balloon" at the end of the loan term.
14. Id. § 5.8.3.
15. Vandell, supra note 10, at 301-02, 311; Kent W. Colton, Housing Finance in the United
States: The Transformation of the U.S. Housing Finance System 5, 7 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies
Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. W02-5, 2002).
16. "Conventional" in the home loan context means not government insured.
17. STEPHEN Ross &JOHN YINGER, THE COLOR OF CREDIT: MORTGAGE DISCRIMINATION,
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, AND FAIR-LENDING ENFORCEMENT 17 (2002); Eskridge, supra note
9, at 1097.
18. For a history of these loans, see Vandell, supra note 10, at 301-12, and Colton, supra
note 15, at 1-9.
19. Usury limits were adopted to prevent the extreme poverty and debt servitude that
could be caused by a desperate borrower's irrational willingness to take on the risk of a
high interest loan that the borrower would not be able to afford. Edward L. Glaeser &Jos6
Scheinkman, Neither a Borrower nor a Lender Be: An Economic Analysis of Interest Restrictions and
Usury Laws, 41 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3, 27 (1998).
20. See DAVID LISTOKIN ET AL., FANNIE MAE FOUND., THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITATIONS OF
MORTGAGE INNOVATION IN FOSTERING HOMEOWNERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 27-36 & tbls.6
& 7 (2002) (listing historical conventional loan, borrower, and property underwriting char-
acteristics); Jody Shenn, Mortgage Risk Debate Heating Up, AM. BANKER, May 5, 2005, at 1, 1
(referring to capital, capacity, collateral, and character as "the textbook 'four C's"'); John
W. Straka, A Shift in the Mortgage Landscape: The 1990s Move to Automated Credit Evaluations,
I1 J. Hous. REs. 207, 209-210 (2000) (describing the use of the "three Cs"); Vandell, supra
note 10, at 311 (documenting the collateral requirements for FHA loans over time).
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measures of credit and income history. To allow for the costs of col-
lection, lenders required collateral to be appraised high enough so
that the maximum loan-to-value ratio (LTV) would be 80%, although
private and government mortgage insurance allowed borrowers to in-
sure themselves out of this limit.2 ' Collateral could be downgraded
on the basis of neighborhood characteristics, which allowed govern-
ment and private discrimination to dampen credit supply to house-
holds in nonwhite neighborhoods through redlining.2 2 A fourth "C,"
"character," while not particularly effective in controlling risk,2 3 lim-
ited the supply of credit on the basis of subjective evaluation of the
applicant and allowed discrimination again to limit the supply of
credit to nonwhite applicants.
24
Lenders had limited information from which they could forecast
the risk of borrower default and loan servicing costs and therefore
faced the potential for adverse selection by costly, risky borrowers. As
explained by the Stiglitz-Weiss model, lenders managed their inability
to sort borrowers well by cost and risk through rationing credit to only
the most apparently creditworthy borrowers. 25 Lenders charged a be-
low-market-clearing rate and provided a below-market-clearing supply
of home loan credit to keep low-risk borrowers and avoid costly bor-
21. Vandell, supra note 10, at 302.
22. Redlining is the practice of refusing to make loans in minority neighborhoods.
The practice derives from federal government maps that placed red lines around racial or
ethnic minority communities to indicate areas in which the government would not insure
home loans. The practice quickly spread to mortgage lenders, who would redline areas in
which they would not extend home loan credit. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRON-
TIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 197-98 (1985); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY &
NANCY A. DENTON, AMERiCAN APARTHEID 51-52 (1993); Vandell, supra note 10, at 302.
23. Cf Straka, supra note 20, at 218-23 & figs.2 & 3 (observing that home loan under-
writing by objective criteria outperforms subjective underwriting judgments).
24. See, e.g., Complaint 17, United States v. Decatur Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, No. 1 92-
CV-2198-CAM (N.D. Ga. Sept. 17, 1992), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/
documents/decaturcomp.htm (alleging that lender discriminated by not extending home
loans to blacks). Using 1990 data, researchers at the Federal Reserve Board found that,
controlling for loan applicant and collateral characteristics, the probability of being denied
a mortgage was 1.8 times higher for black and Latino mortgage applicants than for compa-
rable whites in a major metropolitan area. Alicia H. Munnell et al., Mortgage Lending in
Boston: Interpreting HMDA Data, 86 AM. ECON. REv. 25, 26 (1996). Women were also denied
equal access to home loan credit. NAT'L COMM'N ON CONSUMER FIN., CONSUMER CREDIT IN
THE UNITED STATES 152-53 (1972); see also, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981)
(invalidating Louisiana statute giving only husbands the unilateral right to execute a mort-
gage on property jointly owned with a spouse).
25. Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Informa-
tion, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 393 (1981); see also Michael Klausner, Market Failure and Community
Investment: A Market-Oriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
1561, 1565-68 (1995).
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rowers. Credit rationing thus restricted the availability, price, and risk
of home loan credit.
The resulting marketplace was one in which prices could easily be
advertised because rates did not vary with borrower characteristics.
Each lender charged a single low rate for each of a very small number
of loan products, resulting in a short menu of prices for standardized
conventional, FHA, and VA loans. Although riskier borrowers might
have been willing to pay higher prices, this demand was unmet due to
the restrictions on price.
2. The Brave New World of Proliferating Products, Price, and Risk.-
In the past thirty years, price caps and standardized terms have virtu-
ally disappeared, and constraints on risk and supply have loosened
dramatically. In response to the interest rate disintermediation cri-
sis26 of the 1970s, most state usury limits were raised significantly, abol-
ished, and/or preempted for home loans by federal law, and the FHA
and VA price caps were raised.2 7 These changes eliminated one con-
straint on price, risk, and supply. The structure of home loans be-
came less standardized with the introduction of adjustable rate
mortgages (ARMs), again spurred by the disintermediation crisis.
This creative loan structuring was made legally possible by the removal
of usury restrictions and of prior state and federal legal prohibitions
on variable rate structures.28
26. In the 1970s, most lenders were dependent on deposits as a source of loan funds,
because home loans had not yet been widely securitized. The credit crunch of the 1970s
caused interest rates to rise, such that lenders with outstanding fixed rate home loans were
taking in less interest income than they needed to pay in interest on deposits to convince
depositors to keep their deposits at the lender instead of in alternative, higher-interest-
earning investment vehicles. Because the depository institutions were no longer able to
perform their intermediary role between depositors and borrowers, this phenomenon is
called disintermediation. Jonathan McCarthy & Richard W. Peach, Monetary Policy Trans-
mission to Residential Investment, FED. REs. BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REV., May 2002, at 139,
140.
27. Title V of The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
(DIDMCA), 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a (2000), preempted state regulation of first mortgages by
all federal lenders and their subsidiaries and all large lenders (i.e., lending over $1 mil-
lion/year). See also Eskridge, supra note 9, at 1108-09. A provision of the National Bank
Act of 1864, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 85, was interpreted in Marquette National Bank v. First of
Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978), to allow national banks to export the interest
rates of their home states to all other states, thus effectively eliminating usury caps for all
home loans originated by national banks that chartered themselves in states with no rate
caps. JamesJ. White, The Usury Trompe L'Oeil, 51 S.C. L. REv. 445, 445 (2000). Caps on
FHA and VA rates were originally set by statute, then set by the relevant administrative
agencies according to market rates, and then, in 1983, all price caps on FHA loans were
removed. Mansfield, supra note 10, at 480-84; Vandell, supra note 10, at 303 tbl.1.
28. See Browne, supra note 11, at 183-88 (federal regulators permitted federally
chartered lenders to originate ARMs beginning in the early 1980s). The Alternative Mort-
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Supply was potentially increased in other ways as well. Federal
legislation strengthening the secondary market for home mortgages
by allowing the GSEs and state-regulated financial institutions to in-
vest more heavily in private mortgage-backed securities loosened
credit supply. 9 Beginning in the late 1980s, the federal government
began to enforce laws prohibiting discrimination in home lending.3 °
Fair lending enforcement broadened the supply of home loan credit
to previously excluded communities, although consolidation in the
banking industry simultaneously led to the withdrawal of branches
from some minority communities.31
But dramatic changes in prices, standardization, risk, and credit
supply have only come about as a result of technological advances in
computer data storage, processing, and networking in the 1990s.
Asymmetric information and adverse selection, with the borrower hav-
ing more information about her default risk and doing the selecting,
formed the underpinnings of the Stiglitz-Weiss model of credit ration-
ing.32 Advances in creditworthiness data collection and processing
have revolutionized the ability of lenders to model borrower behavior
so as to more accurately forecast lending default, prepayment, and
gage Transaction Parity Act (AMTPA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3806, preempted state regulation
of all "alternative" mortgages, whether made by federally or state-chartered lenders or sub-
sidiaries. To fall within AMPTA's preemption ambit, the loan must be structured in a
more complex way than the traditional fixed-rate fully amortizing product, such as an ad-
justable-rate or balloon loan. AMTPA effectively removed prior state-law prohibitions on
ARMs. Mansfield, supra note 10, at 510. It also opened the door for state-chartered institu-
tions to structure home loans with prepayment penalties and balloons, where federal regu-
lators permitted the equivalent federally chartered type of institution to do so. KEEST &
RENUART, supra note 13, § 3.9. The federal regulators have at times claimed authority to
preempt state prepayment penalty and balloon prohibitions and at times left these to state
law. Id.
29. Colton, supra note 15, at 12-13. For an explanation of securitization of home loans,
see infra note 37.
30. The government did not bring a single home loan mortgage redlining case under
the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3619, 3631, or the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1691-1691f, until 1992 in United States v. Decatur Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n,
No. I 92-CV-2198-CAM (N.D. Ga. Sept. 17, 1992). John Goering & Ron Wienk, An Over-
view, in MORTGAGE LENDING, RACIAL DIsCRiMINATION, AND FEDERAL POLICY 401, 420-21
(John Goering & Ron Wienk eds., 1996).
31. Between 1975 and 1997, consolidation led to a 40% drop in the number of bank
and thrift lenders. Ross & YINGER, supra note 17, at 23. This particularly affected minority
communities; a U.S. News & World Report study found that in 1970, the number of bank
branches per person in minority and white neighborhoods was roughly equal, but by 1993,
there were only a third as many branches per person in minority neighborhoods as in
white neighborhoods. Penny Loeb et al., The New Redlining, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr.
17, 1995, at 51.
32. Klausner, supra note 25, at 1566.
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servicing costs with automated underwriting. 33 Whereas lenders were
once limited to using a few objective independent univariate criteria
for underwriting plus a degree of subjectivity provided by the human
underwriter, today lenders can use multivariate regression-based ob-
jective risk modeling. Computer capacity allows such modeling to use
millions of data points mined from past borrowers, their loans, and
their personal and collateral characteristics to generate a constantly
updated predictive tool that is more accurate and more sensitive to
the interactions among variables. Each small change in one variable
can be met by a change in another variable; for example, a high debt-
to-income ratio that might have led to a per se rejection in the old
underwriting method can now be "outweighed" by a low LTV and a
strong credit history.
Now that prices are no longer restricted by legal regulation, a
change in price can be combined with other variables to result in a
constant predicted return to the lender regardless of the riskiness of
the loan. As a result, lenders today can price discriminate based on
risk rather than grossly pricing credit.3 4 Lenders' potential to predict
loan performance may not be realized where the cost of gathering
information needed for input into the lender's underwriting model
remains high. For example, credit reporting agencies may not have
dossiers on borrowers who have not been part of the traditional credit
market.3 5 But the cost of collecting, storing, and analyzing more and
more credit-relevant data is inexorably decreasing. The observable re-
sult, as theory would predict, has been a move toward risk-based pric-
ing and away from credit rationing's limits on loan price, risk, and
33. Straka, supra note 20, at 210-18. Individual creditworthiness data is gathered by
credit reporting agencies and, typically using a proprietary model developed by Fair, Isaac
and Co., turned into an individual's credit (FICO) score. Individual lenders (and/or the
GSEs for a loan the originator intends to sell to a GSE) translate this credit score and other
borrower, loan, and collateral information into a prediction of loan performance, some-
times called an "origination score," using their own proprietary models. Ross & YINGER,
supra note 17, at 22-23; Straka, supra note 20, at 211-14.
34. Thus, assumptions previously made by some economists and policymakers that
lenders must price credit grossly and cannot price discriminate with respect to individual
consumers are not generally true today. Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Informa-
tion in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L.
REv. 1387, 1462 (1983).
35. See Klausner, supra note 25, at 1567-68 (theorizing that the costs of acquiring infor-
mation about potential borrowers in low-income areas may lead lenders to rationally forgo
such lending opportunities). Discrimination wrought by redlining and the subjectivejudg-
ment of loan underwriters in the old world of mortgage credit can thus infect the new
world, even as objective credit modeling creates the possibility of greater fairness in access
to credit.
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supply as lenders have gained the ability to better sort borrowers ac-
cording to risk and CoSt. 3
6
Large scale securitization 7 of home loans starting in the early
1990s has further expanded the availability of credit, particularly from
nondepository lenders not regulated by federal banking authorities."
Legal changes in the mid-1980s that allowed for the development of
the private home loan securities market laid the groundwork,39 but
the ability of securities markets to use computer data modeling to
more accurately price loan pools created the drive to securitization.4 °
36. A 2003 American Bankers Association report explains:
[O]ver two decades ago, Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss demonstrated that it
was rational for lenders to ration credit where they could not accurately identify
the riskiest borrowers .... With the development and refinement of credit scor-
ing techniques, lenders are now able to classify borrowers by their risk characteris-
tics and thus are able to price their loans accordingly.
Litan, supra note 3, at 7 n.6; see also Raphael W. Bostic & Brian J. Surette, Have the Doors
Opened Wider? Trends in Homeownership by Race & Income, 23 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 411,
420-21 (2001); Michael Collins et al., Exploring the Welfare Effects of Risk-Based Pricing in the
Subprime Mortgage Market 2-3 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Working Paper
BABC 04-8, 2004); Wendy Edelberg, Risk-Based Pricing of Interest Rates in Household Loan
Markets 2-4 (Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys. Fin. & Econ., Discussion Series No. 2003-62,
2003); Alan Greenspan, Former Federal Reserve Chairman, Remarks Before the Indepen-
dent Community Bankers of America National Convention in San Antonio, Texas: Bank
Regulation (Mar. 11, 2005), available at http://wAw.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
speeches/2005/2005031 1/default.htm.
37. Securitization is the process of obtaining financing by selling the pooled rights to
future income stream from individual receivables, here, mortgage loans. Whole loans can
be pooled and securitized, or they can be divided into future interest, principal, and pre-
payment penalty payment streams or "strips." Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy,
Predatory Lending. What Does Wall Street Have to Do with It?, 15 Hous. POLY DEBATE 715, 718
(2004). See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, I STAN. J.L. Bus.
& FIN. 133 (1994).
38. The market share of originations by nondepository lenders (mortgage companies)
was about 60% in 2000, roughly paralleling the share of originations funded through the
secondary market. Colton, supra note 15, at 34 fig.6, 36 fig.8. Note, however, that many of
these nondepository lenders are affiliated with lenders regulated by the federal banking
authorities; many bank holding companies have both prime banking units and subprime
lending units or affiliates. See Edward M. Gramlich, Federal Reserve Board Governor, Re-
marks at the Financial Services Roundtable Annual Housing Policy Meeting, Chicago, Ill.:
Subprime Mortgage Lending: Benefits, Costs, and Challenges (May 21, 2004), at tbl.4,
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040521 /default.
htn (demonstrating that in 2002, commercial banks and thrifts accounted for 41% of sub-
prime originations and subsidiaries and affiliates of banks accounted for 47% of subprime
originations, leaving only 12% of these originations to independent mortgage companies).
39. Colton, supra note 15, at 12.
40. See Michael LaCoeur-Little, The Evolving Role of Technology in Mortgage Finance, 11 J.
Hous. REs. 173, 192-94 (2000) (explaining that in the mid-1990s, e.g., computer processor
conversion from 386 to Pentium chips reduced the secondary market's valuation time for
each home mortgage by a factor of ten and the advent of the Internet reduced the time
and expense of securitization transactions).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Voi. 65:707
As a result, the share of mortgages funded through the secondary
market more than doubled from 1984 to 2001, when it reached about
60% of home loan originations.4 About half of these are securitized
through the GSEs, but an increasing proportion are issued by private
conduits. 42
Collectively, these changes have ushered in what is called "sub-
prime" lending, meaning home loans at prices higher than those
available in the traditional low-risk "prime" market, justified in theory
by the increased costs and risks entailed in lending to a broader and
less creditworthy borrower market." Between 1993 and 2004, sub-
prime lending increased from less than 1% to over 20% of the market
in originations, with over one trillion dollars in outstanding subprime
loans as of the first quarter of 2005.44 While loan sharks have always
existed to provide some high-cost loans to risky borrowers, only with
the inflow of money from Wall Street through securitization could the
41. Colton, supra note 15, at 36 fig.8.
42. Ross & YINGER, supra note 17, at 22 (reporting on loans sold in 2000); McCarthy &
Peach, supra note 26, at 142.
43. Banking regulators define "subprime borrowers" as those with one of the following:
two or more thirty-day delinquencies in the last year; one or more sixty-day delinquency in
the last two years;judgment, foreclosure, repossession, or charge-off in the last two years;
bankruptcy in the last five years; or a debt-service-to-income ratio of 50% or higher. Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, Economic Issues in Predatory Lending 8 n.§ (July 30,
2003) (unpublished working paper) [hereinafter OCC Working Paper]. While "subprime"
was thus originally defined with reference to the credit quality of the borrower, no lender
reports data by creditworthiness characteristics. Subprime versus prime lending was there-
fore estimated by identity of the lender as one who primarily served one market or the
other.
However, new reporting requirements for loans covered by the Home Mortgage Dis-
closure Act (HMDA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (2000), are likely to effectively define sub-
prime loans by price. HMDA-reporting lenders must now report price information for
home loans they originate at prices above certain thresholds. The threshold for first-lien
loans is three points above the prevailing rate on Treasury securities of comparable matur-
ity; for subordinate mortgages, the threshold is five points above that rate. The Federal
Reserve Board chose these thresholds "in the belief that they would exclude the vast major-
ity of prime-rate loans and include the vast majority of subprime-rate loans." Press Release,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Frequently Asked Ques-
tions About the New HMDA Data 3-4 (Mar. 31, 2005), available at http://www.occ.gov/ftp/
release/2005-37a.pdf. With no existing definition of prime and subprime by loan charac-
teristics, the reporting requirements themselves are likely to create these definitions.
44. See Anthony Pennington-Cross et al., Credit Risk and Mortgage Lending: Who Uses Sub-
prime and Wy? I (Res. Inst. for Hous. Am., Working Paper No. 00-03, 2000) (citing HMDA
data that subprime home loan market share was 0.74% in 1993); Subprime Market Share
Nears 25%, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Feb. 28, 2005, at 1 (reporting $608 billion in subprime
home loans originated in 2004, a market share of 21.8%); Subprime Servicers Crack the $1
Trillion Outstanding Mark in '05, INSIDE B&C LENDING, June 6, 2005, at I (reporting $1.01
trillion in subprime mortgages outstanding as of March 2005).
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volume of loans from unregulated lenders reach today's
proportions.
4 5
Only between 10% and 20% of subprime loans are used for home
purchases.4 6 Instead, most subprime loans are home equity loans or
cash out refinancings, meaning that the borrower is taking equity out
of the home, primarily for debt consolidation and general consumer
credit purposes.47 The reason for this is that most homebuyers, partic-
ularly first-time homebuyers, have not amassed large downpayments.
Accordingly, most purchase money loans do not involve large up-front
fees or points and are at high LTVs, with little equity remaining in the
home as security for the loan. Conversely, subprime loans generally
rely more heavily on the equity in the home and up-front fees, in addi-
tion to higher interest rates, to cover higher origination, servicing,
and default risk costs than do prime loans.48 Because subprime lend-
ers require more equity to secure the loan, subprime loans are less
likely to be used for home purchase.49
45. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL & STATE AGEN-
CIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING, GAO-04-280, at 6 (Jan. 2004)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT] ("[T] he secondary market may... inadvertently serve to facili-
tate predatory lending, both by providing a source of funds for unscrupulous originators to
quickly sell off loans with predatory terms and by reducing incentives for these originators
to ensure that borrowers can repay their loans."); Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Preda-
tory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REv. 503,
534-52 (2002); OCC Working Paper, supra note 43, at 5 (attributing "skyrocket[ing]" of
subprime lending in the 1990s in part to "increased securitization ... which facilitated
expanded capital flows to the subprime market").
46. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URB. DEv. & U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, RECOMMENDA-
TIONS TO CURB PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 29, 31 (June 20, 2000) [hereinafter
HUD-TREASURY REPORT] (reporting that 80% of subprime loans in HMDA data, and 82%
according to industry data, are refinancing loans, while an additional number are home
improvement loans); id. at 3 ("A majority of mortgages in the subprime market are used
for consumer debt rather than housing [purchase or home equity] purposes."); 2000
House Hrg., supra note 3, at 386 (testimony of Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Associate Professor
of Law, Drake University) (reporting that for the largest subprime lenders, only 10% of
their loans were for home purchase).
47. HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 46, at 26.
48. See, e.g., JOHN C. WEICHER, THE HOME EQUITY LENDING INDUSTRY: REFINANCING
MORTGAGES FOR BORROWERS WITH IMPAIRED CREDIT 60-61 & tbl.4.4 (1997) (stating that
based upon industry figures, the median LTV for subprime mortgages was 70%); Howard
Lax et al., Subprime Lending: An Investigation of Economic Efficiency, 15 HOUS. POL'Y DEBATE
533, 537, 540 (2004) (finding that subprime loans typically have lower LTVs than prime
loans). Wall Street discussions of securities backed by pools of subprime loans count
"overcollateralization"-low LTVs-as enhancing the value of the securities. See, e.g., BofA,
Leaving Subprime, Sets Couple of Records, CREDIT & COLLECTIONS WORLD, Jan. 7, 2002, http://
www.collectionsworld.com/news/010702-2.htm [hereinafter CREDIT & COLLECTIONS
WORLD].
49. At first blush, increasing homeownership rates combined with increasing default
rates in the 1990s might seem to be evidence for a story of expanding homeownership
through riskier subprime loans, some of which fail but others of which do not. However,
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In addition to facilitating riskier, pricier subprime lending and
secondary market investment in that lending, computer-driven finan-
cial modeling also allows home loans today to be structured and
priced in a mind-boggling array of ways. Particularly in the subprime
sector, although increasingly in the prime market as well,5" the days of
cookie-cutter thirty-year fully amortizing home loans are gone. Due to
what has been termed "nichification," loan structuring and pricing
can be extremely transaction specific, reflecting a host of borrower,
property, market, and loan features.5" The note rate alone can be
complicated; in addition to or without adjusting the rate with the
movement of a common index, an ARM can adjust automatically up-
the fact that subprime loans are infrequently used for home purchase undermines this
view. To the contrary, homeownership rates would have increased more during the 1990s,
absent the loss of homeownership caused by predatory refinancings and second mort-
gages. See, e.g., Roberto G. Quercia et al., Assessing the Impact of North Carolina's Predatory
Lending Law, 15 Hous. POL'Y DEBATE 573, 587-88 & tbl.3 (2004) (providing empirical evi-
dence that predatory practices are concentrated in the refinancing market).
Recent expansion in homeownership has been largely due to the strong economy in
the 1990s, decreases in processing costs due to automation, Bostic & Surette, supra note 36,
at 420-21, decreases in costs of funds due to securitization, James W. Kolari et al., The Effects
of Securitization on Mortgage Market Yields: A Cointegration Analysis, 26 REAL EST. ECON. 677,
679 (1998), the near elimination of downpayment requirements for prime purchase
money loans, Irna Barakova et al., Does Credit Quality Matter for Homeownership? 22 (U.S.C.
Lusk Center for Real Estate, Working Paper No. 2003-1014, 2003), available at http://www.
usc.edu/schools/sppd/lusk/pdf/wp 2003_1014.pdf., and, possibly, prime lender out-
reach to low-income borrowers pursuant to the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), 12
U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (2000), Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvest-
ment Act and Its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 513, 561-76 (2005).
50. Within the last few years, standardization of terms and pricing in the prime market
has decreased, potentially introducing the problems currently more prevalent in the sub-
prime market to the prime market. Until recently, the cost to the lender of price and term
nichification in the prime market was not worth the added returns to be garnered thereby;
a separating equilibrium had formed between subprime loans with high processing (appli-
cation and loan structuring) costs and prime loans with low processing costs. Joseph Nich-
ols et al., Borrower Self-Selection, Underwriting Costs, and Subprime Mortgage Credit Supply, 30 J.
REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 197, 215 (2005). Either the processing costs have decreased or the
returns to those costs have increased, as is evidenced by the increasing use of interest-only,
variable-rate, and other creatively structured loans in the prime market. See, e.g., Tara
Siegel Bernard, Buy Now, Pay Later, WALL ST.J., Mar. 28, 2005, at R5 (noting that 33% of all
new home loans are now interest-only and outlining a variety of newly common loan struc-
tures that diverge from the fully amortizing thirty-year fixed-rate product); Kenneth R.
Harney, Low Down-Payment Loans Can Prove Costly to Unwary, BALT. SUN, Jan. 16, 2005, at IL
(reporting securities market concerns about default and foreclosure potential of recent
interest-only and "no doc" home loan mortgages that are "flooding" the home loan
market).
51. Jack Guttentag, Another View of Predatory Lending 12 (Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr., Work-
ing Paper No. 01-23-B, 2000). Guttentag describes a software system commonly used for
home loan pricing. When developed in the early 1990s, the system used only a few pieces
of data to determine loan price. A decade later, the system used so many factors to deter-
mine price that there were forty million possible combinations of pricing factors. Id.
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ward each year, or in certain years, by a certain amount regardless of
index movement. For example, the rate could begin fixed for three
years and then convert to an adjustable rate (a 3/1 ARM), or begin at
one rate and then move up by a percentage point each year for two
years before it hits its regular rate (a 2/1 buydown), or some combina-
tion of these.52
The total loan price can be extracted through a host of loan
terms and ancillary items in addition to the interest rate. Origination
fees, meaning anything charged as part of origination, can be a large
component of a loan's price. These fees include points that may or
may not buydown the interest rate and a host of 'junk fees" (e.g., doc-
ument preparation fees, underwriting analysis fees, tax escrow fees,
escrow fund analysis fees). 5' A lender can use inflated prices for ancil-
lary products, such as credit insurance, to extract more from the bor-
rower. 54 When financed into the loan, origination fees and ancillary
products form the basis for additional interest charges over the life of
the loan. During the loan repayment period, late fees and foreclosure
fees can be quite lucrative.55 Prepayment penalties have become such
a major source of cash flow that they can be securitized apart from the
interest and principal payment stream components of home loans.56
Computer price modeling means there need not be any correla-
tion between the components of the cost of the loan to the lender and
the components of the price of the loan as charged to the borrower.
That is, there need not be any correlation between origination costs
and what are called "origination fees" or between costs due to delin-
quency or default and what are called "late fees" or "foreclosure fees."
52. Dave Hershman, Stay Afloat with Innovation, MORTGAGE BANKING, Jan. 1988, at 39,
41-42. A variety of terms are used for the same or similar products. Freddie Mac calls a
buydown a "graduated payment mortgage" on its website for consumers, see Freddie Mac,
CreditSmart: Glossary, http://www.freddiemac.com/creditsmart/glossary/glossary.html
(last visited Mar. 23, 2006), but calls it a buydown on its website for industry, see Freddie
Mac, Temporary Subsidy Buydown Mortgages, http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/fact
sheets/tempsubbuydown.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
53. FANNIE MAE, NATIONAL HOUSING SURVEY 2001, at 6 (2002) [hereinafter 2001 NAT'L
Hous. SURVEY].
54. See, e.g., Brian Collins, Citi Pays $215 Million to Settle Alleged Fraud at Associates, NAT'L
MORTGAGE NEWS, Sept. 23, 2002, at 2 ("It was not uncommon for Associates to charge
$5,000 for credit insurance on a $35,000 loan and add it to the loan amount."). Lenders
receive average commissions of 30% on sales of single-premium credit insurance. HUD-
TREASURY REPORT, supra note 46, at 88 n.84.
55. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Harney, Fairbanks Capital Settles with HUD, WASH. POST, Nov. 1,
2003, at F1 (recounting story of borrower who was charged over $3500 in late fees and
related charges); Bar-Gill, supra note 6, at 1393 (late fees in credit card contracts are a
significant source of revenue for lenders).
56. Engel & McCoy, supra note 37, at 718.
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The note interest rate, adjusted downward for any points paid at clos-
ing, has traditionally reflected various components of the lender's
costs-cost of funds, risk to lender's return due to borrower default or
prepayment, and servicing costs-yet today the interest rate need not
reflect these costs nor need it be adjusted to account for points paid.
Rather, a lender can creatively manipulate each component of the
price of a loan to effect a desired predicted return. For example, a
loan can carry no origination fee but a higher interest rate to cover
origination costs so long as it also carries a prepayment penalty to
guarantee that even if the borrower refinances before interest pay-
ments cover origination costs, the lender will recover these costs.
In theory, creative loan structuring and price nichification can be
beneficial to consumers. Pricing nichification could help moderately
credit-impaired "A minus" borrowers because loans can be more accu-
rately priced, rather than lumping a range of borrower risk types to-
gether, with the lower risk "A minus" types in that group, in effect,
subsidizing the higher risk "D" types.5 7 Product nichification can also
theoretically provide loan terms better suited to each individual bor-
rower's needs. Creatively structured products all have some legitimate
uses. A doctor in residency could benefit from a loan with a monthly
payment amounts that starts low butjumps up simultaneously with the
increase in income she expects when her residency ends. A borrower
who knows she will receive a trust fund on a particular date, or a
homeowner planning to sell her home at retirement, could benefit
from a loan that has a balloon maturing at the appropriate time. In
some scenarios, manipulation of the prices of various aspects of the
transaction can help a borrower obtain a wise, not unduly risky, and
fairly priced loan for which the borrower would otherwise not qualify.
However, nichification also means consumers today are faced
with a "bewildering array" of home loan products.58 Evidence from
the field indicates that complex loan products developed to satisfy
small niche markets are now being sold to a broader range of borrow-
57. See, e.g., Collins et al., supra note 36, at 4-7 (describing the benefits of more finely
grained risk-based pricing over crude credit rationing). In theory, lenders can also de-
velop expertise within a limited niche, which could lead to greater efficiencies passed on to
borrowers.
58. WILLIAM APGAR ET AL., JOINT CTR. FOR Hous. STUDIES, REPORT No. CCC04-1,
CREDIT, CAPITAL & COMMUNITIES: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHANGING MORTGAGE BANKING
INDUSTRY FOR COMMUNITY BASED ORGANIZATIONS 5 (2004); see alsojinkook Lee &Jeanne M.
Hogarth, The Price of Money: Consumers' Understanding of APRs and Contract Interest Rates, 18J.
PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 66, 67 (1999) (explaining that complexity of financial informa-
tion,jargon used by creditors, and proliferation of credit product choices all contribute to
consumer lack of understanding of price of credit).
[VOL. 65:707
THE PROBLEM OF PREDATORY LENDING: PRICE
ers, for whom these products are not always appropriate. 59 Compari-
son shopping is more difficult for loans with nonstandardized
structures because consumers must determine how to trade off, e.g.,
origination fees, interest rates, and prepayment penalties. Consumers
must make extensive financial forecasts to accurately assess the suita-
bility of loans with increasing monthly payment structures, balloons,
or prepayment penalties.
Compounding these difficulties, nichification also means that
subprime loan terms and prices cannot be effectively advertised.6 °
Within the prime market, lenders continue for the most part to en-
gage in average cost pricing, meaning that once the borrower meets a
creditworthiness threshold, loans are priced to reflect the lender's av-
erage cost of funds over all prime borrowers, from the most to the
least risky.6 Although this is starting to change, prime lenders usually
offer a small number of loan structures (e.g., fixed rate or an indexed
adjustable rate, fifteen- or thirty-year term). Each structure has a cor-
responding price that is charged to all prime borrowers, with some
variation depending on loan type (e.g., purchase money, refinance, or
FHA).62 Prime lenders will frequently advertise the price for a single,
popular product such as a thirty-year fixed rate conventional loan.
The prices for their other products usually do not differ greatly and
are made easily accessible to the applicant who wants to price shop,
frequently through the newspaper or Internet.63
In contrast, subprime loan pricing is too complicated and varia-
ble to advertise prices. As a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development report notes: "With the adoption of risk-based pric-
ing . . . , consumers may not be able to shop around for rates using
advertisements-no one rate can be advertised that would be offered
to all borrowers."64 Even a competitive pricing structure for subprime
loans will result in a range of prices according to the cost and risk
59. A recent article in The American Banker describes extensive "changes in thresholds
for granting loans and terms that were once considered niche products" such as "wide-
spread consumer and lender acceptance of mortgages with the potential for severe pay-
ment shocks or gradual escalation in monthly payments." Shenn, supra note 20, at 1.
60. For further discussion, see infra Part IV.A.2.
61. KENNETH TEMKIN ET AL., SUBPRIME MARKETS, THE ROLE OF GSEs, AND RIsK-BASED
PRICING 27 (U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. Mar. 2002).
62. HUD-TREAsuR' REPORT, supra note 46, at 2 (citing "greater homogeneity in loan
terms" in prime market).
63. Cf. Pennington-Cross et al., supra note 44, at iv ("[W]hy do subprime lenders not
advertise more, and why do local newspapers not publish, as they do for prime lenders,
current interest rates and fees for local subprime lending institutions?"). But see supra
note 50, for evidence that products in the prime market are becoming less standardized.
64. TEMKIN ET AL., supra note 61, at 32.
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presented by each borrower and loan. There are no generic stan-
dards defining which borrower qualifies for which price. Pricing for-
mulae are complicated and change rapidly in response to feedback
from the market about current loan performance. Therefore, a sub-
prime lender cannot transmit sufficient information in an advertise-
ment for a borrower to identify the price for which she would qualify
from that lender.
The result is that subprime loan pricing and structure are non-
transparent to many consumers, creating information asymmetries be-
tween borrowers and loan sellers that can be exploited by the latter.
In the process of setting a subprime loan's individualized price, loan
sellers can add a discretionary element (or "overage") to the price,
limited only by the price negotiations, if any, between borrower and
lender.65 Analysts reporting on securities backed by subprime loan
pools deem "excess spread"-i.e., note interest rates above what the
borrowers' cost and risk profiles would call for-to be a "credit en-
hancement" for the loan pool.6 6 The nonuniformity resulting from
risk-based pricing and the opacity resulting from nichification and
lack of price advertising create opportunities for sellers to exercise
discretion in mortgage pricing to the detriment of borrowers.67
The home loan marketplace today is thus a very different one
than existed in the middle of the twentieth century, or even in 1990.
Loan supply is limited only by the willingness of investors to purchase
mortgage backed securities. Loan risk is limited only by borrower self-
protection and the outside bounds within which the market can price
that risk to produce adequate returns for lenders or investors.
68
Loans terms are limited only by the creativity of the marketplace.
65. Avery et al., New Information Reported Under HMDA and Its Application in Fair Lending
Enforcement, 91 FED. RES. BULL. 344, 369-70 (2005) (listing "discretionary pricing" as among
the reasons for home loan price variation); TEMKIN ET AL., supra note 61, at 28 (noting that
in the subprime market, lenders adjust loan price based on the risk of the borrower and
the negotiating powers of the borrower and loan seller).
66. CREDIT & COLLECTIONS WORLD, supra note 48.
67. Collins et al., supra note 36, at 9 ("As products become more complex, the asymme-
try of information between well informed . . . and less well informed buyers and sellers
increases, and the potential for unfair, discriminatory, and inefficient transactions
grows."); Greenspan, supra note 36 ("The adoption of risk-based pricing, together with
elements of discretion that are often afforded loan officers or brokers in the pricing of
credit, does raise the concern that some borrowers, in fact, may not be treated fairly."); see
also Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of
Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1255, 1284-84 (2002) (contrasting relatively standardized
prime loans with more complicated subprime loans, and noting the increased comprehen-
sion difficulties created for subprime shoppers).
68. There is also some legal limit on risk through prohibitions on asset-based lending.
15 U.S.C. § 1639 (2000).
[VOL. 65:707
THE PROBLEM OF PREDATORY LENDING: PRICE
Loan prices are limited only by the price competitiveness of the mar-
ketplace. And loan price advertising persists in the prime market, but
not the subprime market.
3. Evidence of Predatory Home Lending.-An examination of home
lending today demonstrates that the marketplace is not very price
competitive, leading to overpriced home loans, and that borrowers
are not very self-protective when it comes to loan risk, leading to
overly risky home loans.
On average, subprime loan prices expressed as an annual per-
centage rate (APR)6 9 are about three to four points higher than prime
loan prices,7" a difference that can amount to significantly greater
monthly and total loan costs. A $100,000 thirty-year loan at 6.5% car-
ries monthly payments of about $630 and total finance charges of less
than $130,000; that same loan at 9.5% carries monthly payments of
about $840 and total finance charges of over $200,000.71 But some
subprime loans are at much higher prices than the average, leading to
astoundingly greater costs to the borrowers. In 2003, a year when
prime rates averaged less than 6% and points and fees averaged about
0.50%, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, and Household, all major U.S. lenders,
reported originating subprime loans with APRs exceeding 20%, and
Household originated loans with APRs in excess of 30%.72 A $100,000
thirty-year loan at 20% carries monthly payments of over $1670 and
total finance charges of over $500,000.
69. APR is roughly the cost of a loan, including interest, fees, and points, expressed as
an annual percentage rate, with the assumption that the borrower will hold the loan to
term. Freddie Mac, Credit Smart, Glossary, supra note 52.
70. TEMKIN ET AL., supra note 61, at 19 (reporting average prime loan APRs to be be-
tween 7% and 8%, and subprime loan APRs to be about 10% to 12% in 1999); Elizabeth
Laderman, Subprime Mortgage Lending and the Capital Markets, FRBSF ECON. LETTER (San
Francisco), Dec. 28, 2001, at 2 (showing industry data that loans originated by subprime
lenders averaged 3.7 points higher than loans originated by prime lenders from 1998 to
2001).
71. All calculations herein were performed using the amortization calculator on the
"Yahoo! Finance" website. Yahoo! Real Estate, Amortization Calculator, http://realestate.
yahoo.com/re/calculators/amortization.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
72. See KEVIN STEIN, CAL. REINVESTMENT COALITION, WHO REALLY GETS HOME LOANS?
YEAR ELEVEN: MORTGAGE LENDING TO AFRICAN-AMERICAN AND LATINO BORROWERS IN 5 CALI-
FORNIA COMMUNITIES IN 2003, at 2-3, 25 app. II (2005) (using data reported by lenders to
the California Department of Corporations); McCarthy & Peach, supra note 26, at 143
(noting that initial fees and charges for a mortgage averaged just over 0.50% in 2002); see
also WASiH. STATE DEP'T OF FIN. INSTS., EXPANDED REPORT OF EXAMINATIION FOR Household
Finance Corporation III passim (2002) [hereinafter HOUSEHOLD EXAMINATION] (reviewing
borrower complaints and finding home loans with interest rates ranging from 10% to 25%,
in many cases in addition to 7.25% in points).
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Although the higher prices of subprime loans are justified in the-
ory by higher anticipated costs to the lender, many subprime loans
exhibit signs of excessive price, more than would be justified by the
borrowers' risk and cost. It is estimated that as many as half of the
borrowers with subprime loans were qualified for lower prime interest
rate loans, based on their credit history and loan profile. 73 A 2004
memo from the vice president at a subprime subsidiary of Country-
wide, the largest mortgage lender in the United States, "encouraged
loan officers . . . to downgrade borrowers' credit ratings in order to
steer them into more expensive loans" and "suggest[ed] five ways loan
agents can steer borrowers, including those with good credit, into the
sub-prime category, including listing only one income when there are
two wage earners, increasing the amount of the loan and not listing
any of a borrower's assets." 74
Further, many of those with subprime credit profiles are being
charged much more than what their higher risk and cost should gar-
ner. The manner in which loans are graded varies by lender, but gen-
erally prime home loans are graded as "A" quality paper. Subprime
home loans are generally graded as "A minus" or "Alt A," "B," "C," and
"D" paper, in increasing order of price, in theory to correspond with a
declining order of borrower creditworthiness and predicted loan per-
formance. 75 An analysis of "A minus" loans, loans at the lowest risk
73. Federal Reserve Board Governor Gramlich explained: "[B]orrowers with FICO
[credit] scores below 620 are viewed as higher risk and generally ineligible for prime
loans .... But it is noteworthy that about half of subprime borrowers have FICO scores
above this threshold, indicating that a good credit history alone does not guarantee prime
status." Gramlich, supra note 38; see a/soJames H. Carr & Lopa Kolluri, Predatory Lending:
An Overview, in FINANCIAL SERVICES IN DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES: ISSUES & ANSWERS 31, 37
(Fannie Mae Found. ed., 2001) ("[R]esearch by Freddie Mac reports that as much as 35
percent of borrowers in the subprime market could qualify for prime market loans. Fannie
Mae estimates that number closer to 50 percent."); FREDDIE MAC, AUTOMATED UNDERWRIT-
ING: MAKING MORTGAGE LENDING SIMPLER AND FAIRER FOR AMERICA'S FAMILIES 5-6, 10-35
(1996), available at http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/reports/moseley/chap5.htm
(estimating 10% to 35%); see also STEIN, supra note 72, at 9 (explaining that Citigroup's
2003 review of borrowers who received loans from its subprime unit, Citifinancial, revealed
that over 25,000 of them were qualified for lower cost prime loans); Pennington-Cross et
al., supra note 44, at iv (concluding, in an industry-sponsored study "that borrowers may
not be consistently or appropriately assigned the right mortgage by the market").
74. Annette Haddad, Countrywide Fires Manager, Citing Ethics, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2004,
at Cl. Another subprime lender told investors that more than three-fourths of its high-cost
loans went to people with relatively good credit, and a former loan officer confirmed that
customers with A credit would pay the same prices as customers with D credit. Diana B.
Henriques & Lowell Bergman, Profiting from Fine Print with Wall Street's Help, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 2000, at Al.
75. In addition to borrower creditworthiness, loan performance predictions take pre-
payment risk and servicing costs into account. Pricing is not yet finely graduated into a
smooth price-performance line. Rather, loan performance is predicted roughly to sort
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level and lowest price level for subprime loans, found that at least 1%
of the note interest rate alone being charged to these borrowers could
not be explained by risk or cost of the loans.76 In addition to interest,
origination fees and points are frequently in excess of the slightly
higher origination costs to be expected for subprime risk loans, and
without any reduction in interest rates as is typically bought by points
paid in the prime market.77 The CEO of one predatory lender told
the New York Times that his company "had recently reduced its origina-
tion fees to an average of about 10 percent because of... the 'sound-
bite effect of the high origination fees.' ,78 This was after it had come
to light that the lender had been charging fees as high as 25%, in
addition to interest. 79
On the risk side, despite economic boom times in this country
and record homeownership rates, foreclosures on owner-occupied
dwellings during the mid- to late-1990s more than doubled in many of
the central cities where predatory loans are concentrated. s The New
York Times reported in April 2003: "[I]n the last nine years, despite a
decrease of 20 percent in foreclosures on prime-rate mortgages, the
loans into A through D price buckets. As information technology advances, pricing will no
doubt become more finely tuned. See Straka, supra note 20, at 228 ("Potentially, all or most
loans, regardless of risk, can be quickly approved and offered at statistically appropriate
competitive risk-based prices.").
76. Lax et al., supra note 48, at 567-69. This study examined note interest rates only
and did not consider the further differentials in pricing caused by higher origination
points and fees paid by subprime borrowers. Id. at 569.
77. Id. at 540. An examination of Household found that it was adding 7.25% in
"points" without lowering the borrower's interest rate. HOUSEHOLD EXAMINATION, supra
note 72 passim. Other subprime lenders charge fees of 7% to over 10%. Eric Stein, Quan-
tifying the Economic Cost of Predatory Lending 14-15 & nn.50-51 (Oct. 30, 2001) (unpub-
lished report prepared for the Coalition for Responsible Lending), reprinted in Predatory
Mortgage Lending: The Problem, Impact, and Responses: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Hous., and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter 2001 Sen. Hrg.].
78. Henriques & Bergman, supra note 74, at Al (emphasis added).
79. Id. The same article reported the story of a woman who thought she had borrowed
about $51,000, but later discovered she had signed for over $64,000 because 26% in fees
were added to the loan at origination. Id.
80. See, e.g., 2000 House Hrg., supra note 3, at 203-04 (statement of William Apgar, Assis-
tant Secretary for Housing and FHA Commissioner) (citing studies demonstrating that in
Chicago, foreclosures doubled between 1993 and 1998, and foreclosures of subprime loans
increased by a factor of forty; in Atlanta, although foreclosures overall decreased between
1996 and 1999, subprime foreclosures more than tripled and by 1999, were 16% of all
foreclosures but only 9% of originations); PA. Ass'N OF CMT. ORGS. FOR REFORM Now
(ACORN), EQUITY STRIPPERs: THE IMPACT OF SUBPRIME LENDING IN PHILADELPHIA (2000),
reprinted in 2001 Sen. Hrg, supra note 77, at 410, 414 (foreclosures in Philadelphia in-
creased over 100% between 1995 and 2000 due to increase in subprime originations and
foreclosures).
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national foreclosure rate has risen by 68 percent .... "81 As explained
above, subprime loans are predominately refinancings or second
mortgages, not home purchase loans, and therefore subprime lending
has not substantially increased homeownership rates. To the con-
trary, the most comprehensive national study of foreclosures and sub-
prime loans indicates that over 20% of all first-lien subprime
refinance loans originated in 1999 had entered foreclosure by Decem-
ber 2003, a mere four years later; 60% of these borrowers had lost
their homes and another 10% to 20% were still in foreclosure as of
December 2003.82 Some securitized subprime loan pools have fore-
closure rates as high as 28%.83 Subprime lenders are responsible for a
tremendous proportion of foreclosures, given that at the time most
subprime borrowers received the loans, they had a successful track
record of mortgage payments to their previous lender.84 Further, the
risk of foreclosure for many of these loans should have been evident
at the time of origination; subprime loans that result in foreclosure do
81. Dennis Hevesi, Jump in Subprime Loans Spurs Fight over Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25,
2003, at B1O. These figures, based on Federal Reserve data statistics, understate the true
subprime foreclosure rate because they exclude statistics on loans from finance companies,
a fertile source of subprime and predatory loans. See OCC Working Paper, supra note 43,
at 7 & n.*. (noting heavy participation of independent mortgage companies in the sub-
prime market).
82. ROBERTO G. QUERCIA ET AL., KENAN INST. FOR PRIVATE ENTER., THE IMPACT OF PRED-
ATORY LOAN TERMS ON SUBPRIME FORECLOSURES: The Special Case of Prepayment Penalties &
Balloon Payments 21-22, 31 tbl.1 (2005). The database used for this analysis represents 39%
of the subprime market in 1998 and 67% of that market in 2002. Id. at 12. Another study
reported that between 2000 and 2003, the number of foreclosure sales in Pennsylvania was
over 55,000, more than the number of households in Pennsylvania's third-largest city, and
attributed the majority of these foreclosures to subprime loans. PA. DEP'T OF BANKING,
LOSING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A REPORT ON RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES AND
ABusIvE LENDING PRACTICES IN PENNSYLVANIA 23-27 (2005).
83. 2000 House Hrg., supra note 3, at 385 (statement of Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Associ-
ate Professor of Law, Drake University). The loans in the particular pool examined were
originated in 1998 and examined in 2001, meaning that in about two years these loans
were already failing at these rates. Id. The loans were originated by WMC Mortgage, a
major wholesale lender. Id.; see also Sandra Fleishman, Landmark Predatory Lending Suit Set-
tled, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2005, at El (reporting a foreclosure rate of one in three loans
made over a three-year time period by one lender).
84. See, e.g., Harold L. Bunce et al., Subprime Foreclosures: The Smoking Gun of Predatory
Lending?, in HOUSING POLICY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 257, 266-
68 (Susan M. Wachter & R. Leo Penne, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. eds., 2001).
Although one would expect subprime loans to default at higher rates than prime loans
because many subprime loans are made to higher risk borrowers, there is nothing to indi-
cate that subprime borrowers know how very much higher their likelihood of foreclosure
is. Lenders, when selling these loans to consumers, work to convince borrowers otherwise.
See Deposition Testimony of Gene A. Marsh at 82-83, Pagter v. First Alliance Mortgage Co.,
No. CV766996 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 28, 1999) [hereinafter Marsh Testimony] (discussing
subprime lender training manual that explains to loan officers that "[t]he customers must
feel this loan is risk free for them").
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so about twice as quickly as do prime loans that end up in
foreclosure. 5
Moreover, the households paying these high prices and facing
this high risk of foreclosure are disproportionately African American,
Latino, and low- to moderate-income 6 households that already have
fewer financial resources to spare and significantly lower homeowner-
ship rates 7 to begin with. The elderly have also been particularly
hard hit."8 The targeting of minority and elderly communities for
predatory loans has been dubbed "reverse redlining." 9 The sum of
85. Bunce et al., supra note 84, at 263-65.
86. Of home loans originated in 2004 by lenders required to report price and race
data, about 32% of conventional purchase money loan and about 35% of conventional
refinance loans to African-Americans were priced above the threshold price spread set by
the Federal Reserve Board to approximate the dividing line between prime and subprime
mortgages (see supra note 43 for explanation of this dividing line), whereas the corre-
sponding figures for non-Hispanic white borrowers were about 9% and 13%, meaning that
black borrowers were three to four times more likely than white borrowers to receive sub-
prime loans. Avery et al., supra note 65, at 377 tbl.10 & 379. Despite Federal Reserve
Board researcher attempts to control for borrower, loan, and lender characteristics, some
race disparities remained otherwise unexplained. Id. Disparities were stark at some well-
known lenders. James R. Hagerty & Joseph T. Hallinan, Blacks Are Much More Likely to Get
Subprime Mortgages, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2005, at A2 ("At Washington Mutual Inc., the
nation's third-largest mortgage lender, blacks were about 4.4 times as likely as whites to pay
[higher, subprime] rates .... That compares with 3.3 at Wells Fargo & Co., the second
largest-mortgage lender [and] 2.8 at Countrywide Financial Corp., the No. I lender .... );
id. (showing that almost 50% of African Americans who borrowed in 2004 from one of
Citigroup's lenders have loans with APRs at least three points over the Treasury-bill rate,
whereas less than 20% of whites who borrowed from Citigroup have rates this high); Nich-
ols et al., supra note 50, at 214 (finding African Americans, Indians, Hispanics, and Asians
more likely to use subprime mortgages than whites, even after controlling for borrower
income, debt, and credit history); Carr & Kolluri, supra note 73, at 37 (stating that black
households have roughly twice the credit problems of, but obtain subprime refinance
loans at roughly four times the rate of, non-Latino white households).
87. Although national homeownership rates are at an all-time high of about 69%, gross
disparities exist within that number; the homeownership rate for non-Hispanic whites is
just over 75%, but the rates for African Americans and Latinos are just under 50%. U.S.
Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership: Annual Statistics 2005, http://
www.census/gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annualO5/annO5t20.htm (last visited Mar. 23,
2006).
88. See GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 99-105 (reporting on targeting of consumers
over age sixty-five for predatory home loans); HUD-TREASURy REPORT, supra note 46, at 36
(finding that loans to borrowers over age fifty-five constituted 35% of subprime mortgages
but only 21% of prime mortgages); MarshaJ. Courchane et al., Subprime Borrowers: Mortgage
Transitions and Outcomes, 29J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 365, 372 (2004) (finding that 20% of
subprime borrowers were over age fifty-five, whereas only 13% of prime borrowers were
this old).
89. E.g., Gregory D. Squires, The New Redlining, in WHY THE POOR PAY MORE: HOW TO
STOP PREDATORY LENDING 1, 3-4 (Gregory D. Squires ed., 2004) ("In other words, many of
those families and neighborhoods that have long been underserved by traditional lenders
find themselves victimized by what could be considered a form of reverse redlining. They
are offered far more in the way of financial "services" than is in their financial interests.").
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interest and fees charged on predatory loans at levels above what a
competitive market would produce is conservatively estimated to cost
affected U.S. consumers $9.1 billion annually,90 an average of $3800
per subprime loan household per year.9' Compare the $3800 per
household loss caused by predatory loan overpricing to the median
African-American household net worth of $7500 as of the 2000
Census.92
These statistics provide the outlines of the problem, but behind
these numbers lie the stories of borrower after borrower. One such
borrower tells her own story thus:
I grew up in West Virginia and went through the 6th
grade.... [I]n 1987, my husband Richard and I were very
proud that we were finally able to purchase our own small
home. He worked as a maintenance worker and passed away
in June 1994. I became the sole owner. In July 1994, I paid
off the $19,000 owed on the home from the insurance from
my husband's death. Before my husband's death, I had
never had a checking account or a credit card. I had always
paid my bills in cash and tried to be an upstanding, responsi-
ble citizen....
In 1995, I received a letter from Beneficial Finance of-
fering to lend me money to do home improvements. I
thought it was a good idea to put some new windows and a
new heating system in my home. I signed a loan with Benefi-
cial in May 1995 .... My monthly income at that time was
$458 from Social Security and my payments were more than
half of this. They took a loan on my house of about $11,921.
The very next month, Beneficial talked me into refinancing
the home loan for $16,256. I did not understand that every
time I did a new loan, I was being charged a bunch of fees.9 3
I began getting calls from people trying to refinance my
mortgage all hours of the day and night. I received a letter
from United Companies Lending telling me that I could save
90. Stein, supra note 77, at 2-3. These figures include financed single-premium credit
insurance, excessive up-front fees, prepayment penalties, and excess interest, but do not
include equity lost in foreclosures. Id.
91. This assumes that the $9.1 billion in losses are spread evenly over the 2.4 million
subprime loans cited by Stein. Id. at 14 n.49.
92. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NET WORTH AND ASSET OWNER-
SHIP OF HOUSEHOLDS: 1998 AND 2000, at 12 (2003). The net worth of white households was
just under $80,000. Id.
93. Note that this borrower was not alone in this misapprehension. Twenty-eight per-
cent of consumers responding to a 2001 national survey did not know that home mortgage
refinancing results in added fees. Marianne A. Hilgert et al., Household Financial Manage-
ment: The Connection Between Knowledge and Behavior, 89 FED. RES. BULL. 309, 313 (2003).
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money by paying off the Beneficial loan. On September 28,
1995, I signed papers in their office. More fees were added
and the loan went to $24,300, at an interest rate of 13.5
percent.
Just a few months later, I received a letter from Benefi-
cial telling me I could save money by paying off United and
going back to Beneficial....
In February 1996, Beneficial advised me that it was time
for me to refinance again. The loan papers show that I was
charged a finance charge of $18,192 plus other fees and an
interest rate of 14 percent. By the end of February, I had five
different loans in 10 months. I did not understand that they
were adding a lot of charges each time.
After that I was called by Equity One by telephone to
refinance .... On May 28, 1996, I signed papers with Equity
One . . . which ... increased my total loan from $45,000 to
over $64,000. I got $21.70 cash out of the loan....
Then on June 13, Equity One suggested that I needed
another loan to pay off a side debt and they loaned me
$1,960, at over 26 percent interest.... This loan brought my
monthly payments to Equity One to $434 a month. My
monthly income . . . was $470....
Then on August 13, Equity One started me on another
loan . . . to help me by lowering my payments. This loan
included $2,770 in new fees and costs. There were a whole
lot of papers with this . . . loan that I did not understand.
The payments were still too much.
I missed my first payment ... in December 1996....
[T] hey would not take a late payment from me unless I made
up for the missed payment. I could not do it. Later in 1997,
94I lost my home to foreclosure ....
B. A New Definition of Predatory Lending
The Chairs of both the Senate Banking Committee and the
House Financial Services Committee have complained that predatory
lending cannot be defined, 95 but I offer a new definition of the term,
based on the two first-order harms to borrowers that have been ob-
94. 2001 Sen. Hrg., supra note 77, at 18-19 (statement of Mary Podelco).
95. See Michele Heller, HousePanel Calls Reg Reform Priority, AM. BANKER, Apr. 5, 2001, at
4, 4 (quoting U.S. House Financial Services Chair Michael Oxley as saying, "I might suggest
we look at enforcing the existing statutes and regulations before we go whole-hog at going
after something as difficult to define as predatory lending."); Michele Heller & Rob
Garver, Gramm Takes Stand Against Predator Bills, AM. BANKER, Aug. 24, 2000, at 1, 1 (2000)
(quoting U.S. Senate Banking Chair Phil Gramm as saying, "[T]here is no definition of
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served in today's home loan market: overpriced and overly risky
loans.96
Overpriced loans would include: (1) high-priced subprime loans
given to "A" grade borrowers, borrowers who present a prime, low risk
and cost profile to the lender; and (2) subprime loans to borrowers
who present a subprime risk and cost profile, but at prices beyond
what these risks and costs should garner, such as a "C" loan given to a
"B" borrower. An overpriced loan is priced higher than otherwise
comparable loans that were available on the market to the borrower
and at a greater savings than the tangible search costs that the bor-
rower would have incurred by price shopping. The line between over-
priced and competitively priced loans can thus be drawn by reference
to market data. As Part III of this Article explains in detail, overpriced
loans are priced97 to exploit borrower vulnerabilities, rather than
through a price-competitive market.
Overly risky loans are loans that present a high risk of foreclosure
and loss of home to the borrower when other, less harmful and on the
whole preferable, alternatives to such a loan exist. Alternatives could
include: declaring bankruptcy but taking a homestead exemption;
selling the home on the open market rather than losing it at a foreclo-
sure sale;9 8 and/or forgoing the benefits of the loan, i.e., the loan
proceeds. Overly risky loans are loans that leave the borrower in the
position of such a risk of default and loss of equity in the home that
the loan itself is financially unwise and would not have been taken but
for exploitation of borrower vulnerabilities. A loan presenting appro-
priate risk, on the other hand, is one that is based on an objectively
reasonable forecast that the borrower is highly likely to repay, rather
than a loan made in anticipation of default and forfeiture of the un-
derlying home asset. The line between higher-than-prime-risk sub-
predatory lending . . . I don't know how we can hope to address the problem before we
have decided what it is.").
96. I exclude from my definition predatory servicing practices, a problem distinct from
the attributes of the loans and that can occur with any type of loan. Predatory servicing
also has a "price" component-when the servicer extracts unwarranted or inflated fees
from the borrowers-and a "risk" component-when the servicer improperly causes bor-
rowers to go into default and foreclosure. See generally Kurt Eggert, Limiting Abuse and
Opportunism by Mortgage Servicers, 15 Hous. POLY DEBATE 753, 756-61 (2004).
97. "Priced" here is shorthand for some amalgamated value of both formal price terms
and nonprice terms of the loan that have a financial value to the lender and cost to the
borrower, such as prepayment penalties and arbitration clauses.
98. A foreclosure sale being likely to be both: (1) more emotionally costly than an
ordinary sale, over which the homeowner has some sense of agency and control; and (2)
less financially profitable than an ordinary sale, given the inefficiency of foreclosure
markets.
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prime lending and overly risky predatory lending is not possible to
draw without a defined ceiling of maximum acceptable risk levels,
and/or a cost-benefit analysis of the loan and alternatives to that loan.
This line-drawing involves a host of normative calls and will be the
subject of a subsequent article.
Although a prime loan could be predatory if it were overpriced
and/or overly risky, the prime market traditionally has been quite
price-competitive and has involved very low risk. This is because: (1)
the cost to sellers of distinguishing between the small differences in
risk and cost among prime risk borrowers has been higher than the
returns to be had from offering lower prices to the very lowest risk and
cost "A plus" customers, and so the prime market has continued to
involve mostly standardized, advertised terms and prices;99 and (2)
prime borrowers, for a variety of reasons, can more easily focus on
price during home loan shopping. 00 Therefore, as a practical matter,
predatory lending has been a subset of subprime lending.01 How-
ever, this may be changing, particularly on the risk side, as more com-
plex and higher risk loan products enter the prime market. 1 2
Even more than subprime loans generally, predatory loans are
almost always refinancings or second mortgages because equity in the
home, not usually present for purchase money loans, is needed to
drive the process. The predatory lender typically extracts a high price
through large up-front fees financed by existing equity and profits
from high-risk loans through the equity that can be recovered at
foreclosure.1
0 3
While a loan on overly high-risk terms could be made on fair
price terms, and a loan on opportunistic noncompetitive price terms
could be on appropriate risk terms, the two harms can be related.
From the borrower's perspective, inflated price terms can create
99. See infra Part V.A.1.
100. See infra Part III.A.3.
101. See HUD-TREASURv REPORT, supra note 46, at 2 ("While predatory lending can occur
in the prime market, it is ordinarily deterred in that market by competition among lend-
ers, greater homogeneity in loan terms and greater financial information among
borrowers.").
102. See supra note 50.
103. Thus, most predatory loans are at low LTVs. An exception occurs when a preda-
tory lender refinances a borrower repeatedly, charging fees and prepayment penalties at
each flip, until there is no equity left in the home, preventing the borrower from refinanc-
ing elsewhere. On paper, a foreclosure appears to cost the lender because equity does not
cover the face value of the loan. However, the lender could find such a series of loans
profitable on account of multiple financed fees and penalties. See GAO REPORT, supra note
45, at 4 (recognizing that, due to up-front fees, lenders can make high returns even on
loans that default).
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higher risk to the extent that a borrower, who might have a high likeli-
hood of being able to make payments on competitive price terms, is
less likely to be able to afford the monthly payments on an overpriced
loan and therefore is placed at high risk of default.1"4 Risk of default
is partly endogenous to the loan transaction in a number of other
respects as well. The longer the loan period the more opportunities
for adverse life events to interfere with the ability to make payments.
A large balloon payment can create a risk of default if refinancing or
payoff is not possible when the balloon comes due. A larger total loan
means that there is less equity in the home to extract through a refi-
nancing to tide a borrower through loan payments during an adverse
life event.
Risk of default is certainly partly exogenous, varying with, e.g.,
economic conditions generally, neighborhood and property apprecia-
tion conditions, and the borrower's personal ability and willingness to
make payments. But that the risk of default is not entirely exogenous
can be seen from the fact that risky predatory loans are typically
refinancings, often on higher price and risk terms than the mortgages
previously held by the homeowners and successfully paid by them
each month. 1
0 5
The new definition I propose here differs significantly from the
definitions proposed in the literature on predatory lending to date.
Others have offered two sorts of definitions of the term. The first de-
fines predatory lending as outright fraud: deception of the rational
wealth-maximizing consumer achieved through incomplete or inaccu-
rate disclosures, resulting in a loan on terms the consumer would not
have agreed to had the disclosures been properly given. As the execu-
tive director of the National Home Equity Mortgage Association, a ma-
jor subprime home lending industry trade group, has stated: "The
104. Cf Kirstin Downey, Disparities Found in Sub-Pime Lending, WASH. POST, Apr. 11,
2005, at A2 (quoting Wharton School Professor Susan M. Wachter as stating that subprime
loans "respond to risk and create risk").
105. Risk affects pricing on the seller's side because sellers attempt to price loans so as
to ensure at least a competitive (if not higher) rate of return, over a pool of loans, based on
default and prepayment likelihood, cost of origination and servicing, and opportunity costs
(cost of funds). Generally, loans with higher probabilities of default should be priced
higher to cover the probabilistically anticipated losses of principal and future interest pay-
ment streams and collection costs caused by default. Various pricing mechanisms, such as
ARMs that adjust with indexed interest rates and prepayment penalties, can reduce lender
opportunity cost risk. Lenders can charge borrowers late fees and foreclosure fees to cover
servicing and cash flow costs of delinquency and default. Low LTVs also shift default risk
from lender to borrower because the lender can recover its losses from equity at
foreclosure.
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essential problem is misrepresenting the terms to customers. ' 10 6 By
defining predatory lending narrowly as fraud, industry groups can ar-
gue that current disclosure laws are sufficient to solve the problem:
these laws simply need to be enforced more vigorously.
The problem with this definition is that while a few lenders and
brokers have been caught crossing the line into fraud-covering up
loan terms with a forearm while pointing out the line at the bottom of
the page where the borrower should sign, forging borrower signa-
tures, and the like-most need not go to such lengths to get borrow-
ers to sign up for loans that are neither competitively priced nor
financially prudent. Even with all disclosures fully given, and even
with no false information given by the seller, °7 borrowers are agree-
ing to loans that are not in their self-interest. As the Federal Reserve
Bulletin has noted: "[I] n many cases the terms of such contracts are
not technically illegal but rather are inappropriate for and disadvanta-
geous to consumers." 10 8
The second type of definition, frequently offered by consumer
advocates, is to define predatory lending by reference to long lists of
specific predatory practices.' 0 9 But predatory home lending should
be defined based on the harms that we seek to prevent, rather than
based on a list of predatory practices, for two reasons. First, loan
seller practices mutate in response to bans on particular practices and
are limited only by the ingenuity of loan sellers. Consumer advocates
have reached some consensus as to the types of lending practices that
need to be stopped today: packing loans with expensive and rarely
useful credit insurance, charging high fees and points including
unearned yield spread premiums, and stripping homeowners of eq-
uity through flipping loans to generate more fees and through repay-
106. William Wan, Mortgage Cost Linked to Race, Study Finds, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, May
2, 2002, at A6; see also Litan, supra note 3, at 2 (defining predatory lending as fraud).
107. Which is not to say that sellers of loans are not also frequently giving borrowers
false information. Part of the problem with the loan purchasing process is that, because
the transactions and disclosures are so poorly understood by borrowers and due to the
various heuristics, biases, and emotional coping mechanisms described below, it is easy for
sellers to engage in fraud during the process, despite the disclosures.
108. Sandra Braunstein & Carolyn Welch, Financial Literacy: An Overview of Practice, Re-
search, and Policy, 88 FED. RES. BULL. 445, 446 (2002).
109. E.g., 2000 House Hrg., supra note 3, at 204-05 (statement of William Apgar, Assistant
Secretary for Housing and FHA Commissioner), 477-78 (testimony of Margot Saunders,
Managing Attorney, National Consumer Law Center); cf Engel & McCoy, supra note 67, at
1260 (defining predatory lending as a syndrome of practices that involve "(1) loans struc-
tured to result in seriously disproportionate net harm to borrowers, (2) harmful rent seek-
ing, (3) loans involving fraud or deceptive practices, (4) other forms of lack of
transparency in loans that are not actionable as fraud, and (5) loans that require borrowers
to waive meaningful legal redress").
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ment schedules calculated to lead to foreclosure. But while consumer
advocates propose legislation to close loopholes in the laws, lenders
and brokers just as quickly find new loopholes to slip through. 1
Without developing the law on a foundation of common understand-
ing of the harm we are trying to stop, new practices resulting in the
same harm will simply rise to take the place of any that are banned,
such as has already occurred in the use of open-ended credit to cir-
cumvent protections in the Home Ownership and Equity Protection
Act (HOEPA). 111
Second, defining predatory lending by a list of particular loan
features and then banning those features as they become known cre-
ates a bloated regulatory scheme. Simply multiplying the number of
laws on the books may have the unintended consequence of restrict-
ing access to credit to marginal borrowers-often the same low-
income, elderly, and/or minority borrowers the anti-predatory lend-
ing laws are intended to assist. This credit restriction can occur di-
rectly through credit rationing by a lender market unwilling to take
on the risks imposed by the new laws or indirectly through increasing
the legal compliance costs of lenders and thereby increasing the price
of credit.
Predatory lending is thus more accurately and completely, yet
parsimoniously, defined as noncompetitively overpriced and overly
risky home loans. The structure of today's home loan market, ex-
plained above, in conjunction with borrower decisionmaking vulnera-
bilities, explained below, facilitates the sale of these loans. Borrower
vulnerabilities include a multitude of cognitive and emotional difficul-
ties encountered by some segments of borrowers in the home loan
process and the heuristics, biases, and coping mechanisms these bor-
rowers use to respond to those difficulties. These processes are ex-
ploited by loan originating professionals to prevent segments of
borrowers from stimulating and benefiting from price competition
within the subprime loan industry to deflect these borrowers' atten-
110. See, e.g., E. Scott Reckard & Mike Hudson, More Mortgage Lenders Targeted; In the
Aftermath of Ameriquest, Regulators Say They're Continuing to Probe 'Sub-Prime'Firms, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 31, 2006, at CI (reporting conclusion of former assistant attorney general of Iowa that
"predatory lenders have stayed ahead of government crackdowns and a changing market
by abandoning some bad practices while inventing new ones to squeeze borrowers").
111. See, e.g., HOUSEHOLD EXAMINATION, supra note 72, at 54-56 (explaining how a
lender structured home loans as open-ended home equity lines of credit, even though the
loans were for all practical purposes ordinary amortizing closed-end loans, so as to avoid
HOEPA's requirements); see also HUD-TREAsuRv REPORT, supra note 46, at 17 ("Any list of
predatory practices is destined to be incomplete because bad actors are constantly develop-
ing new abusive practices, sometimes to evade new government regulation.").
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tion from the risk presented by the loans, and to restrict these borrow-
ers' effective choice set when they are deciding whether to borrow at
all. The following analysis is limited to the price side of the problem,
leaving the risk side to another project.
II. FEDERAL LAW REGULATING THE PRICING OF HOME-SECURED
LOANS: DISCLOSURE AS PANACEA
A. The Rational Actor Decisionmaker Model
Neoclassical economics and the law and economics movement it
spawned have assumed that individual decisionmaking takes a certain
form. That rational homo economicus model of decisionmaking, when
stated as more than a nonfalsifiable postulate that people's actions
reveal their rational choices, holds that decisionmakers choose op-
tions that maximize their expected utility." 2 Implicit assumptions are
that people can and will know all alternatives and understand their
costs and benefits, probabilistically weighting for uncertain out-
comes. 113 People then evaluate the alternatives with reference to re-
sultant states of well-being by assessing possible end-states in light of
their own internal fixed orderings of preferences." 4 Only once they
have performed this evaluation of the situation do people then select
the alternative that will maximize personal utility. Under this theory,
having more alternative choices available is always better because they
create the potential to increase utility through better matching the
decisionmaker's internal preferences.
The thicker versions of rational choice theory would add that
consumers' marketplace decisions reflect their own financial self-
interest. For marketplace decisions to do so, neoclassical versions of
the model assume that people are motivated and able to price shop,
that they will costlessly observe and evaluate all alternatives with refer-
112. The discussion here draws on Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1051, 1060-75 (2000). See also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and
the Framing of Decisions, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 209, 210-11 (Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky eds., 2000) [hereinafter CVF] (listing axioms of expected utility theory). My
summary no doubt slights rational choice theory's adaptations to accommodate behavioral-
ist critiques, but my focus here is to understand the model as reflected in the current legal
paradigm so that we might understand how that paradigm fails to, and how we might
better, serve the needs of all home loan consumers.
113. This implies linear responses to probability changes (or mildly hyperbolic re-
sponses to probability changes to account for the declining marginal utility of wealth).
114. They may also engage in subjective state-dependent preference ordering, to ac-
count for the effect of emotional state on instantaneous preferences. These are still viewed
as "fixed" in the expected utility rational actor model, in the sense of not being manipula-
ble by external framing.
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ence to a pre-existing set of internal preferences, and that when they
at first do not understand an attribute such as price, they will costlessly
obtain the information and education necessary for that understand-
ing. The marketplace result in this model is efficiency: resources be-
ing put to their most valued use, as measured by people's internal
preferences, within the constraints of wealth inequality.
Modern advocates of rational choice theory recognize that peo-
ple may lack sufficient cognitive skills, information, or time to make
decisions this way, and that the tangible costs of obtaining the requi-
site skills, information or time-"search costs"-may be prohibitive.
Bounded rationality, a term coined by Herbert Simon, accepts the
core axiom of the homo economicus theory that people will try to make
decisions that maximize expected utility, but recognizes that they may
fail to achieve this goal due to these constraints. ' 15 When search costs
exceed the gains in decisionmaking benefits to be had by further
search, embracing a "stopping rule" is rational. However, an efficient
stopping rule is difficult to establish because without the additional
search, one cannot know what information will be found and what
effect that information might have on a decision. A common re-
sponse to high search costs and the difficulty of establishing a stop-
ping rule is "satisficing," Simon's term for choosing by examining
alternatives sequentially until a satisfactory alternative, one that mini-
mally meets one's requirements, is found and then taking that option,
rather than engaging in further search and analysis.116 The search
process itself may influence the aspired outcome level, depending on
what information is learned about likely alternatives.'17 But provided
that search costs are low, even a somewhat bounded theory of the ra-
tional consumer predicts that consumers' marketplace decisions will
be welfare-maximizing.
Given this model, government interference with the market is
only justified to respond to market failures. One such market failure
occurs when consumer search costs are high, and no seller has suffi-
cient incentive to reduce those search costs as a means of claiming
market share. The government would then be justified in intervening
to reduce search costs, such as by providing information to consumers
115. See generally Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99
(1955). Simon's own research went much farther, as he recognized not merely tangible
search costs, but also intangible limits on decisionmaking, such as information overload,
discussed further below. The part of his research incorporated into the homo economicus
model is generally limited to tangible search costs.
116. HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 270-71 (1957).
117. Simon, supra note 115, at 111.
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in a format they have the skills to use, and at a time when they can use
it. Just as more choice is better, more information about these
choices is generally better because it allows consumers to choose the
option that will be the most welfare-enhancing.
Current federal law governing home lending requires that bor-
rowers be given a stack of disclosures, but, with the removal of usury
constraints, has few substantive prohibitions. Implicit in the disclo-
sure form of regulation is the premise that either: (1) all borrowers
are financially knowledgeable wealth maximizers, competent and mo-
tivated to comparison shop for credit, or (2) an informed minority of
borrowers fits this description and loan sellers cannot distinguish be-
tween the shoppers and the uninformed and so must offer competi-
tive price terms to all.118 The disclosure regime admits of some
boundedness to consumer rationality-if borrowers were un-
boundedly rational and the market perfectly competitive, there would
be no need for the government to intervene in the market by requir-
ing disclosures at all-but concludes that the main correction the
market needs is informational. The informational fix assumes that
consumers will make self-interested, well-informed, rational probabil-
istic financial choices using the disclosures. Embracing the thicker
conception of rational choice theory, the assumption as to price is
that borrowers will not agree to take a loan if a cheaper one can be
found at a tangible search cost that does not exceed the difference in
price.
B. Current Federal Law
Congress passed the Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA) 119 with the ex-
plicit goal of increasing price competition in the consumer credit
market by giving consumers information in a form they could use to
comparison price shop. In enacting TILA in 1968, Congress declared:
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be en-
hanced and the competition among the various financial in-
stitutions and other firms engaged in the extension of
consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use
of credit. The informed use of credit results from an aware-
118. A minority of informed rational price shoppers can produce low prices for all con-
sumers in a market only if there is no price discrimination between consumers who price
shop and those who do not-i.e., terms and prices are relatively standardized throughout
the market. As explained above, this is an inaccurate description of today's home loan
marketplace. See supra Part I.A.2; infra Part W.A.
119. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1615, 1631-49, 1661-1667f (2000 & Supp. II 2004) (implemented
by the Federal Reserve Board via Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2005)).
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ness of the cost thereof by consumers. It is the purpose of
this subchapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit
terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more
readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid
the uninformed use of credit.1 21
The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) t 2 1 was subse-
quently passed in 1974 with the aim of giving borrowers information
with which to price shop for home loan settlement services.' 2 2 In
1994, in response to the overpriced and overly risky home loans that
were coming into the market, Congress passed the Home Ownership
and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) 12' again primarily a disclosure
statute aimed at helping borrowers make better price shopping deci-
sions, as well as better decisions about foreclosure risk.
The first place Congress envisioned that consumers would en-
counter federal regulation of the home loan marketplace is in adver-
tising, as a result of TILA. TILA requires that when advertisements for
consumer credit contain price information, the price must be ex-
pressed in APR terms. 1 24 The APR is intended to express the total
annual cost of borrowing, including interest and other scheduled
charges and fees imposed by the lender, such as origination fees and
points, so that borrowers can comparison price shop between a loan
with a higher interest rate but lower up-front costs and a loan with
lower initial costs but a higher interest rate. Prior to passage of TILA,
not only did lenders not integrate these two price components, but
they also advertised interest rates using inconsistent methods, some
advertising annual rates and others advertising monthly or even
weekly rates.' 25 By performing financial calculations to convert inter-
est and up-front costs into a single uniform metric, lender price adver-
tising pursuant to TILA is intended to overcome price shopping
barriers that may be due to a lack of skills. Even if the consumer does
not know precisely what APR means or what it includes, so long as she
knows to search for the lowest advertised APR, she will effectively com-
parison price shop. However, the law assumes that lenders will adver-
120. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a).
121. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (2000) (implemented by the Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
24 C.F.R. §§ 3500, 3800).
122. Id. § 2601 (a) (aiming to provide borrowers with "greater and more timely informa-
tion" so as to protect them from "unnecessarily high" settlement costs).
123. Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2190 (1994) (amending TILA). The regulation de-
fining HOEPA loans is at Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.32.
124. TILA permits the annual interest rate also to be disclosed, but only alongside the
APR. 15 U.S.C. § 1664; 12 C.F.R. § 226.24.
125. NAT'L COMM'N ON CONSUMER FIN., supra note 24, at 169-70.
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tise price and that consumers will use these advertisements to price
shop.
The next point at which federal law attempts to assist borrower
price shopping occurs within three days after the lender receives the
consumer's application for home loan credit. At this time, RESPA re-
quires loan sellers to provide applicants information about a plethora
of settlement costs, including origination fees, points, and broker fees
that will be charged upfront and charges imposed by third parties
such as appraisal or title insurance fees.' 2 6 Within three days of re-
ceiving the borrower's application, the loan seller must disclose these
on a good faith estimate (GFE), in which the figures may be expressed
as a range of estimated dollar values. 127 For a loan carrying a variable
rate, the lender must also give the borrower a booklet on adjustable
rate mortgages, information about the index and/or formula used to
adjust the rate, and either a historical example or an example using
the maximum note rate illustrating how a $10,000 loan would be af-
fected by interest rate changes. 128 If it is a purchase money home
loan, the seller must give the borrower a booklet on settlement
costs129 and an estimated version of the final TILA disclosure de-
scribed in more detail below.
These early disclosures recognize that borrowers need price in-
formation early enough to use it to price shop for settlement services,
and in the case of purchase money loans, the loan itself. The settle-
ment cost and variable rate loan booklets are intended to give con-
sumers the information needed to understand the information in the
GFE and to understand the potential range of costs that an ARM may
impose. But once given the information, the assumption is that con-
sumers will use it to price shop. In addition to the disclosure require-
ment, RESPA prohibits unearned kickbacks and referral fees, such as
payments by third party settlement services providers to lenders or
from lenders to brokers for referring borrower business.130 The anti-
kickback provision is an implicit recognition that the disclosures alone
126. 12 U.S.C. § 2604; 24 C.F.R. §§ 3500.6-.7; 12 C.F.R. § 226.19(a).
127. 24 C.F.R. § 3500.7. The GFE is supposed to bear a "reasonable" relationship to the
final costs, but RESPA imposes no liability on lenders who fail to meet this requirement.
HUD-TRASURY REPORT, supra note 46, at 63 ("RESPA does not impose liability for an inac-
curate or incomplete GFE, or even for failing to provide one."). Although the GFE need
not appear in any particular format, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) has developed a sample GFE, a copy of which may be found at 24 C.F.R. § 3500
app. C.
128. 12 C.F.R. § 226.19(b).
129. 12 U.S.C. § 2604.
130. 12 U.S.C. § 2607; 24 C.F.R. § 3500.14.
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will not always lead to price shopping, at least not when the lender
and settlement service providers collude.
If the loan is a high-cost closed-end (meaning a lump sum loan,
not a line of credit) nonpurchase money home loan13 1 under
HOEPA, additional disclosures must be given to the borrower three
days before closing.132 These include:
(1) the amount borrowed and whether credit insurance is
included;
(2) the APR;
(3) the monthly payment amount;
(4) for variable rate loans (ARMs) the maximum monthly
payment possible under the contract;
(5) the amount of any balloon; and
(6) a statement that the applicant is not required to com-
plete the transaction even though she has signed the
application. 1
33
HOEPA was passed in response to predatory lending and is intended
to provide high-cost loan consumers with disclosures that will en-
courage price shopping."3 HOEPA, using high interest rates and fees
as a proxy for decisionmaking impediments, 131 recognizes that con-
sumers who agree to high-cost loans may mistakenly believe that they
are obligated to take the loan at whatever price is quoted once they
have signed the application.
HOEPA also substantively prohibits adding unfavorable terms-
interest rate escalations triggered by borrower default, balloons on
loans shorter than five years, negative amortization, and some prepay-
ment penalties-to high-cost loans."36 In effect, this prevents lenders
from "piling on," i.e., heaping unfavorable terms, terms that can exact
quite a price from borrowers, onto borrowers from whom a high price
131. Currently, a high-cost loan under HOEPA is one with: (1) for a first-lien mortgage,
an APR of more than eight points, and for a second-lien mortgage, of more than ten
points, above the yield on Treasury securities of comparable maturities; or (2) points and
fees, including mortgage broker fees but excluding other third party charges, that exceed
8% of the loan amount or the current equivalent of $400 in 1994-dollars, whichever is
greater. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa) (2000 & Supp. II 2004); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(b); 12 C.F.R. § 226.31(c). These may be estimated figures. 12
C.F.R. § 226.31 (d) (2).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(c). A sample copy of a HOEPA disclosure
may be found in 12 C.F.R. § 226 app. H-16.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a). HOEPA's provisions are also intended to discourage taking
risky loans. Id.
135. Or perhaps bad luck, as other consumers may suffer the same impediments yet not
have had the misfortune to be offered a loan on such high rate and fee terms.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c)-(f); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d).
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is already being exacted. 7 HOEPA thus recognizes that those con-
sumers who have agreed to loans with high rates and fees may not
fully take account of the price implications of prepayment penalty and
default interest rate escalation provisions when making the loan deci-
sion. Because prepayment penalties and interest rate escalations are
not otherwise reflected in the APR, the stated APR of a HOEPA loan is
thus a more accurate reflection of true anticipated loan cost than of a
loan not covered by HOEPA.
Finally, at closing, both TILA and RESPA require that the bor-
rower be given final price disclosures."' 8 RESPA requires disclosure of
all actual settlement costs, typically on the settlement sheet (the uni-
form settlement statement or "HUD-1").139 The TILA disclosure pro-
vided at closing must also disclose actual as opposed to estimated
figures. For refinance loans and second mortgages, this final TILA
disclosure is the only one the borrower receives, as the three day esti-
mated TILA is not required. Both estimated and final TILA disclo-
sures are a single page document with a standardized format that
includes:' 40
(1) the annual percentage rate ("APR") of the loan;
(2) the finance charge;' 4 '
(3) the amount financed;'4 2
(4) the total of all payments that will be made on the
loan;14
3
(5) the number and amount of monthly loan payments, ex-
clusive of taxes and insurance, and the amount of any
balloon;
137. Thus far, HOEPA's prohibitions on adding particular terms to high-cost loans ap-
pear to be successful in stopping this specific practice, which is easy for a lender or court to
identify. To enforce these provisions, HOEPA also leverages the power of the secondary
market, which under HOEPA does not have the full protection of the holder in due course
doctrine for loans that, on the face of the documents, violate HOEPA. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1641 (d)-(e).
138. 12 U.S.C. § 2603 (2000); 24 C.F.R. § 3500.10; 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(b). The consumer
may be given these disclosures on the day before closing, if the consumer knows of the
right to request the disclosures early and exercises that right. 12 U.S.C. § 2603(b); 24
C.F.R. § 3500.10. The borrower need not be informed of the right to see these prior to
closing. 12 U.S.C. § 2603(b); 24 C.F.R. § 3500.10.
139. 12 U.S.C. § 2603; 24 C.F.R. § 3500.8. A copy of HUD's Uniform Settlement State-
ment, or HUD-1, may be found in 24 C.F.R. § 3500 app. A.
140. 15 U.S.C. § 1639; 12 C.F.R. § 226.18. A sample TILA disclosure may be found in 12
C.F.R. § 226 app. H.
141. A dollar figure expressing the total cost of borrowing, not including certain third-
party charges. 15 U.S.C. § 1605; 12 C.F.R. § 226.4.
142. The total loan principal amount, including both net proceeds and any financed
charges and fees, whether imposed by the lender or third parties. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(b).
143. Including principal, interest, and other charges and fees. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a) (5).
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(6) the amount of any late charge;
(7) whether credit insurance is required and at what price;
and
(8) whether a borrower "may" or "will not" have to pay a
prepayment penalty if she pays the loan off early.
The first four of these must appear in the familiar TILA box at
the top of the disclosure. For a nonpurchase money home loan, the
borrower has three days from the date of receiving accurate final dis-
closures to rescind the contract.
1 44
The federal statutes governing home lending embrace the
thicker conception of rational choice theory, but with a recognition of
some boundedness in borrower decisionmaking 1 45 On the price side,
the legal model recognizes that, due to a lack of financial literacy and
an unwillingness to incur the necessary search costs, consumers may
fail to accurately extract price information from a stack of loan docu-
ments in arcane and nonstandardized legal vocabulary. The disclo-
sures are intended to put the crucial price information on a few sheets
of paper and for the disclosures under TILA and HOEPA, in a some-
what standardized way, such that consumers can, in theory, under-
stand the price of the loan and comparison price shop. The
disclosure of APR is aimed at helping consumers compare the total
cost of credit as between loans with different interest rates and up-
front costs.
While the model admits people are not unboundedly rational,
and thus need the assistance of disclosures, it also assumes that they
will, once given the information in the disclosures, use it to choose
whether and which loan to take based on a rational calculus of their
financial'self-interest (or the self-interest of their families). Even for
consumers who are satisficing rather than optimizing in their price
shopping, the price disclosures are intended to allow consumers to
accurately determine whether the loan price meets their personal
maximum price satisficing requirements. The law assumes that once
consumers receive the correct information through disclosures, their
home loan decisions will reflect their own price-minimizing or price-
satisficing, self-interested choices. People's choices, when informed
by the disclosures, are seen as the touchstone of their well-being.
144. Id. § 1635; 12 C.F.R. § 226.23.
145. This is not to say that any legislator had this vision of decisionmaking explicitly in
mind. See generally Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth-in-
Lending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 233 (1991). Rather, such a model was implicit in the design of the
statute.
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C. Even a Rational Actor Could Not Use the Federal Disclosures to Price
Shop in Today's Marketplace
Even if all borrowers met the mildly bounded decisionmaker
model envisioned by the law, price shopping for home loans would be
extremely difficult in the subprime marketplace because the timing of
the disclosures is late, the information given is incomplete, and bor-
rowers lack the financial literacy needed to use the information
provided.
1. Logistical Problems of Timing and Expense.-The law recognizes
that consumers need written price disclosures to make a decision, yet
it fails to give them the disclosures until a point in time when, as a
practical matter, many consumers will not be able to price shop. For a
refinance loan or second mortgage, the GFE is the only document
provided early enough to potentially use to price shop, but it discloses
only settlement costs, not the interest rate or other loan terms. Even
for settlement costs, the GFE is a poor tool for shopping because the
figures are not firm and can be expressed as a range of potential set-
tlement costs. One study reveals that 83% of borrowers end up with
higher closing costs than those estimated on their GFE.1 46 Moreover,
it is given after the application fee is paid, and borrowers on a limited
budget may lack sufficient cash to pay another lender another applica-
tion fee 1 4 7 in time to obtain a competing price offer quickly. Thus, if
a borrower has an immediate need for cash and lacks funds to pay
multiple application fees, she is virtually locked in to the first lender
to which she applies, regardless of the settlement costs or terms of the
loan.
The HOEPA disclosures are provided for high-cost loans three
days before closing. With automated underwriting, the loan approval
and pricing decision can be fairly quick in the prime market. How-
146. See Dieter Brunner, The Mistakes Borrowers Make, and How to Avoid Them, CONSUMER-
AFFAiRs.CoM (June 6, 2006) available at http://consumeraffairs.com/news04/2006/06/
mortgage-geek.html.
147. U.S. BD. OF GOVERNERS OF THE FED. RES. Sys. & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URB. DEv.,
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS CONCERNING REFORM TO THE TRUTH IN LENDING Acr AND THE
REAL ESTATE SETrLEMENT PROCEDURES Acr, at ii (1998) (reporting that loan applicants
"frequently must pay a fee before receiving required disclosures). Although some lenders
charge no application fees, a 2001 survey found that lenders quoted charges between $100
and $400, with an average of about $250. See Michael D. Larson, Closing Costs Compared,
BANKRATE, June 21, 2001, http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mtg/20010621b.asp.
High application fees, particularly where the lender or broker does not need to do much
work to submit the loan and obtain a quote, may reflect an attempt to inflate the transac-
tion costs for the purpose of trapping the borrower.
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ever, in the subprime market, more information1 48 must be collected
and analyzed before a lender will make a pricing decision. This
means that three days is not enough time to obtain competing loan
price offers. For refinancings and second mortgages that fall below
the HOEPA triggers, the only required written disclosure of the APR
and finance charge is usually given at closing on the TILA disclosure,
after which the borrower has only the three day rescission period for
price shopping, again too short a period to obtain competing offers.
2. Incomplete Information.-The information in the disclosures is
also insufficient for price shopping. Each lender uses its own termi-
nology on the GFE, making it difficult for borrowers to comparison
price shop for settlement costs.149 Although the TILA disclosure is
standardized to disclose the APR, finance charge, amount financed,
and total payments, these figures do not expose all potential price
features of the loan, such as late fees and prepayment penalties. Even
ignoring these potential costs, the APR does not allow for accurate
comparisons between loans because it is only accurate if the borrower
holds the loan to term or if the entire price is charged through inter-
est, both unlikely scenarios. APR also excludes the price of title insur-
ance and application, appraisal, and document preparation fees, all of
which are part of the true cost of credit.1 5
The prepayment penalty statement on the TILA disclosure is par-
ticularly opaque, stating whether the loan "may" result in a prepay-
ment penalty, but without any explanation that refinancing the loan is
the equivalent of prepaying it, nor any indication of how much such a
penalty will cost the borrower.15' The failure to require a more trans-
148. In the predatory market, this borrower information could include whether the bor-
rower is likely to be exploitable, willing to accept a loan at a higher price than risk and cost
to the lender would dictate.
149. Holden Lewis, Closing Costs Study Reveals a Shell Game, BANKRATE, Nov. 6, 2003,
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mortgages/20031106a1 .asp.
150. All figures on the TILA and early HOEPA disclosures exclude the cost of credit
insurance where credit insurance is not "required" by the lender. The problem with this is
that lenders frequently slip credit insurance into loans such that borrowers perceive it to
be required, and to be part of the price they must pay for credit, yet it is not included in
the disclosed aspects of loan price.
151. A passage in a state regulator examination of loans originated by Household Fi-
nance Corporation explains:
While the [TILA disclosure] contains a statement that the loan "may" contain a
prepayment penalty a borrower would have to carefully read the document from
top to bottom to identify the sentence. Even then, it is not at all clear that the
loan "will" contain a prepayment [penalty], offering the HFC representative every
opportunity to confuse the borrower.
Even less obvious than the [TILA] disclosure of prepayment penalty is the
contractual terms of the prepayment penalty. Here, in the note, the prepayment
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parent prepayment penalty disclosure reflects an underlying substan-
tive issue-these penalties are structured in so many ways today that
no uniform short statement can convey all the information needed to
make a fully informed price decision. 5 2
3. Financial Illiteracy.-Current legal rules recognize consumers'
inability to comprehend underlying loan documents, but fail to recog-
nize that the same problem infects the responses of some borrowers to
the disclosures themselves. Understanding all of the types of home
loans available and the terms offered requires a working knowledge of
hundreds of specialized terms-e.g., "amortization," "balloon,"5
"points,"l 54
-that many borrowers do not have and that the required
settlement cost and variable rate loan booklets will not give them. For
penalty notice is buried in the middle of several paragraphs of other contractual
information. It is preposterous to put forth that the borrowers have ample oppor-
tunity, much less the knowledge, to search through a stack of documents looking
for this "disclosure," during a hurried and controlled document signing meeting.
Just as preposterous is HFC's repeated explanation ... that the borrowers could
have found the prepayment penalty in the documents and rescinded the transac-
tion within three days following closing.... [E]ven if the loan officer has simply
remained silent about the existence of the prepayment penalty, there is no reason
for the borrower to undertake a search of documents looking for.., unsaid terms
of the loan.
HOUSEHOLD EXAMINATION, supra note 72, at 42-43.
152. For example, prepayment penalties can be structured as a constant dollar amount,
as a percentage of the remaining principal, or as a proportion of the as-yet-unpaid interest
payment stream the lender had been hoping to receive, and can vary over time or expire
after a set period. Engel & McCoy, supra note 37, at 734 n.30. For such a loan, the disclo-
sure of the prepayment penalty would have to contain quite a lot of information, none of
which is well-understood by people with low financial literacy.
153. Balloons can be particularly difficult for borrowers to understand when their loans
are partially amortizing. One lender that routinely originated home loans with balloons of
approximately 80% of the loan amount denied allegations that it had "misled" borrowers.
However, when sued by the federal government, the lender agreed to refinance into fully
amortizing loans any borrowers with balloon loans who certified that "[a]t the time I got
my loan, I believed or was told my loan did not have a balloon payment." See Stipulated Final
Judgment and Order at 12 & app. B, United States v. Mercantile Mortgage Co., Inc., Civil
Action No. 02-CV-5078 (N.D. Ill. July 18, 2002). The lender explained that "it agreed to
the settlement to help approximately 1,500 borrowers who . . . 'may not have fully under-
stood the 15-year balloon term'" stated in their loan disclosures. Mercantile Settles Deception
Lawsuit, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, July 22, 2002, at 3, 3.
154. One misunderstanding frequently occurs in borrower comprehension of "points,"
traditionally used to buydown the interest rate, but today often just another form of origi-
nation fee. A borrower may see that she is paying points and think that she is receiving a
lower note rate, but because she has no way of knowing what her rate would be without the
points, she cannot know whether her rate has been lowered. In the subprime market gen-
erally, a large number of borrowers are paying "points" yet still receiving high interest
loans. One study found twice as many subprime versus prime borrowers paid between two
and four points, and 5% of subprime borrowers paid over six points, versus virtually no
prime borrowers paying such high points. Courchane et al., supra note 88, at 376.
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example, regarding loan price disclosures, only about 10% of respon-
dents in a survey of consumers who had applied for or obtained home
loans in the previous five years understood the concept of APR well
enough to accurately answer whether the APR is higher, the same, or
lower than the note or contract interest rate, 155 fewer than would have
correctly guessed the answer by chance. The disclosures are not
presented in simple enough lay terms and many borrowers ignore the
disclosures as incomprehensible legally mandated gobbledygook.
Most people also lack the financial literacy they would need to
make sense of the entire transaction, even if they were given all rele-
vant information and a dictionary explaining all relevant terms. 156 To
assess the full potential price of the loan, the loan applicant borrower
must understand explicit price terms (reflected in the monthly pay-
ment, interest rate, APR, various origination and settlement fees, and
points) and must forecast the likelihood, timing, and amount of po-
tential additional costs such as late fees, interest rate changes, and
prepayment penalties.
One of the largest subprime lenders in the United States, Household, was found to
have routinely charged 7.25% in "points" on many of its subprime home loans, without
lowering borrower interest rates. HOUSEHOLD EXAMINATION, supra note 72, at 6. House-
hold is not alone: Citigroup's subprime unit, CitiFinancial, routinely charges "points" on
its home loans as a form of origination fee. Riva D. Atlas, Citigroup Makes Changes at Lend-
ing Division, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 2002, at C2 ("Citifinancial will also lower a form of up-
front fee on real estate loans, known as points, from 5 percentage points to 3 points, begin-
ning in the fourth quarter .... ").
155. Lee & Hogarth, supra note 58, at 70. About half the respondents said they were
equal, about a third said the APR was lower, and the rest admitted they did not know. Id.
Even if those respondents who said that the APR and the interest rate are equal have a
good enough understanding to effectively use the APR to price shop, the remaining con-
sumers do not. HUD and the Federal Reserve Board have recommended that the TILA
disclosure be changed to disclose the note interest rate in addition to APR. HUD-
TREASURY REPORT, supra note 46, at 69. However, adding another item to an already clut-
tered and poorly understood document is unlikely to be of assistance to borrowers who are
vulnerable to predatory lending.
156. One loan seller testified that as part of his sales pitch he would ask potential bor-
rowers-all of whom had pre-existing mortgages on their homes-whether anyone had
ever explained to them how mortgages work and the time value of money, and most of
them said "no." Transcript of Record, Day 1-Vol. II, at 85-86, Official Joint Borrowers
Comm. v. Lehman Commercial Paper, Inc., No. SACV 01-0971-DOC (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18,
2003) (testimony of Terence J. LaFrankie) [hereinafter LaFrankie Testimony Day 1-Vol.
II]. The broader point has been made in greater detail by Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser
Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 233 (2002). Earlier, Eskridge
made this point in the context of home purchase loans. Eskridge, supra note 9; see also
Creola Johnson, Maxed Out College Students: A Call to Limit Credit Card Solicitations on College
Campuses, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'V 191, 266-67 (2004) (showing that even college-
educated consumers have difficulty understanding credit).
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Although nearly half of U.S. households have home loan debt,' 1 7
the National Adult Literacy Survey found that only 4% could perform
multiple arithmetic calculations sequentially, when the features of the
problem had to be discerned from the text or when background
knowledge was required to determine quantities or operations. 58
The remaining 96% of adults could not calculate the total interest
charges on a $10,000 home equity loan from the information given in
an advertisement. "' The advertisement listed, among other things,
the length of the loan in months, and the monthly payment amount
for a $10,000 loan, yet most respondents did not know to multiply the
monthly payment given for a $10,000 loan by the number of months
of the loan term stated in the advertisement minus the $10,000 princi-
pal.' 6 ° This does not mean that 96% of consumers could not shop
between loans based on total interest, points, and fees charged, once
given a TILA disclosure stating the finance charge-one purpose of
the TILA disclosure is to perform this calculation for consumers. But
most borrowers would probably not be able to compare prices of loans
when some costs are contingent on future events requiring the con-
sumer to do her own calculations, such as prepayment fees, late fees,
and interest rate changes, unless the loans were identical as to all
terms governing these events.
Yet the majority of Americans are unaware of their lack of finan-
cial literacy. Most described themselves as functioning "well," includ-
ing those in the lower half of the population by language and
financial literacy levels, well below those tiers who can calculate home
loan interest.' Less than a quarter of those in the lower half report
receiving a lot of help from family members or friends in reading
printed information, filling out forms, or performing arithmetic. 6 2
Even a rational price shopper, if she is unaware that she lacks the
knowledge and information needed to price shop, will fail to accu-
rately price shop.
The Federal Reserve Board's 1997 Surveys of Consumers con-
firms these problems with the current federal disclosures: over 80% of
157. Brian K. Bucks et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the 2001
and 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, 92 FED. REs. BULL. Al, A26 & A28 tbl. 11-B (2006),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2006/financesurvey.pdf.
158. IRWIN S. KIRSCH ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, ADULT LITERACY IN
AMERICA 17 fig.1.1 (3d ed. 2002), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs93/93275.pdf.
159. Id. at 17 fig.1.1, 178.
160. Id. at 178.
161. Id. at 20-21.
162. Id. at 21 tbl.1.3.
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respondents found TILA disclosures "complicated,"'' 63 about 65%
found some of the information in them unhelpful,'64 and only 2% of
recent home equity second mortgage borrowers said that the TILA
disclosures affected their loan decision.' 6 5 But fully understanding
why that is so requires moving beyond the law's model of borrower
decisionmaking.
III. How THE SUBPRIME HOME LOAN INDUSTRY MAKES USE OF
CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY IN TODAY'S MARKETPLACE TO SELL
OVERPRICED HOME LOANS
A. Heterogeneous Behavioralism Meets the Home Loan Market
Recent psychology and behavioral economics research does not
merely expand upon the insight that human rationality is bounded,
but rather supports an alternative theory of human decisionmaking. I
set forth this theory here broadly, along with a critique of attempts to
apply it without a nuanced understanding of the effects of context
and experience on the decisionmaking of different segments of the
population. I then show how specific decisonmaking heuristics, bi-
ases, and emotional coping mechanisms are triggered for some con-
sumers in the home loan shopping process, resulting in overpriced
home loans.
1. A New Schematic of Internal Decision Processes: Recognizing the In-
fluence of Intangible Transaction Costs.-nAmos Tversky, Daniel
Kahneman, and others show that decisions frequently are arrived at
not through the application of expected utility functions, but rather
through the application of biases and heuristics-mental rules of
thumb to "reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and pre-dicting values to simpler judgmental operations." '66 Their alternative
to rational choice theory, dubbed prospect theory, posits that people:
(1) make decisions based on evaluations of potential gains and losses
from a context-dependent current reference point; (2) weight losses
more heavily than gains and certain losses and gains more heavily
163. Thomas A. Durkin & Gregory Elliehausen, Disclosure as a Consumer Protection, in THE
IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON CONSUMER CREDIT 109, 129 tbl.6 (Thomas A. Durkin &
Michael E. Staten eds., 2002).
164. Id. That these borrowers found the disclosure helpful might be viewed with some
skepticism given Lee and Hogarth's findings that so few borrowers know what APR means.
See supra text accompanying note 155.
165. Glenn B. Canner et al., Recent Developments in Home Equity Lending, 84 FED. RES.
BULL. 241, 245 (1998).
166. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Introduction to JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY.
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 1, 1 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafterJUU].
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than probabilistic ones; and (3) display diminishing sensitivity to in-
creasing marginal losses and gains.'6 7 Complementary work by Loew-
enstein, Baumeister, and others have focused on the influence of
emotion, or "affect" on decisionmaking. These researchers have
found, for example, that people suffering from threats to self-esteem
or other forms of emotional distress tend to make decisions based on
short-term concerns, without thinking through long-term
consequences.
168
Nonrational cognitive and emotional processes no doubt pro-
duce excellent results in many situations.'69 However, heuristics, bi-
ases, and emotional coping mechanisms can also produce bad
outcomes, 70 such as agreeing to overpriced home loans.' 7 1 People's
informed choices are not necessarily the touchstone of their well-
being; instead, whether and when "people make choices that serve
their best interests . . . is a question to be answered based on
evidence."172
I offer a new general picture of decisionmaking that integrates
the heuristics, biases, and emotional coping literature: the intangible
transaction costs schematic.1 7 3 During decisionmaking, two typically
167. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk
in CVF, supra note 112, at 17; accord Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36J. ECON.
LIT. 11, 13-16 (1998).
168. See generally Roy F. Baumeister, Esteem Threat, Self-Regulatory Breakdown, and Emotional
Distress as Factors in Self-Defeating Behavior, 1 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 145 (1997); George Loew-
enstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 ORG. BEHAV. & HuMAN DECISION
PROCESSES 272 (1996).
169. Peter M. Todd & Gerd Gigerenzer, Precis ofSimple Heuristics That Make Us Smart,
23 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCi. 727, 731-36 (2000). Some of the heuristics appear to have evolu-
tionary origins. Colin Camerer et al., Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics,
43J. ECON. LIT. 9, 11, 26 (2005). Others appear to be cultural. Tanya Menon et al., Culture
and the Construal of Agency: Attribution to Individual Versus Group Dispositions, 76J. PERSONAL-
ITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 701 (1999). In this Article, I use "people" or "we" to refer to Wes-
terners or people in the United States, and the discussion here should be viewed as so
qualified.
170. Howard Margolis, Simple Heuristics That Make Us Dumb, 23 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 758,
758 (2000).
171. By positing that these are "bad outcomes," I embrace the same conception of the
good that the thick versions of rational choice theory embrace-i.e., that the ends sought
should be individual (or household/family) wealth and well-being.
172. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv.
1471, 1545 (1998); see also Amartya Sen, Rational Behaviour, in THE NEW PALCRAVE: UTILITY
AND PROBABILITY 198, 210 (John Eatwell et al. eds., Am. ed. 1990) ("IT]he cardinal repre-
sentation of choices as the 'utility' of the person . . . does not give any independent evi-
dence on what the person is aiming to do or trying to achieve.").
173. While my framing of this model is new, I do not claim any of the underlying con-
cepts as my own. I draw heavily on the work of Bettman, Luce, Payne, and others cited
below.
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strong but subconscious tendencies1 74 exist that are not congruent
with the rational choice model: to minimize the cognitive effort and
resources spent on decisionmaking and to minimize "the experience
of negative emotions during decision making.' 75 These are not the
only tendencies that influence the pursuit of substantive decisionmak-
ing goals-people also frequently seek justification for their decisions,
a tendency that is sometimes incongruent with substantive goals.17 6
Moreover, people can be motivated by situation or personality to en-
gage in deep cognitive and emotional effort and processing.177 But
the tendencies to minimize cognitive and emotional resource use are
particularly likely to lead to poor substantive decision outcomes.
The minimizing effort tendency means relying on heuristics
rather than more difficult deep cognitive processing. The minimizing
negative emotions tendency can be met by avoiding or denying any
ego threats presented by the decision process. Where these decision
process tendencies conflict with meeting substantive decision goals, 71
these tendencies can prevent people from reaching the substantive
results they truly want.
1 7 1
174. While others have called these "goals," I call them tendencies due to their uncon-
scious and nonteleological nature.
175. James R. Bettman et al., Constructive Consumer Choice Processes, 25J. CONSUMER RES.
187, 192 (1998). Rationally calculated, a decisionmaker might want to use the least cogni-
tive effort or experience the least amount of negative emotion necessary to reach the de-
sired outcome, but a less rational form occurs as well, in the unconscious use of cognitive
shortcuts and emotional coping mechanisms. These unconscious tendencies are not ra-
tional in the local, decision-specific sense implied by rational choice theory.
176. Bettman et al., supra note 175, at 192 (calling this the goal to maximize "the ease
with which a decision can be justified"); Dan Horsky et al., Stating Preference for the Ethereal
but Choosing the Concrete: How the Tangibility of Attributes Affects Attribute Weighting in Value
Elicitation and Choice, 14J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 132, 133 (2004); Eldar Shafir et al., Reason-
Based Choice, in CVF, supra note 112, at 597, 600.
177. Cognitive motivation refers to both a situational variable and a personality dimen-
sion. As a decision calls for increased accuracy, such as when stakes are high, people will
have a situational motivation to perform more complex cognitive processing. On the
other hand, if time constraints or stressful situational variables are present, motivation to
engage in cognition decreases. John A. Bargh, Losing Consciousness: Automatic Influences on
ConsumerJudgment, Behavior, and Motivation, 29J. CONSUMER RES. 280, 280-81 (2002). As a
personality trait, cognitive motivation is the degree to which people tend "to engage in and
enjoy effortful cognitive activity." John T. Cacioppo et al., Dispositional Differences in Cogni-
tive Motivation: The Life and Times of Individuals Varying in Need for Cognition, 119 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 197, 197 (1996).
178. Kahneman has described this as the conflict between deriving "decision utility" and
obtaining "experienced utility." Daniel Kahneman, New Challenges to the Rationality Assump-
tion, in CVF, supra note 112, at 758, 760-62.
179. While this is a schematic rather than a model, because it is admittedly at too high a
level of generality to predict decisions, it responds to claims by the critics of behavioral
economics that the field lacks a unified theory of decisionmaking. E.g., Richard A. Posner,
Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1551, 1558-61 (1998).
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Because people are continuously seeking to conserve intangible
resources, including time, decisionmaking does not linearly proceed
from perception to attention to evaluation to decision. Rather, that
which is salient, and therefore perceived with less effort, is immedi-
ately put to evaluative use. A decisionmaker perceives and appraises
the choice situation in a cognitive and emotional context that will af-
fect what features of alternatives are salient and begins to assess trade-
offs inherent in the decision based on those initial perceptions. If the
reasoning process is not truncated by lack of time or stress, the deci-
sionmaker will recursively focus increased and decreased attention on
different aspects of the choice as she seeks to resolve, through deeper
understanding or through simplification, the tradeoffs inherent in the
decision. When one alternative in the perceived choice set domi-
nates, or after the decision is made, frequently the individual will un-
consciously reappraise the choice set so as to reconceive the tradeoffs
as more heavily weighing in favor of the dominating or chosen choice,
thereby justifying the decision. The looping process of decisionmak-
ing means that it is not always possible to distinguish between when
the reasoning process leads to the decision and when the decision
leads to the reasoning process. 80
Cognitive effort and negative emotions experienced during deci-
sionmaking are intangible forms of what economists call transaction
costs, although neoclassical economics does not traditionally recog-
nize them as such."' "Cognitive" here refers to the conscious process
of decisionmaking, including more than mere mathematical calcula-
tion. "Emotional" here refers to often subconscious and automatic
affective states, including both immediate visceral reactions and emo-
tions more heavily mediated by cognition, such as anticipation of
one's experience of future costs and rewards and assessment of pro-
Moreover, I would argue that the rational actor model is no more predictive than the trans-
action costs schematic: a nuanced understanding of context, both socioeconomic and idio-
syncratic to the individual, is crucial to understanding how the transaction costs schematic
maps onto decisions, but so too a nuanced understanding of an individual's utility function
is necessary to use the rational actor model to predict decisions. If an individual's utility
function assigns disutility to not only the tangible transaction costs recognized by standard
economic theory, but also to the intangible costs of cognitive and emotional resources, the
theories begin to merge.
180. MARY FRANCES LUCE ET AL., EMOTIONAL DECISIONS: TRADEOFF DIFFICULTY AND COP-
INC. IN CONSUMER CHOICE 21-33 (2001).
181. Others have called the use of cognitive and emotional resources during decision-
making "internalities," an intangible form of what traditional economists call externalities.
E.g., Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for
"Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1211, 1221 n.30 (2003).
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gress towards or threats to important values. 82 Although decision-
making is often conceived of as purely cognitive, psychological and
neurological theories have recently converged on an understanding
that cognition alone is insufficient for even simple rational decision-
making-present bodily experience of emotions based on the mental
anticipation of future experience appears to be necessary for decision-
making involving future costs and benefits.' It is useful to divide
these conceptually, although cognitive and emotional processes are,
in action, fully intertwined.
1 8 4
Sellers of predatory loans frequently instead benefit from cogni-
tive and emotional transaction costs because they can exploit the
heuristics, biases, and coping mechanisms consumers use to minimize
these costs. 185 Cognitive difficulty can lead consumers to use heuris-
tics and biases, which in turn lead to decisions that fail to achieve the
goal of obtaining a loan at the lowest possible price and a reasonable
level of risk. Emotions can both short-circuit consumers' cognitive
processes, increasing the use of heuristics and biases, and can also di-
182. George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 267-68
(2001); see also LUCE ET AL., supra note 180, at 3 (developing a theory of consumer choice
difficulty and adding to cognitive difficulty and emotional difficulty the concept of "trade-
off' difficulty). The cognitive versus emotional divide is slightly askew to "dual processing
theory," the notion that people use both analytical, conscious, deliberate thinking and
affective, unconscious, automatic responding to process the world. Seymour Epstein, Inte-
gration of the Cognitive and the Psychodynamic Unconscious, 49 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 709, 710
(1994).
183. Antonio R. Damasio explains:
[E]motions and feelings can cause havoc in the processes of reasoning under
certain circumstances... [but] the absence of emotion and feeling is no less dam-
aging, no less capable of compromising the rationality that makes us distinctively
human and allows us to decide in consonance with a sense of personal future,
social convention, and moral principle.
... Emotion and feeling, along with the covert physiological machinery un-
derlying them, assist us with the daunting task of predicting an uncertain future
and planning our actions accordingly.
ANTONIO R. DAMAsIo, DESCARTES' ERROR: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, at xii-
xiii (1994); see also THoMAsJ. COTTLE & STEPHEN L. KLINEBERG, THE PRESENT OF THINGS
FUTURE 13-35 (1974) (discussing the need to form an image of and emotionally experience
a future event for the future to influence present behavior); DmtAsio, supra, 201 & n.25
(citing congruent psychological and philosophical work); Loewenstein et al., supra note
182, at 267-74 (discussing evidence that feelings are not only helpful, but necessary to
decisionmaking).
184. Emotion or affect can influence what information is attended to and cognated, can
be a form of information, and can be a result of cognition. See generallyJoseph P. Forgas,
Mood and Judgment: The Affect Infusion Model (AIM), 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 39 (1995); Loewen-
stein et al., supra note 182.
185. Cf Jeff Sovern, Towards a New Model of Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated
Transaction Costs, 47 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 1635 (2005) (detailing ways in which sellers profit
from imposing transaction costs on consumers).
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rectly form competing emotional goals that consumers may meet at
the price of not meeting price or risk goals. These emotional goals
may be quite legitimate, but the magnitude of the home loan deci-
sion's effect on a person's life is such that the negative consequences
of a poor cost or risk decision may overshadow the positive effects of
meeting these emotional goals. The process by which predatory loans
impose these price and risk injuries on the borrower is socially and
psychologically pernicious, in that the borrower participates in her
own injury. Regret over having agreed to these loans is widespread.
Although predatory home lending reflects a failure to meet both
price and risk goals, the heuristics, biases, and coping mechanisms
that influence decisionmaking about price differ from those that in-
fluence decisionmaking about risk. Therefore, to develop appropri-
ate policy solutions, price and risk should be considered
independently. As previously explained, this Article focuses on price.
2. The Importance of Socioeconomic Context on Decisonmaking Out-
puts.-To understand individual decisionmaking, a distinction must
be made between inward psychological (cognitive and emotional)
processes and outward behavior. At the psychological level, it appears
that the same cognitive and emotional processes shape all human
decisionmaking and that, generally speaking, these processes can
"bias"-or affect in nonrational ways-their resultant decisions. Cog-
nitive processes are, as Tversky and Kahneman famously asserted,
"neither rational, nor capricious."' 86 "IJIudgment and choice-like
perception and memory-are prone to distortion and error.. . [and]
errors are common and systematic rather than idiosyncratic or ran-
dom."'87  Heuristic, biased, and emotion-laden decisionmaking
processes are not departures from the norm, they are the norm.'88
However, the real-world triggers for various psychological re-
sponses are not the same for all segments of society, with the result
that people's decisionmaking behaviors are not homogeneously
modelable and predictable.' 89 This is perhaps particularly true of the
186. Massimo Piatelli-Palmarini, Probability Blindness: Neither Rational nor Capricious, Bos-
TONIA, Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 28, reprinted in ANNUAL EDITIONS: PSYCHOLOGY 1992-1993, at 114,
114 (K.G. Duffy ed., 1992).
187. George A. Quattrone & Amos Tversky, Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses
of Political Choice, in CVF, supra note 112, at 451, 472.
188. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 166, at 18; Camerer et al., supra note 169, at 25.
189. Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics'Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for
Behavioral Law and Economics'Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 86-87 (2002). However,
probability estimates can be established for populations based on repeat trials. Jon D.
Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipula-
tion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 630, 747-48 (1999).
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home loan decisionmaking process, given the range of literacy and
numeracy levels consumers bring to what is a complex and difficult
decision for even the most financially savvy and consumers' different
historical experiences of inclusion or exclusion from the credit and
homeownership markets. Different borrowers, to some extent falling
along socioeconomic lines, make the home loan decision in different
contexts, contexts that influence which cognitive and emotional
processes will come into play. 90
There is a tendency in some legal scholarship, in an attempt to
match the parsimoniousness of rational choice theory, to collapse the
distinction between psychological processes and behavior. These
scholars fail to appreciate sufficiently the degree to which context me-
diates between internal processes and resultant behavior. Focused on
the commonness of nonrational decisionmaking mechanisms, they
miss how the heterogeneity of contexts in which people find them-
selves leads to heterogeneous behaviors.' 9 ' The seminal Christine
Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler article exhorting the use of
economic behavioralism in legal analysis asserts that "behavioral eco-
nomics allows us to model and predict behavior relevant to law,' ' 192
and subsequent articles have attempted "to provide a decisionmaker
model that is relevant to a broader and more realistic range of behav-
ioral contexts than the traditional economic actor."' 93 They have re-
jected a homo economicus model in favor of a more realistic model of
homo behavioralus, one who is altruistic, lacking in perfect willpower,
and subject to some cognitive errors, in short a model of the person
we intellectuals have come to recognize as ourselves at the dawn of the
twenty-first century.
But in a monolithic homo behavioralus model, the influence of so-
ciological factors such as race, gender, class, and age are ignored.
190. Cf Marianne Bertrand et al., A Behavioral-Economics View of Poverty, AM. ECON. REV.
419, 419 (May 2004) ("[T]he poor may exhibit the same basic weaknesses and biases as do
people from other walks of life, except that in poverty, with its narrow margins for error,
the same behaviors often manifest themselves in more pronounced ways and can lead to
worse outcomes.").
191. Of course, other scholars have recognized the importance of context and that vari-
ation in context makes predictions about behavior based on nonrational psychological
mechanisms difficult. E.g., Jennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of Behavioral Economic Analy-
sis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1776-87 (1998); Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects
Within Corporate Agency Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-5 (2002); Mitchell, supra note
189, at 86, 98-119.
192. Jolls et al., supra note 172, at 1474.
193. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 189, at 638 (emphasis added). But see Chris Guthrie,
Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 Nw. U. L. REx. 1115, 1160-61 & nn.308-13
(2003) (listing works that examine differences in individual decisionmaking behavior be-
tween socioeconomic groups).
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Most of the experimental research on decisionmaking has been per-
formed on a socioeconomically and educationally privileged members
of society-captive college students enrolled in Psych 101 and other
members of the academic communities at which the experimenters
work.' 94 But uniformity of behavior in the laboratory does not imply
uniform behavior throughout the population in the real world. Basic
tenets of prospect theory include the reference-dependent nature of
choice and the extent to which choice is influenced by framing ef-
fects. t9 5 Because people come to decisions from different frames of
reference, and because immediate real life contexts are too complex
and idiosyncratic to be replicated in the lab, experimental observa-
tions do not permit predictions of homogeneous real-world behav-
ior. 196 Just as law based on a monolithic homo economicus model fails to
reflect the realities of some consumer segments, so too does law based
on a monolithic homo behavioralus model. Recognizing the heteroge-
neity of behavioral responses decreases the elegance of behavioral de-
cision theory, but inheres in the diversity of human experience and
the existence of framing effects."9 7
The effect of context does not render decisionmaking utterly un-
predictable; context is shaped by socioeconomic and situational influ-
ences that, while heterogeneous, are neither thoroughly idiosyncratic
nor immune from manipulation. Because the application of heuris-
tics, biases, and coping mechanisms, unlike the application of rational
self-interested decisionmaking, can result in different decisions de-
pending on the psychological mechanism involved, the seller who can
194. At the other end of the spectrum, the neurological research described above is
primarily performed on patients with neurological disorders, they being the most available
to the lab, and providing, through evidence of nonfunctioning during impairment, sugges-
tive evidence regarding the manner of functioning in normals. E.g., DAMASiO, supra note
183, at xii.
195. Cf Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA
L. REv. 1193, 1227 (1994) (noting that people's ability to understand and make decisions
based on product warnings "is influenced by educational backgrounds, personality traits,
and motivation levels, by socioeconomic status and group affiliations, and by idiosyncratic
personal experiences and prejudices").
196. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 112, at 1058 (noting that tangible evidence of
behavior in real-life settings, not just controlled research, is needed to ground legal
policy).
197. As Tversky and Kahneman admit:
Theories of choice are at best approximate and incomplete. One reason for this
pessimistic assessment is that choice is a constructive and contingent process....
The heuristics of choice do not readily lend themselves to formal analysis because
their application depends on the formulation of the problem, the method of elic-
itation, and the context of choice."
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of
Uncertainty, in CVF, supra note 112, at 44, 65.
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invoke a decisionmaking mechanism can manipulate consumer
choice.' 98 Consumers usefully, heuristically if you will, can be divided
into different segments by reference to the likelihood that their socio-
economic context will render them susceptible to marketing and sales
techniques that will increase seller profits.
Vulnerable segments are not necessarily stable, nor need they be
for that vulnerability to be exploited. The asymmetry between the re-
versibility of the decision not to borrow versus the decision to take the
loan means that a consumer need only be caught by a seller when in a
vulnerable state that lasts long enough for the borrower to engage in
the loan transaction and, for nonpurchase money loans, through the
three day rescission period.' 9
3. Segmenting the Market by Vulnerability Rather Than Risk and
Cost.-Within the home loan borrowing public, rough lines can be
drawn between those for whom price shopping is more difficult and
those more likely to obtain competitively priced home loans.
First, the reasons that even a rational actor could not use the fed-
eral disclosures to price shop affect some borrowers more than others.
The logistical problems of timing and expense are more problematic
for subprime than prime borrowers because, as noted above, in the
subprime market, more information must be collected and analyzed
before a lender will make a pricing decision, meaning that three days
is not enough time to obtain competing loan price offers. Addition-
ally, subprime borrowers are more likely to lack the resources neces-
sary to pay multiple application fees.
The federal disclosures are also less informative for subprime
loans. The figures disclosed on the TILA and HOEPA disclosures-
APR, financed charge, amount financed, and total payments-come
closer to disclosing the true cost of credit for prime than subprime
loans. The APR is also more accurate for comparing price of prime
loans because prime loans carry only small origination fees and
costs-as noted above, typically 0.5% of the loan amount-whereas
198. For the classic work in this regard, see generally LEFF, supra note 7. Sellers need
not understand the cognitive psychology underlying consumer manipulability for competi-
tive market forces to lead sellers evolutionarily towards marketing and sales techniques that
exploit consumer psychology. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 189, at 724. On the other hand,
as described infra, evidence has leaked out from the industry indicating a sophisticated
understanding and purposeful exploitation of consumer cognitive and emotional
vulnerabilities.
199. Although a borrower can refinance, origination fees and prepayment penalties can
make refinancing into a lower interest rate loan a money-losing proposition. See infra Part
IV.A.3.
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subprime up-front fees can be a much larger share of the loan
price.2°° Late fees21 and prepayment penalties not reflected in the
disclosed figures are more frequently charged to subprime borrowers.
Estimates are that between 64% and 98% of subprime loans, but only
2% of prime home loans, have prepayment penalties.20 2 The opacity
of the prepayment penalty disclosure on the federal forms is of no
consequence to most prime borrowers, but can impede accurate price
shopping for subprime borrowers whose loans are more likely to carry
these penalties.
Financial illiteracy that impedes price shopping for even rational
actor borrowers is a bigger problem for subprime than prime borrow-
ers. Financial experience and knowledge is possessed disproportion-
ately by the well-educated, middle and upper classes, who have more
familiarity with financial matters from personal experience, work ex-
perience, and education and have networks of family and friends with
similar experience and knowledge. Those borrowers who do under-
stand what an APR is, for example, and are able to translate it into a
dollar amount, tend to be in higher socioeconomic groups, with both
higher levels of income and of education; these are prime loan bor-
rowers, not subprime borrowers. 20 3 Lower income and African-Ameri-
can and Latino consumers on average possess less financial and
document literacy as a result of less financial education and experi-
ence.20 4  A 2003 study of recent African-American and Latino
homebuyers found that they "had a limited understanding going into
200. See GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 4 (noting that predatory practices "offer lenders
that originate predatory loans potentially high returns even if borrowers default, since
many of these loans require excessive up-front fees"). Recall that the APR is an accurate
statement of price only if the loan is held to term or the price is charged as interest rather
than upfront fees.
201. Late fees are often larger for subprime loans than for prime loans. Holden Lewis,
How Mortgage Lenders Grade Borrowers, BANKRATE, Apr. 18, 2002, http://www.bankrate.com/
brm/news/mtg/20020418a.asp.
202. Engel & McCoy, supra note 37, at 734 n.30; Elizabeth Renuart, An Overview of the
Predatory Mortgage Lending Process, 15 Hous. PoL'v DEBATE 467, 475 & n.17 (2004). It was
previously thought that subprime loans prepay faster than prime loans, thus justifying the
greater use of prepayment penalties in the subprime market. E.g., OCC Working Paper,
supra note 43, at 11. However, recent literature casts some doubt on this conclusion; be-
cause subprime loans prepay even when interest rates are rising, lenders and investors may
benefit from subprime prepayments even when no penalty is charged. See infra Part IV.A.3.
203. Lee & Hogarth, supra note 58, at 67-68; see also Paul S. Calem et al., Neighborhood
Patterns of Subprime Lending: Evidence from Disparate Cities, 15 Hous. POL'y DEBATE 603, 618
(2004) (finding a strong negative relationship between neighborhood educational levels
and quantity of subprime loans); Rubin, supra note 145, 236 & n.15 (citing empirical
sources for the proposition that price shopping for consumer credit is limited to "upscale
consumers who would manage perfectly well without benefit of legislation").
204. KMRSC ET AL., supra note 158, at 32-37, 60-65.
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the mortgage application process" and specifically expressed concerns
about "[u]nderstanding the terminology of the [home loan] pro-
cess."2 5 Those with lower incomes, less education, and lower English
fluency also reported that they lacked friends or relatives with exper-
tise to help them through the process.2 °6 On average, older adults
also demonstrate more limited document and financial literacy skills
than do adults under fifty-five years of age. This is in part due to fewer
years of schooling 20 7 and in part due to degraded cognitive abilities
caused by the aging process.20 8
Beyond the rational actor model, some segments may encounter
larger intangible transaction costs in obtaining a home loan than
others, leading to greater use of heuristics, biases, and emotional cop-
ing mechanisms in decisionmaking and greater vulnerability to poor
price decisions. As elaborated in the next Section, we know that all
people tend to reduce decision situations to a handful of attributes.
The next question is: which small set of attributes will the deci-
sionmaker select as the ones on which to base the home loan
decision?
For prime borrowers, low-risk borrowers who receive low-cost
loans, who on the whole are better educated and more financially
savvy, more loan price characteristics are understood and evaluable
and therefore salient. These borrowers are less likely to be under as
much stress, and thus can consider more loan attributes when making
their decision. As previously explained, prime loan products are sig-
205. RESEARCH INST. FOR Hous. AM., INSIGHTS INTO THE MINORITY HOMEBUYING EXPERI-
ENCE: THE MORTGAGE APPLICATION PROCESS 4 (2003) [hereinafter RIHA].
206. Id. at 6.
207. KIRSCH ET AL., supra note 158, at 30, 31 fig.1.5.
208. Older borrowers may suffer from "[r] educed capacity for maintaining information
active in memory" and "[d]ecreased ability to process complicated text," including "diffi-
culty making appropriate inferences from texts." Gabriel K Rousseau et al., Designing
Warnings to Compensate forAge-Related Changes in Perceptual and Cognitive Abilities, 15 PSYCHOL.
& MARKETING 643, 647 tbl.1, 653 (1998); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 100-01
("Age-related . . . mental impairments can limit the capacity of some older persons to
comprehend and make informed judgments on financial issues . . . [and] can make older
persons more vulnerable to financial abuse and exploitation."); Catherine A. Cole & Siva
K. Balasubramanian, Age Differences in Consumers' Search for Information: Public Policy Implica-
tions, 20J. CONSUMER RES. 157, 158, 166 (1993) (noting that older adults on average search
less for information about consumer choices and are more likely to use satisficing strate-
gies); Melissa Finucane et al., Task Complexity and Older Adults' Decision-Making Competence,
20 PSYCHOL. & AGING 71, 79-80 (2005) (finding lower decisionmaking quality in older
adults due to, e.g., decreased comprehension and less consistency in valuation of choice
attributes); GaryJ. Gaeth & Timothy B. Heath, The Cognitive Processing of Misleading Advertis-
ing in Young and Old Adults: Assessment and Training, 14 J. CONSUMER RES. 43, 52 (1987)
(concluding that older adults are more susceptible to misleading advertising than younger
adults when both groups are given more time to scrutinize the advertisements).
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nificantly more standardized in their structure, such that fewer terms
must be analyzed to assess price to meaningfully compare prices of
various loans. 209 For example, because prime loans rarely have pre-
payment penalties, prime borrowers do not have to find the price of a
prepayment penalty and weight it by the likelihood of prepayment in
determining loan price. Prime loans are more likely than subprime
loans to have a fixed rate rather than an adjustable rate,2 10 such that
prime borrowers are less likely to need to forecast future monthly pay-
ment changes to determine loan price. Prime loans also are more
standardized in collateral and credit history requirements, such that
prime rates do not significantly vary. 21 ' Advertising of prime rates
gives prime borrowers the ability to shop without going through the
application process.2 12 Prime loans are not very risky, so risk of fore-
closure is not a concern. These borrowers are rarely rejected for
loans, 211 so rejection is not a salient concern for them. Therefore,
although prime borrowers generally do reduce the home loan deci-
sion to a few attributes, the characteristics they consider are, on aver-
age, the more important ones for determining prime loan price.
By contrast, subprime borrowers have many more decision attrib-
utes to worry about during the home loan borrowing process. Under-
standing these in detail is the subject of the next Part of this Article,
but I present a summary here. People who have bad credit, who erro-
neously think they have bad credit, or who fear lending discrimina-
tion-all groups into which minorities disproportionately fall-may
fear rejection and choose lenders advertising guaranteed approvals
rather than lowest APR or price. Less financially savvy borrowers may
ignore attributes of a loan they do not understand because lack of
understanding leads to lack of salience. The legal requirement that
borrowers be given a form that lists, among a great number of loan
209. See supra Part I.A.2.
210. See HUD-TREASURV REPORT, supra note 46, at 31 (reporting that for the last quarter
of 1999, that about 30% of mortgages in existence overall at that time were ARMs, but
about 40% of subprime mortgages were ARMs); Courchane et al., supra note 88, at 382
tbl.A1 (finding that in 1999-2000, a period of interest rate lows which might cut in favor of
fixed rates generally, only 9% of the prime borrowers in the survey who obtained loans
received an ARM, whereas 30% of subprime borrowers received ARMs).
211. As noted above, however, standardization of terms and pricing in the prime sector
appears to be decreasing of late. See supra note 50.
212. For further discussion, see infra Part 1V.A.2.
213. According to 1998 data, the denial rate for prime purchase loans was 13%, 13% for
refinance loans, and 33% for home improvement loans; the comparable figures for sub-
prime loan application denials were 45%, 57%, and 68%. See 2000 House Hrg., supra note
3, at 666 (statement of Laura J. Borrelli on behalf of National Home Equity Mortgage
Association, an industry group).
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attributes, whether the loan has a balloon and what the APR is, may
have no effect on these borrowers if they do not understand these
aspects of the decision. Because subprime loan structures are more
complicated than prime loan structures, subprime borrowers must at-
tend to even more loan features than prime borrowers to assess loan
price, and thus they are more likely to become overloaded when at-
tempting the task. Most subprime borrowers do pay attention to the
monthly payment amount, both as an indicator of price and an indica-
tor of risk. But often they will take the first loan offer that comes in
below their maximum monthly payment limit. Lender sales manuals
have come to light telling loan officers to obtain that figure and struc-
ture the loan to have initial monthly payments of that amount. But
the loan may extend many years or may have monthly payments that
increase at intervals automatically, not necessarily tied to any indexed
rate. Because people consider long-term future events abstractly, they
assess feasibility by looking at the near-term monthly payments only.
Finally, many borrowers think they do not have to price shop because
they are paying a broker or loan officer to do that for them. The next
Section elaborates on each of these factors and how they are used by
brokers and lenders to sell overpriced home loans.
B. Heuristics, Biases, and Coping Mechanisms That Shape
Borrower Decisionmaking
1. Reducing the Decision to a Few Salient Attributes.-
The majority of customers are looking at one thing ....
-1998 Senate Hearing Testimony of
former finance company employee,
testifying anonymously214
As shown above, the federal disclosures are intended to assist bor-
rowers by deluging them with every piece of information they need to
fully assess the price of the loan transaction. But do consumers use all
this information in making a loan decision? The cognitive problem of
information overload indicates that few if any consumers consider this
many factors in making any decision. The emotional phenomenon of
stress-truncated reasoning means that consumers under stress con-
sider even fewer choice attributes. From the long list of loan attrib-
utes disclosed, different attributes are considered by different
consumers, segmenting borrowers into those who can more easily
price shop and those for whom price shopping is more difficult.
214. 1998 Sen. Hrg., supra note 1, at 38 (statement of"Jim Dough," former finance com-
pany employee).
[VOL. 65:707766
THE PROBLEM OF PREDATORY LENDING: PRICE
a. Cognitive Responses to Information Overload.-Even when
people have all pertinent information about a decision, they fre-
quently fail to use it, not only due to comprehension difficulties ex-
plained above, but also due to the second bound on rationality Simon
identified, information overload. Too much information may be as
harmful as too little. Information overload has been grossly used to
describe a number of different phenomena.215 First, the quantity of
information presented or for which the consumer must search can be
daunting. Because the costs of complete information search and
processing seem too high, the consumer may not even try.2 1 6 Second,
processing too much information can cause the consumer to lose
track of some of that information or to fail to encode all of the infor-
mation, when memory and attention become overloaded.217 Once
the finite limits on assimilating and processing information in any
given unit of time are surpassed, cognitive performance becomes con-
fused, less accurate, and less effective. 2t8 Third, too much informa-
tion can lead a consumer to conserve effort by examining only a few
aspects of a decision, and these may turn out to be the wrong aspects
for good decisionmaking: "In a world where attention is a major
scarce resource, information may be an expensive luxury, for it may
turn our attention from what is important to what is unimportant."219
As a result of information overload, all people reduce most deci-
sions to a small number of salient characteristics. In laboratory exper-
iments-ideal conditions not present in real-world home loan
decisionmaking in that (1) subjects are given information about all
relevant attributes (and thus subjects have no search costs); and (2)
information is presented in a format that is easily understood and en-
coded (and thus subjects have low information processing costs)-
subjects typically consider a maximum of five attributes (including
price and quantity terms) of a product.22 ° Within this bound, differ-
215. E.g., Latin, supra note 195, 1211-15 (product warnings).
216. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 307, 310 (1986).
217. Latin, supra note 195, at 1215-16, 1241.
218. Jacob Jacoby, Information Load and Decision Quality: Some Contested Issues, 14 J. MAR-
KETING RES. 569, 569 (1977); Adam Zuckerman & Shelly Chaiken, A Heuristic-Systematic
Processing Analysis of the Effectiveness of Product Warning Labels, 15 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 621,
622 (1998).
219. Herbert A. Simon, Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought, 68 AM. ECON. REV.
1, 13 (1978); see generally JAMES R. BETTMAN, AN INFORMATION PROCESSING THEORY OF CON-
SUMER CHOICE (1979); DAVID SHENK, DATA SMOG (1997).
220. Denis A. Lussier & Richard W. Olshavsky, Task Complexity and Contingent Processing
in Brand Choice, 6 J. CONSUMER RES. 154, 155 (1979) (noting that past research indicates
that consumers consider only three brands and five attributes when making purchase deci-
sions); id. at 162 (in product choice experiment, subjects usually reduced the number of
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ent subjects consider different attributes and different numbers of at-
tributes and use different choice strategies.221 In marketing studies
designed to determine which attributes consumers consider in mak-
ing real-world product purchasing decisions, under more realistic
search and information processing cost conditions, consumers con-
sider even fewer attributes.222 Studies of more complex decisions
demonstrate that as complexity increases, people rely more heavily on
suboptimal simplifying strategies.223 One study of recent mortgage
loan shoppers found that giving shoppers more information about the
subcomponents of the loan price led to worse price shopping deci-
sions; consumers were significantly more likely to chose a more expen-
sive but otherwise identical loan over a cheaper loan when price
subcomponents and total price were revealed for the cheaper loan but
only the total price was listed for the more expensive loan.
2 24
The federal disclosures contain too many items for most consum-
ers to consider them all. The amount of information on the federal
disclosures, however, reflects a deeper problem: home loan products
today can be structured in such complicated ways that a true assess-
ment of the loan price requires all of the information disclosed and
more. The existing disclosures made sense in a world of fairly uni-
form loan products, containing a standardized package of features for
the borrower to compare. Prepayment penalties and ARMs, for exam-
ple, were virtually nonexistent in 1968 when TILA was passed.225 But
in today's marketplace of loans with multifarious complex structures,
the disclosures have become encrusted with layer upon layer of addi-
tions to meet each new complexity in the product.
brands considered to three or four, and then analyzed five or fewer attributes, even when
information was readily available on other relevant attributes); Richard W. Olshavsky, Task
Complexity and Contingent Processing in Decision Making: A Replication and Extension, 24 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUMAN PERFORMANCE 300, 314 (1979).
221. Alfred S. Boote, Market Segmentation by Personal Values and Salient Product Attributes,
21 J. ADVERTISING RES. 29, 30-31, 34-35 (1981); Lussier & Olshavsky, supra note 220, at 163;
Danielle Timmermans, The Impact of Task Complexity on Information Use in Multi-Attribute
Decision Making, 6J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 95, 100 & exhibit 1 (1993).
222. See David M. Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of
Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 302 app. (1986) (listing studies showing that, in
addition to price, consumers consider anywhere from a single attribute to three attributes
in making purchase decisions); id. at 300 ("[T]he number of salient or determinant prod-
uct attributes . . .does not exceed five, and often is less.").
223. E.g., id. at 299; Barbara E. Kahn & Jonathan Baron, An Exploratory Study of Choice
Rules Favored for High-Stakes Decisions, 4 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 305, 325-26 (1995).
224. JAMES M. LACKO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, BUREAU OF ECON., FED. TRADE COMM'N,
THE EFECT OF MORTGAGE BROKER COMPENSATION DISCLOSURES ON CONSUMERS AND COMPE-
TITION: A CONTROLLED EXPERIMENT 24-25, 49 (2004).
225. See supra Part I.A.1.
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b. Abbreviated Reasoning: A Response to Emotional Distress.-On
the emotional side, people who are suffering emotional distress, in-
cluding anger, fear, embarrassment, annoyance, or frustration, fre-
quently make poor decisions.2 2 6 People experiencing such stress tend
to truncate their cognitive processing when they make decisions.
Truncated reasoning under stress occurs through two mecha-
nisms. The first is that the person is devoting part of her limited con-
scious attentional capacity to the stressor and has insufficient capacity
remaining to cope with the decision task, in a response similar to in-
formation overload.227 To an even greater extent than when un-
stressed, she does not assimilate all available information and instead
focuses on a very few dimensions of the problem. Even more than
when unstressed, she will satisfice, choosing the first option she en-
counters that seems minimally acceptable along these dimensions.2 2 8
Stress also increases reliance on highly salient and tangible dimen-
sions in decisionmaking.2
29
The second mechanism by which stress causes truncated reason-
ing is as a motivation to terminate and escape from the stressful situa-
tion as quickly as possible. 23" The escape mechanism is both a form of
prioritizing short- over long-term consequences and increases use of
short-term-focused decision strategies. People under stress tend to
make choices impulsively, based on a consideration of short-term con-
sequences only.2 3 1 For example, when given an ongoing choice be-
tween playing an enjoyable game or studying for an upcoming test,
subjects who were put in a bad mood through watching an upsetting
film played the game longer, prioritizing improving their mood in the
short term at the long-term expense of preparing for the test.23 2 In
the real world, when "bad moods" can run significantly deeper than
those caused by a brief film, emotional distress can result in behavior
that is out of control, even "in situations characterized by substantial
deliberation. '"233
226. E.g., LUCE ET AL., supra note 180, at 97-100.
227. See Giora Keinan, Decision Making Under Stress: Scanning of Alternatives Under Control-
lable and Uncontrollable Threats, 52J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 639, 639, 642 (1987).
228. Id. at 642.
229. Karen Pezza Leith & Roy F. Baumeister, Why Do Bad Moods Increase Self-Defeating
Behavior? Emotion, Risk Taking, and Self-Regulation, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1250,
1264 (1996).
230. See Keinan, supra note 227, at 642.
231. See, e.g., Loewenstein, supra note 168, at 275 (explaining that visceral factors gener-
ally can cause people to act impulsively in that they experience "a good-specific collapsing
of one's time-perspective toward the present").
232. Baumeister, supra note 168, at 148-49.
233. Loewenstein, supra note 168, at 289.
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Subprime home lender marketing strategies attempt to reach po-
tential borrowers at times of stress, when the borrowers are more
likely to truncate their reasoning. One method is to target marketing
efforts to consumers whom sellers know to be in some financial crisis.
Lenders and brokers search courthouse records for home loan owners
facing foreclosure or tax liens and buy lists of home loan owners with
overdue balances on their credit cards or medical debt.
23 4
Second, predatory lenders mail homeowners "live checks," in-
stant loans with high interest rates disclosed in the mailing. The
homeowner who cashes the check is the ultimate "prequalified lead"
for an overpriced home loan. She has demonstrated that she will take
an immediate gain, even at an exorbitant later price, possibly because
she is under stress and focuses only on the short-term benefits.235 The
lender will contact her within days, hoping to catch her in the same
state of mind, and the lender will offer to refinance the check loan at
a lower rate on a home loan.23 6 Once she has taken the check loan,
motivated reasoning may kick in, assuring her that the lender is trust-
worthy, a company she wisely chose to do business with on the check
loan, and could safely do business with again on a home loan.
Third, lenders target borrowers who need, or have been led to
believe they need, home repairs. Lenders pair with real or fraudulent
home repair companies that go door-to-door in neighborhoods with
older housing stock (and often older and minority homeowners).
The repair people tell homeowners that their homes need crucial re-
pairs and that these repairs can be financed with a home loan that the
234. See, e.g., Robert W. Seifert, The Demand Side of Financial Exploitation: The Case of Medi-
cal Debt, 15 Hous. POL'Y DEBATE 785 (2004) (discussing the link between medical debt and
predatory home loans). One predatory lender explained how his company could convince
borrowers to accept loans with fees and costs often equaling half the money they borrowed:
"When you're broke, you'll borrow money at any price. It's like buying tomatoes. Every-
body's got a price." Mike Hudson, Little Relieffor Consumers, RoANoKE TIMES, Dec. 12, 1994,
at Al (quoting owner of Landbank).
235. She may also misunderstand the price disclosure for the live check and will there-
fore be likely to misunderstand a home loan price disclosure.
236. Although the higher check loan rate appears more favorable to the lender, the
lender can get large origination fees and the security of collateral out of a borrower flipped
into a home-secured loan, even at a lower rate. Major lenders, such as Wells Fargo and
Household, send live checks to targeted consumers. E.g., Promoting Homeownership by Ensur-
ing Liquidity in the Subprime Market: Joint Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Financial Institu-
tions & Consumer Credit & the House Subcomm. on Housing & Community Opportunity, 108th
Cong. 110 (2004) (statement of Assistant Attorney General Pamela Kogut, Office of the
Attorney General of Mass.) (noting that practices of Household Bank included "luring"
mortgage customers through live checks); E. Scott Reckard, State Sues to Void "Instant
Loans" by Wells Fargo Unit: Regulators Accuse Finance Arm of Knowing It Was Overcharging Inter-
est on Unsolicited Check Sent in the Mail, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2003, at Cl.
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company will arrange. Under the stress of fear that their homes may
be at risk of damage, homeowners may focus on the immediate re-
pairs rather than the long-term costs of the repairs and associated
home loan.237
Finally, the very stakes of the home loan decision may induce
stress in all borrowers, prime and subprime. 2 8 The home loan deci-
sion typically involves a large amount of money and a large proportion
of household net worth, which would motivate a consumer to engage
in systematic rather than heuristic processing-that is, to increase cog-
nitive effort rather than accepting decreased accuracy. 239 That so
many black, Latino, and low- and moderate-income homeowners have
nearly all of their savings for retirement tied up in their home equity,
and that the home loan decision would typically involve a greater pro-
portion of their net worth than the home loan decision does for
higher wealth and income segments, might motivate these groups to
engage in particularly careful home loan decisionmaking. 240 That the
elderly are more likely to have lived longer in their homes and be
more adverse to losing the home, might provide a similar impetus.
On the other hand, the added stress from the higher stakes may push
in the opposite direction, putting these homeowners at greater risk of
truncated reasoning.2'"
237. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Constructing a New Theoretical Framework for Home Im-
provement Financing, 75 OR. L. REv. 1095, 1095 (1996).
238. A former loan officer explains: "Be ready for an emotional roller coaster. It really
is true that your mortgage will probably be the most expensive transaction of your lifetime,
so don't be surprised if it's an emotionally draining [experience]." Brunner, supra note
146.
239. But see Paul A. Klaczynski & Gayathri Narasimham, Development of Scientific Reasoning
Biases: Cognitive Versus Ego-Protective Explanations, 34 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 175, 185
(1998) (finding that increased accuracy goals led to superiorjustifications, but no decrease
in cognitive biases).
240. While about 30% of net worth of white households was held in home equity, over
60% and over 50% of net worth was held in home equity for black and Hispanic house-
holds, respectively. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 92, at 15 tbl.I. This is not due to
minority households having greater home equity, but rather due to having virtually no net
worth other than home equity: in 2000, black and Hispanic households had less than
$2000 of median net worth excluding home equity, whereas white households had over
$22,000 of median net worth excluding home equity. Id. at 13 fig.6. The elderly also
disproportionately hold equity in their homes. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE & OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HoUs. & URBAN DEV.,
AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES 2003, at 148 tbl.3-15 (2004) (noting
that 72% of homeowners age sixty-five and over own homes free and clear of any mort-
gage, versus only 35% of all homeowners); Kurt Eggert, Lashed to the Mast and Crying for
Help: How Self-Limitation of Autonomy Can Protect Elders ftom Predatory Lending, 36 Loy. L.A. L.
REv. 693, 704-05 (2003).
241. High stakes have a mixed effect on decisionmaking, at times increasing departures
from the rationality assumption and at times reducing biases, although never fully elimi-
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2. Ignoring the Price: Focusing on the "Yes" and the "Now."
The Power of Yes.
-Washington Mutual242
Marketing pitches of subprime lenders emphasize that applicants
will be approved for credit, that they will get the 'Yes!" with ease. Why
is this their marketing strategy? First, it exploits the ego threats exper-
ienced by borrowers who believe they have poor credit or fear discrim-
ination. Second, it stresses the immediate tangible reward to be had,
thus taking advantage of cognitive tendencies to discount over time
and certainty.
a. Avoidance: Response to Ego Threats.-Someone who fears a
denial of credit may experience the loan application process as ego-
threatening. Ego threats are situations that challenge, undermine, or
dispute favorable self-appraisal, and thereby can evoke negative emo-
tions such as anxiety, depression, and anger. 24 3 The most ego-threat-
ening situations are those in which people perceive that others may
judge them negatively. 244 Although home loan credit denials today
are based on cold, calculating financial modeling, creditworthiness is
seen as a reflection on such moral traits as industry, frugality, and in-
tegrity. "Character" has even been called the fourth "C" of consumer
loan underwriting. 245 Offering someone credit is perceived as a state-
ment of trust, an implicit statement from the lender that the borrower
is trusted to pay back the loan.24 6 At the same time, failing to pay back
a loan is seen as reflecting poor character-being a "deadbeat," a per-
nating biases. Colin F. Camerer & Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives in
Experiments: A Reviewv and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7
(1999). Very high stakes are particularly likely to hinder decisionmaking. See Dan Ariely et
al., Large Stakes and Big Mistakes 5 & 19-21 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Res. Ctr. for
Behav. Econ. & Decision-Making Working Paper No. 05-11, July 23, 2005) (finding that
higher levels of financial rewards consistently lowered performance on a broad range of
experimental tasks requiring cognitive effort).
242. "The Power of Yes" is Washington Mutual's slogan, and much of its advertising in
recent years has prominently featured the word "Yes." Washington Mutual, About the Pre-
mier Mortgage Broker Program, http://www.wamupremierebroker.wamudashboard.com/
broker/website/AboutPremiere.jsp (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
243. See Baumeister, supra note 168, at 145.
244. Id. at 146.
245. See LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF CON-
SUMER CREDIT 87-88 (1999) ("Character earned the confidence of the community, and
confidence established credit."); id. at 258 (recounting J.P. Morgan's congressional testi-
mony where he said that " ' the first thing' in getting credit was not money or property or
connections but 'character"').
246. Getting "trusted" was formerly popular slang for obtaining a loan. Id. at 93. "Get
the credit you deserve" is a popular tag line in consumer loan advertising today.
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son who lacks control of her finances and is not trustworthy. 24 7 Being
denied a home loan sends a negative message apart from the money
itself, and thus any perceived possibility of rejection in the home loan
application process presents an ego threat.
Fear of race or gender discrimination in the home loan process is
also ego-threatening. Cultural stereotypes paint minorities, women,
low-income persons, and the elderly as unable to manage their own
financial affairs. 248 Despite laws prohibiting discrimination, in the
2002 Fannie Mae National Housing Survey, African Americans continued
to report fear of discrimination in home lending; although over 40%
reported that obtaining approval for a home mortgage loan has im-
proved, half said it is the same as before or harder for African Ameri-
cans to get financing from banks or mortgage companies than ten
years ago.2 4 9 About a quarter of Latinos report that it is harder for
them than for other groups to obtain home mortgage financing, and
of these, 45% of non-English speakers believe Hispanics experience
more discrimination in home buying and lending.
250
Further, race and fear of lack of creditworthiness are intertwined;
a substantial segment of the population misperceives their own credit
history as being poor,2 51 and that segment is disproportionately non-
white. A 1999 Freddie Mac study shows that blacks who have good
credit are significantly more likely than whites to believe they have
247. Id. at 8 (observing the association of good values with consumerism); VIVIANA A.
ZEIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY 148 (1994); cf TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 8-9 (1989) ("People
see bankruptcy through a lens of fault.").
248. See CALDER, supra note 245, at 180-83, 218-21 (tracing cultural belief in the "psycho-
pathology of the female credit user"); ZELIZER, supra note 247, at 36-70, 119-98 (chroni-
cling history of cultural belief that women and lower socioeconomic classes cannot be
trusted with cash, evidenced by husbands' control over their wives' spending and the provi-
sion of in-kind rather than cash relief for the poor).
249. FANNIE MAE, THE GROWING DEMAND FOR HOUSING: 2002 FANNIE MAE NATIONAL
HOUSING SURVEY 11 (2003) [hereinafter 2002 NAT'L HoUs. SURVEY]; cf Joe R. Feagin &
Melvin P. Sikes, Contending with Everyday Discrimination: Effects and Strategies, in SELF AND
SOcIETY 332, 345 (Ann Branaman, ed., 2001) (describing African Americans' experience of
being defensively on guard for fear of discrimination).
250. 2002 NAT'L Hous. SURVEY, supra note 249, at 12.
251. Loan sellers may contribute to this misperception. One sales technique for an
overpriced loan is to take the borrower's credit report and, if the borrower does not al-
ready believe she has bad credit, "show [her] that [she] wasn't in as good a shape as [she]
thought [she] was." LaFrankie Testimony Day 1-Vol. II, supra note 156, at 64-65. Even
when the consumer's credit history was good, "[flor the most part, there is always some-
thing on the credit report that can be identified as a weak link." Id. As explained in the
lender's training materials: "Not many people today can say they've never had a 30-day late
on a credit card or a mortgage." Affidavit of Greg Walling, Minnesota v. First Alliance
Mortgage Co., at ex. 2, pt. II, p. 5, No. C9-98-11416 (D. Minn. Nov. 20, 1998) [hereinafter
Walling Aff.].
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bad credit; among those survey respondents who had good credit
records, about a quarter of white respondents, but almost half of black
respondents, mistakenly believed they lacked good credit.2 52
This may be due to a history of discrimination and cultural ste-
reotypes, but it may also be due to disparate treatment received by
minority home loan applicants as compared to white home loan appli-
cants. In a study of six major metropolitan areas in the United States
from 2004 to 2006, white, black, and Latino testers posing as loan ap-
plicants approached the same mortgage brokerage firms looking for
similar loans. The minority testers had slightly higher incomes, better
credit scores, and longer employment histories, making them better
credit-qualified than the white testers. However, nearly 40% of the
minority testers were "pressed for details on possible credit problems,
late payments, outstanding debts or prior foreclosures" whereas only
9% of the white testers were asked about this sort of derogatory credit
information.253 With experiences like these, it would be surprising if
minority home loan applicants did not fear that lenders would not
extend credit to them.
As a report jointly issued by the Department of Housing and Ur-
ban Development (HUD) and the Department of the Treasury ex-
plains: "Many subprime borrowers who have had difficulty obtaining
credit in the past may underestimate their ability to obtain new
sources of credit, which may make them more likely to accept the first
offer of credit they receive, rather than shop for a loan with the best
possible terms. '"254 Borrowers who think they have bad credit also as-
sume they do not qualify for lower rates. A Washington Post story ex-
plains: "In fact, that's what their subprime lenders keep telling them:
With your credit rating, you don't qualify for anything much lower
than what you've got. So stick with US. 25
5
252. Sheila D. Ards & Samuel L. Myers, Jr., The Color of Money: Bad Credit, Wealth, and
Race, 45 Am. BEHAV. SCIENrST 223, 229 (2001) (citing Freddie Mac News Release (Sept. 2,
1999)). About a third of Latinos surveyed were so mistaken. Id.
253. See Kenneth R. Harney, Study Finds Bias in Mortgage Process, WASH. POST, June 17,
2006, at Fl.
254. HUD-TREASuRy REPORT, supra note 46, at 18; see also 1998 Sen. Hrg., supra note 1
(statement of Jodie Bernstein, Director of Bureau of Consumer Protection, Fed. Trade
Comm'n) (reporting that consumers who live in low-income and minority neighborhoods,
which are underserved by traditional banks, tend to turn to subprime lenders regardless of
their credit history).
255. Kenneth R. Harney, Past Credit Woes Don't Have to Haunt High-Rate Borrowers, WASH.
PosT, Apr. 27, 2002, at HI; see also Marsh Testimony, supra note 84, at 93-96 (discussing
how predatory lender training manuals instructed loan officers to "make it sound as
though we are here to help you because no other people will help you."); Walling Aff.,
supra note 251, 15 (lender impressed upon consumers that "unlike 'banks,'" this lender
wanted "to help the consumer get the best possible loan").
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Similar to the effect of stress on decisionmaking, the ego threat
presented to borrowers who have or think that they have bad credit or
who fear discrimination can affect the loan decisionmaking process in
two ways. First, it can cause emotional stress, and impair reasoning by
diverting limited attentional capacity to the threat, rather than to the
decision at hand. Second, to achieve an immediate escape from the
negative emotion created by ego threat, people may engage in the
coping mechanism of avoidance.256 Rather than be subjected to an
ego threat, such as the possibility of discrimination, they may restrict
their activities in an attempt to shield themselves from discrimina-
tion.25 7 The result may be a near-term, certain, intangible benefit to
self-esteem, but the price can be a decision outcome with high tangi-
ble costs.
Borrowers who believe their credit is impaired are more likely
than prime borrowers to choose a lender based on likelihood of being
approved for the loan.258 As one loan broker explained it to me,
these borrowers experience the home loan application process-hav-
ing their credit history pored over, their past financial decisions scruti-
nized, and the bona fides of their current desire for credit second-
guessed-to be a "financial strip search." Subprime lenders engage in
a variety of marketing practices designed to appeal to such borrowers,
reassuring them with slogans such as "Bad Credit? No Problem,"
"Guaranteed Approval," and "We Believe in You." To spare borrowers
the financial strip search, lenders offer "low doc" or "no doc" loans-
meaning loans which require little or no documentation of the bor-
rower's financial condition, but which rely on high prices and equity
in the home to cover the risk of default.259 Loan sellers comb credit
reports for homeowners who have recently been turned down for
256. LUCE ET AL., supra note 180, at 31, 107-08.
257. Daphna Oyserman & Janet K. Swim, Stigma: An Insider's View, 57J. Soc. ISSUES 1, 5
(2001); see also Elizabeth C. Pinel, Stigma Consciousness: The Psychological Legacy of Social Ste-
reotypes, 76J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 114, 126 (1999) (finding evidence that people
avoid domains in which negative stereotyping may occur); Feagin & Sikes, supra note 249,
at 334 ("One way to deal with discrimination is to try to avoid situations where it might
occur, even at some personal cost.").
258. 2001 NAT'L Hous. SURVEY, supra note 53, at 14. Fifteen percent of credit-impaired
borrowers admitted this reason for choosing their lender, versus only 4% of all borrowers
giving this reason. Id.
259. There are legitimate uses of low or no documentation requirements, as when a
borrower is self-employed, but warnings from the loan industry indicate that loan sales-
people also eliminate full documentation requirements in cases where this is unwarranted,
leading to serious default and foreclosure risk. See Shenn, supra note 20, at 1 (citing as a
factor in increasing home loan risk "the large number of loans where ... lenders do not
ask for, or thoroughly verify, a borrower's income").
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credit, and then barrage them with 'Yes!" advertising.260 By assuring
the borrower that she will be approved, the borrower is relieved of the
concern that she will be handed an ego-threatening rejection that im-
pugns her character for creditworthiness.
Moreover, if loan approval is guaranteed, consumers are unlikely
to fear discrimination because in the legitimate credit market,26 1 dis-
crimination has traditionally involved denials, not disadvantageous
pricing.262 More than twice as many borrowers who have subprime
home loans than borrowers overall reported that they picked their
lender based on the fact that the lender did not discriminate.2 6' The
unsurprising result is that blacks and Latinos are over-represented in
the subprime market, even after controlling for credit histories.
2 64
b. Myopia and Certainty Effects: Discounting over Time and
Probability.-As explained above, people must mentally visualize and
emotionally experience a future contingency to give it weight in the
decision process. 265 Contingencies that are farther out in the future,
or more uncertain, influence decisions less strongly than those that
are immediate and certain.2 6 6
There are two ways to conceptualize this effect; either time and
uncertainty decrease the weight put on such an outcome by making
the current imaginings of the outcome murkier, and/or immediacy
and certainty increases the weight put on an outcome by making the
current imaginings more vivid. The effect of time has correspond-
ingly been termed either time discounting or time preference. 26 7 The
260. Credit-impaired borrowers who had previously been rejected for a home loan are
more likely to turn to a lender they learned about through solicitation or advertising than
credit-impaired borrowers who had not previously been rejected. Id. at 15.
261. Although the often illegal loan-shark market has always involved price gouging,
loan sharks traditionally operated surreptitiously. Predatory lenders present themselves as
legitimate professional lenders, and much of their business may be nonpredatory subprime
lending.
262. Which is not to say that denials today are race-neutral. In 2000, black applicant4
were about twice as likely and Latino applicants were about 1.5 times as likely as white
applicants to be denied home loan credit. Ross & YINGER, supra note 17, at 6 & fig.1.2, 7 &
fig.l.3.
263. 2001 NAT'L Hous. SURVEY, supra note 53, at 14. The percentage that said nondis-
crimination was the reason they chose their lender overall was fairly small-6% for sub-
prime borrowers and 3% for all borrowers. Id.
264. See supra Part I.A.3.
265. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
266. Cf Adam Gifford,Jr., Emotion & Self-Control, 49J. EcoN. BEHAV. & ORG. 113, 128-29
(2002) ("[P]urely abstract options tend to present the most difficult problems with self-
control ....").
267. There is some debate in behavioral science as to whether and/or when this phe-
nomenon reflects quasi-hyperbolic discounting, a present-biased, immediacy, or myopia
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effect of uncertainty has been captured by prospect theory's "certainty
effect," the finding that people tend to weight certain losses and gains
more heavily than uncertain or probabilistic ones, so that the differ-
ence between probabilities of 0% and 5% and the difference between
probabilities of 95% and 100% both carry more weight in the decision
process than the difference between 45% and 50%.268 People under-
weight opportunity costs as opposed to out-of-pocket costs in part be-
cause the latter are nearer-term and more certain. 269 The operation
of time and uncertainty will differ both across people and across situa-
tions, depending on the vividness and detail with which a person in-
ternally visualizes the future uncertain event, such that no one
discount rate or myopic preference rate can be applied.27 °
As a consequence, decisions about near-term, certain events are
judged by tangible aspects such as feasibility, whereas long-term or
uncertain events are judged by the desirability of the broad-brush out-
come.271 Even where future feasibility issues can be predicted with
some accuracy, the vague visualization of the event does not call them
to mind. Instead people often leave feasibility to be determined later
in an attitude of "we'll think about that when we get there."272 Not all
aspects of a future or uncertain choice are equally affected by this
phenomenon; those aspects that are consistently construed at a high
or abstract level are neither discounted nor enhanced, but lower-level
details are weighted more strongly when made more concrete, imme-
diate, and certain. So, for example, a loan applicant would place
equal weight on the homeownership dimension-a more abstract fea-
ture of a home loan-regardless of time or uncertainty, whereas she is
unlikely to attend as carefully to a concrete monthly loan payment
when that payment is in the future or uncertain.
effect, or subadditivity of discounting over imagined time intervals. See, e.g., Daniel Read,
Is Time-Discounting Hyperbolic orSubadditive?, 23J. RISK & UNCERTAINrY 5, 5-6, 27-28 (2001).
That debate need not be resolved for the purposes of this analysis.
268. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 167, at 20-22.
269. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 166, at 7-9.
270. Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preferences: A Critical Review, 40 J.
ECON. LIT. 351, 360 (2002).
271. See Nira Liberman & Yaacov Trope, The Role of Feasibility and Desirability Considera-
tions in Near and Distant Future Decisions: A Test of Temporal Construal Theory, 75 J. PERSONAL-
ITy & Soc. PSYCHOL. 5, 8-11 (1998).
272. For example, when subjects were asked to imagine and describe moving into a new
apartment in the long-term future ("sometime next year"), they described starting a new
life. Id. at 8-9. Yet when asked to imagine and describe moving into a new apartment
tomorrow, they described the specific feasibility aspects of the life change, such as packing
and carrying boxes. Id.
273. See Shiri Nussbaum et al., Creeping Dispositionism: The Temporal Dynamics of Behavior
Prediction, 84J. PERSONALTY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 485, 485-86 (2003).
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Components of loan price that are uncertain at the time of loan
purchase, or that do not come into effect until sometime long after
the first monthly payment, are almost certainly underweighted, if not
ignored altogether, in borrower decisionmaking. The popularity of
loans with "teaser rates," adjustable rates that will, with certainty, in-
crease in six months or a year, is due to this bias.274 Consumers are
even more likely to fail to appreciate the true future costs of a loan
when these costs are not only in the future, but also uncertain, such as
where the interest rate is tied to an index. Similarly, prepayment pen-
alties and late fees, future expenses that are, from the borrower's per-
spective, quite uncertain at the time of loan purchase, probably do
not register on most borrowers' conscious decisionmaking about en-
tering into the loan contract. 275 Yet these fees have associated
probabilities-lenders can predict likely incidences of prepayment
penalties and late fees over a pool of loan-and are part of the true
cost of the loan to the borrower.
2 76
That the "Yes!" pitch is successful is a reflection not only of the
premium placed by segments of borrowers on avoiding ego threats; it
is also successful because the approval determination, and the upfront
cash it brings are the most concrete and immediate, and therefore
most salient, aspects of the loan. The "Cash Back Now," "Instant
Cash," "Fast Cash," and "Easy Credit" advertising slogans that are ubiq-
uitous throughout the subprime lending industry exploit the salience
of meeting immediate goals, with little or no mention of the price to
be paid in the future.277 The promise of credit approval holds out the
274. See, e.g., Bar-Gill, supra note 6, at 1405-07 (explaining how credit card teaser rates
play on consumer discounting of future costs). Teaser rates are popular with lenders both
because they can be used to convince borrowers to take loans at higher prices, and because
lenders know that borrowers are unlikely to refinance when rates go up. See infra Part
IV.A.3; cf Bar-Gill, supra note 6, at 1392-93 (reporting profitability to lenders of teaser rates
in credit card marketing).
275. SeeJack Guttentag, Your Mortgage: Prepayment Penalty a Surprise, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14,
2001, at K5 (reporting that many borrowers do not know they have a prepayment penalty
until they attempt to refinance, either because they do not read or understand their TILA
disclosures, or because when they took out the loan "the prepayment penalty did not regis-
ter in [their] mind[s]."); John Hechinger, Home Bound: Nasty Surprise Haunts Some Folks'
Mortgage: A Prepayment Penalty, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2001, at Al (reporting stories of borrow-
ers who were surprised to find their mortgages carried prepayment penalties); Bar-Gill,
supra note 6, at 1392-93 (late fees in credit card contracts are "largely invisible to
consumers").
276. See supra text accompanying note 56.
277. Even when the price to be paid must be mentioned, for example when the bor-
rower is receiving the federal disclosures, the lender can seek to focus the borrower's atten-
tion on what she will do with the loan proceeds rather than on what she will pay for the
loan proceeds. See Transcript of Record, Day 2-Vol. III, at 48-49, Official Joint Borrowers
Comm. v. Lehman Commercial Paper, Inc., No. SACV 01-0971-DOC (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19,
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possibility of a certain gain, as opposed to the uncertain prospect of a
lower-priced loan that might be produced by spending the time,
money, and effort of applying to a prime lender. The subprime indus-
try is well-aware that subprime borrowers are more concerned with
the 'Yes!" than the price; one lender listed loan origination fees and
interest rates last in a list of areas of competition among subprime
lenders, after "convenience in obtaining a loan, customer service,
marketing and distribution channels, [and] amount and term of the
loan. 278
Consumer survey evidence likewise bears out the higher inci-
dence of borrowers with subprime loans who shopped based on the
'Yes!" or the "quick decision" rather than the APR. Subprime borrow-
ers report less search for the best interest rate than prime borrowers;
about a third of subprime borrowers yet half of prime borrowers re-
port that they searched "a lot" for the best rate. 79 No money down
and a quick decision were more frequently cited by subprime borrow-
ers than by borrowers overall as reasons for choosing a particular
lender or broker.28 ° An industry study of recent African-American
and Latino purchase money home loan borrowers fleshes out these
findings, and sheds some light on why even upper-income minorities
are disproportionately likely to end up with subprime loans: A major-
ity reported that they were not provided with, and did not seek, a vari-
ety of mortgage options.
[They] did not actually comparison-shop for the best terms
for their mortgage. Many did not think such comparisons
were possible.
A substantial number ... were just happy to get a "yes"
to their mortgage application, so they did not even consider
the possibility of getting better terms for their mortgage.281
Fannie Mae similarly found that 10% of all homeowners and nearly a
third of all credit-impaired borrowers "did not care whether they re-
2003) (testimony of Terence J. LaFrankie) [hereinafter LaFrankie Testimony Day 2-Vol.
III] (describing lender practice of requiring, in the midst of receiving required federal
disclosures and other documents, that borrowers complete a document stating why they
want the loan).
278. NEW CENTURY FIN. CORP., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 18 (2003).
279. Courchane et al., supra note 88, at 372. Almost a third of all homeowners report
that they chose their lender based on the interest rate, whereas only 11% of subprime
borrowers report that this was why they chose their lender. 2001 NAT'L Hous. SURVEY,
supra note 53, at 14.
280. 2001 NAT'L Hous. SURVEY, supra note 53, at 14.
281. RIHA, supra note 205, at 8-9.
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ceived the lowest-cost loan for which they were qualified. They were
just happy to be approved for a mortgage. "282
3. Framing the Price: Capitalizing on the Evaluability of the Monthly
Payment.-
Through more than fifty interviews with borrowers and
inspection of loan documents, a pattern emerged.
All of the borrowers interviewed knew the amount of
their monthly payments, but none understood all of the fi-
nancial details in their loan such as adjustable interest rates,
balloon payments and points.
Many borrowers said they were not even seeking a loan
when the lenders contacted them via mail or telephone.
-Philadelphia Daily News, Feb. 5, 2001283
Time and again, borrowers and sellers of subprime loans report
that borrowers do not attempt to sort out the complicated structuring
of their loans and instead focus exclusively on one dimension of the
loan in making their decision: the monthly payment.284 Why? Again,
common decisionmaking patterns are to blame. Borrowers do not un-
derstand the other aspects of the home loan decision, and so they
ignore them. They focus on the one attribute of the loan price that
they can easily understand and evaluate, and that aspect is the
monthly payment. Although this can be a successful strategy for deal-
ing with risk, it can lead to accepting an overpriced loan because sell-
ers are also aware that although the evaluability of the monthly
payment is high, other attributes of the loan that determine price-
e.g., interest rate, APR, loan length, origination fees, balloon features,
late fees, credit insurance, and prepayment penalties-are less salient.
a. The Evaluability Bias: Oversimplifying to Cope with Incompre-
hensibility.-When presented with product attributes that they do not
comprehend, some consumers will react by ignoring the incompre-
hensible attributes rather than seeking further information to allow
them to comprehend all aspects of the decision.28 5 For some home
282. 2001 NAT'L Hous. SURVEY, supra note 53, at 12.
283. Paul D. Davies, Beg, Borrow, Beseiged, PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, Feb. 5, 2001, at D3.
284. See, e.g., 1998 Sen. Hrg., supra note 1, at 38 (statement of "Jim Dough," former fi-
nance company employee) ("The majority of customers are looking at one thing-that is
monthly payment"); Henriques & Bergman, supra note 74, at Al (quoting CEO of First
Alliance Mortgage Corporation as saying: "Most borrowers are much more concerned
about their monthly payment than the amount of any fees").
285. See Pamela Klopp & Maurice MacDonald, Nutrition Labels: An Exploratory Study of
Consumer Reasons for Nonuse, 15 J. CONSUMER AFF. 301, 308-09 (1981) (documenting that
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loan borrowers, it is not merely the jargon used by sellers or the spe-
cific operation of a loan term that is incomprehensible; the incompre-
hensibility for some is at a meta level, such that the consumer does
not even know where to begin searching for information that would
be informative. The consumer needs not merely information per se,
but the financial education to make that information meaningful.
Without this education, the consumer has no way to know the depth
of her own ignorance, nor the importance of the loan terms she does
not understand. Without knowing whether the attributes of the loan
that she does not understand are important, she is apt to ignore her
own ignorance. 286 Embarrassment about ignorance may further moti-
vate the consumer to ignore the incomprehensible, rather than seek-
ing more information.
287
b. Number Problems: Percentages, Large Numbers, and Trunca-
tion.-In addition to poor financial literacy, the way in which people
process numbers may cause borrowers to misunderstand or ignore (1)
percentages such as interest rates and APRs; (2) large numbers such
as finance charge, total of all payments, and balloons; and (3) differ-
ences between numbers disclosed when the numbers are grossly
similar.
People have an intuitive sense of whole positive integers, 28 8 but
must think longer and with more effort to process percentages. For
example, information given to consumers about nutritional content
was more likely to evoke relatively correct consumer comparisons of
nutritional value, and to be better remembered later, when presented
consumers reported that they did not use nutritional labels because they did not under-
stand nutrition or nutrition labels); Zuckerman & Chaiken, supra note 218, at 622 (noting
that limited knowledge in the relevant subject area can lead to reduced systematic process-
ing and increased heuristic processing). The general tendency to judge options by the
attributes that are easy to evaluate has been dubbed the "evaluability hypothesis." Christo-
pher K. Hsee, The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference Reversals Between Joint
and Separate Evaluations of Alternatives, 67 ORG. BEtrAY. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 247,
255-56 (1996).
286. Cf Craig R. Fox & Amos Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance, in
CVF, supra note 112, at 528, 539-42 (finding that people are only concerned about their
ignorance regarding aspects of a decision when they have some comparison reference
point that draws their attention to the ignorance).
287. Thus, it is not surprising that few Americans at the lowest financial literacy levels
seek assistance from others in performing tasks that require higher literacy levels to be
performed well. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
288. STANIsLAs DEHAENE, THE NUMBER SENSE: HOW THE MIND CREATES MATHEMATICS 88
(1997); see also Veronika Denes-Raj & Seymour Epstein, Conflict Between Intuitive and Ra-
tional Processing: When People Behave Against Their Better Judgment, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 819, 820 (1994) (describing the ratio-bias phenomenon, a preference for abso-
lute numbers over percentages).
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in adjective format, rather than in percentage format.289 Large effec-
tive differences in price when evaluated from the interest rate per-
spective may seem quite small-because people more easily and more
strongly process numbers as whole integers rather than as percent-
ages, the difference between 8% and 10% may seem small both in
absolute terms, and when the borrower is using a mental scale that
puts 100% at the high end and 1% at the low end, because both eight
and ten seem low. 290 Put in percentage terms, a small increase in the
interest rate or APR, although equivalent to many thousands of dol-
lars, will not register with some borrowers as a difference requiring
consideration in the loan decision. This is not true of all borrowers;
prime borrowers know to refinance when interest rates decline. But
subprime borrowers, particularly black, Latino, and female borrowers
with low credit scores, do not appear responsive to interest rate
changes.
29 1
Survey data bears out a failure to attend to the interest rate. In a
2001 survey of homeowners, including both prime and subprime bor-
rowers, about 10% reported that they do not know what their home
loan interest rate is, even within a percentage point or two. 2 9 2 The
10% figure probably understates the true number who do not know
their interest rate because the researchers did not investigate whether
the responses of borrowers who claimed to know their home loan's
interest rate within a percentage point or two were correct.
When recent home loan borrowers were surveyed, a large major-
ity preferred receiving information about the fees and costs associated
with the loan as a dollar amount such as TILA's finance charge, rather
than as a percentage such as the APR disclosure. A bare majority of
respondents even preferred to receive the contract interest rate dis-
closed as a dollar amount, rather than as a percentage.29 3
Although people state a preference for receiving price informa-
tion as whole numbers rather than percentages, there are problems
with relying on such large numbers as the finance charge or total pay-
289. Debra L. Scammon, "Information Load" and Consumers, 4J. CONSUMER RES. 148, 153
(1986).
290. When people process quantities or numbers, they are subject to a distance effect, in
that they can more easily (as defined by how quickly and accurately they do so) distinguish
between quantities or numbers that are far apart (80 and 100) than those that are close
together (81 and 82). DEHARNE, supra note 288, at 71.
291. See infra Part IV.A.3.
292. 2001 NAT'L Hous. SURVEY, supra note 53, at 13.
293. Jeanne M. Hogarth & Douglas M. Conover, Consumer Shopping for Home Purchase
Mortgages: Evidence from the 1997 Surveys of Consumers 15 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Re-
serve Sys. Div. of Consumer & Cmty. Affairs Consumer Policies Section Working Paper,
Aug. 7, 1997).
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ments to convey loan price. People display a magnitude effect when
trying to estimate numerosity or number size, in that they have more
difficulty distinguishing between two quantities or numbers equally far
apart when they are larger (1100 and 1200), than when they are
smaller (100 and 200). This magnitude effect operates in a decreas-
ing marginal ability to quickly and accurately distinguish between
quantities and numbers as they become larger. 294 It parallels prospect
theory's axiom, noted above, that people display diminishing margi-
nal sensitivity to increasing gains and losses, such that the difference
between $100 and $200 is weighted more heavily than the difference
between $1100 and $1200. As Dehaene has explained regarding the
mental "number line":
The "mental ruler" with which we measure numbers is not
graduated with regularly spaced marks. It tends to compress
larger numbers into a smaller space. Our brain represents
quantities in a fashion not unlike the logarithmic scale on a
slide rule, where equal space is allocated to the interval be-
tween 1 and 2, 2 and 4, or between 4 and 8.295
People display a bias towards small numbers, which occupy more
mental space and are more concrete and mentally available or imagi-
nable. 296 They frequently fail to appreciate the magnitude of differ-
ences between large numbers because these numbers are compressed
on their mental number line. Large dollar values are too big to com-
prehend in terms of daily experience and at some level can become
nearly indistinguishable.297
Some borrowers therefore fail to attend to the finance charge,
total payments, or balloon payment figures reflected on the TILA dis-
closure because these numbers are too large, dollar figures far beyond
their daily life experience. For some borrowers, a large finance
charge-say $81,000-is not so different on the mental number line
than an even larger finance charge-say $89,000. The degree to
294. DEHAENE, supra note 288, at 108.
295. Id. at 76. This principle, called "Weber's law" or "scalar law," is that for each doub-
ling of the quantities or numbers compared, we must double the distance between them to
easily distinguish them; that is, our ability to distinguish ten from thirteen is matched by
our ability to distinguish twenty from twenty-six. Id. at 72.
296. See Denes-Raj & Epstein, supra note 288, at 826 (explaining the ratio-bias
phenomenon).
297. Cf DAVID HUME, A TRE-ATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 22-23 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1888) ("I observe that when we mention any great number, such
as a thousand, the mind has generally no adequate idea of it ... "); Max Singer, The Vitality
of Mythical Numbers, inJUU, supra note 166, at 408, 410-11 (explaining that people cannot
estimate aggregate crime data because the quantity is beyond everyday experience).
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which people display these number line effects will vary across the
population and across settings, with people who are more accustomed
to dealing with larger numbers or dollar amounts less likely to experi-
ence these effects, and people for whom large numbers are especially
unfamiliar likely to experience these effects most strongly.
Finally, people may fail to appreciate significant price differences
due to rounding, simplifying to reduce the amount of information
under consideration, in the context of multi-digit numbers having
more than two digits.298 People prefer round numbers because they
are simpler and more cognitively accessible than nonround numbers.
They do not, however, always follow the rule to round up when they
should. Instead, people sometimes simplify the information load of
the number when the number has more than two digits by truncating,
reading from left to right, so they more frequently round down than
round up.299 The popularity (with sellers) of nines at the ends of
price figures appears to result from consumer truncation of price in-
formation processing. 300 Note that not all consumers need to trun-
cate for nine-ending prices to be profitable, only a significant segment
of consumers. This segment is likely to be the segment having the
least experience and familiarity dealing with numbers and financial
matters.
The effects of truncation will vary with the place-level to which
the buyer truncates: if a $2.19 product price is truncated to $2, the
effect is insensitivity to 19 cents; if a $21,999 loan amount is truncated
to $20,000, the effect is insensitivity to $1999. The rents extracted by
sellers per purchasing decision would vary accordingly. Truncation
can have particularly large effects when it is interest rate percentages
or APRs that are being truncated rather than finance charges or other
whole numbers. The difference between 10% and 10.8% might be
missed by the borrower entirely, if she is the type of shopper who trun-
cates. Unfortunately, this difference can have a large dollar effect
over the life of the loan.30
298. DEHAENE, supra note 288, at 75-76. We understand two digit numbers by processing
both digits simultaneously, rather than by reading from left to right. Id. When faced with
three or more digits, however, people at times truncate. Id. at 80.
299. Robert M. Schindler & Patrick N. Kirby, Patterns of Rightmost Digits Used in Advertised
Prices: Implications for Nine-Ending Effects, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 192, 199 (1997).
300. Id. (dubbing this the "underestimation effect").
301. For a thirty-year $100,000 loan, the difference in monthly payments for a 10% ver-
sus a 10.8% loan is about $60, but the difference in payments over the life of the loan is
about $21,000.
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c. Framing Effects: The Invisibility of Financed Fees and Costs.-
The most fundamental challenge to the rationality assumption made
by decision behavior researchers is the recognition that the manner in
which a decision problem and choice set is presented and perceived
or "coded" affects the decision itself. Decisions cannot be perceived
apart from some frame of reference, whether the integrated states of
well-being reference point assumed by rational choice theory or a
piecemeal isolated gain-loss calculus frame posited by prospect the-
ory.3" 2 This phenomenon has been dubbed "framing,"' ' 3 although it
is not so much a distinctive phenomenon as a reflection of a lack of
definite preexisting preferences and the invocation of various heuris-
tics, biases, and coping strategies that shape those preferences during
the decisionmaking process.
While we need not accept a decision choice as it is framed by
others or by happenstance, we frequently trade off accuracy for less
effort and accept the decision choice formulation as it is presented to
us. 30 4 Framing effects are manipulated by those with a market incen-
tive to do so because "alternative framings of the same options can
give rise to different choices." ' 5 The more familiar we are with a de-
cision situation, and the stronger our preexisting preferences regard-
ing the decision, the easier it is for us to reformulate the situation
(edit the frame) as we make the decision, and the less susceptible we
are to framing effects.30 6 Because the home loan decision process is
an infrequent one for borrowers, it is one in which they are particu-
larly susceptible to framing effects.
One type of framing, "choice bracketing," is framing the breadth
of the decision itself, bundling or unbundling aspects of a choice over
time and space. 0 7 Bundling or unbundling various gains and losses
and considering them part of a single or multiple choice bracket ex-
302. Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, 12 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 183,
186 (1999).
303. Rabin, supra note 167, at 36. For a more extensive typology of framing effects, see
Irwin 0. Levin et al., All Frames Are Not Created Equal: A Typology and Critical Analysis of
Framing Effects, 76 ORG. BEHAV. & Hum. DECISION PROCESSES 149, 152-81 (1998).
304. See Robyn A. LeBoeuf & Eldar Shafir, Deep Thoughts and Shallow Frames: On the Sus-
ceptibility to Framing Effects, 16 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 77, 87 (2003) (observing how
respondents failed to account for additional variants during a second decisionmaking
experiment).
305. Eldar Shafir et al., Money Illusion, 112 Q.J. ECON. 341, 346 (1997).
306. Cf Bettman et al., supra note 175, at 204-05 (explaining that categorizing new stim-
uli according to preexisting schemas improves the accuracy of decisionmaking).
307. See Colin F. Camerer et al., Labor Supply of New York City Cab Drivers: One Day at a
Time, in CVF, supra note 112, at 356, 365 (defining bracketing as "simplifying decisions by
isolating them from the stream of decisions they are embedded in").
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ploits prospect theory's observation of diminishing sensitivity to gains
and losses. Because people place declining weight on marginal in-
creases in gains and losses, when a number of losses are bundled to-
gether, they will register on one's mental account as a smaller total
loss than each loss would register if incurred separately.3 °8 In the loan
context, even if a borrower thinks that shopping around might help
her eliminate one $100 fee or another, she might be unwilling to
spend this effort because the $100 seems negligible compared to the
total loan price of thousands of dollars, even to a borrower who would
comparison shop between grocery stores to save even $10.309
In addition to the origination fee and single premium credit in-
surance, a product that is extremely profitable to lenders but rarely
useful for borrowers, 10 other 'junk fees" are bundled into loan pack-
ages, and then interest is charged on these over the life of the loan.
Fannie Mae found that these fees, costs that lenders can legally add to
a settlement statement under names such as document preparation
fee, underwriting analysis fee, tax escrow fee, or escrow fund analysis
fee, are quite common."' One subprime lender recently claimed that
its fifteen different settlement fees and charges were standard, even
where they could add up to 20% of the total loan.3" 2 The prevalence
of these fees at closing plainly appears to be a framing problem-once
they are bundled in with total price, most consumers do not notice
them at all, and if they do notice them, figure they are such a small
proportion of the overall cost as to not be worth fighting about.3 13
Financing of all fees and costs can decrease the weight put on the fees
308. The classic example of this is when car salespeople sell consumers on a car at a
particular price and then persuade the buyer to add numerous "options" that seem, in
relation to the total price of the car, to be negligible. ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE:
SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 16 (4th ed. 2001). Although Cialdini ascribes this to contrast effects
(the option price in contrast to the car price seems negligible), it is only likely to work in
conjunction with mental accounting-if the option purchase were not choice bracketed
with the car purchase, but were instead an offer by a salesperson passing by the car lot to
sell you an air conditioning unit for your home, it is unlikely that the small price of the air
conditioning as compared to the price of the car would be of any consequence, decision-
ally speaking. See Thaler, supra note 302, at 186.
309. Transcript of Record at Day 2, Vol. II, p. 60, Official Joint Borrowers Comm. v.
Lehman Commercial Paper, Inc., No. SACV 01-0971-DOC (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2003) (testi-
mony of Terence J. LaFrankie) [hereinafter LaFrankie Testimony Day 2-Vol. II].
310. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
311. 2001 NAT'L Hous. SURVEY, supra note 53, at 6. Fannie Mae found that only just
over half of borrowers surveyed were confident that they were not charged these fees. Id.
312. See Davies, supra note 283, at D3 (recounting story of borrower who received a
$21,000 home equity loan, of which $4187 went to pay fifteen different fees and settlement
charges).
313. Caroline E. Mayer, Add-Ons Add Up: Firms Are Finding New Ways to Tack Fees on Basic
Bills, WASH. PosT, Nov. 17, 2002, at Hi.
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in the loan decision or even make them virtually invisible to some
borrowers so much so that The Washington Post found it necessary to
explain to borrowers that "zero cost" loans are not really zero cost.11
This relates to one reason subprime lenders try to sell borrowers
cash-out refinancing loans rather than second mortgages: in addition
to being able to collect interest on the entire amount,31 5 the larger
the loan, the smaller a large origination fee will appear to many bor-
rowers.3" 6 Many subprime borrowers do not have the financial liter-
acy to determine that a refinanced first mortgage loan at a couple of
points higher interest rate is much more expensive than keeping a
first mortgage with a low interest rate and adding a small second mort-
gage at a higher rate. As one borrower who paid points and fees total-
ing $8105 to do a cash-out refinancing of an existing $74,000, 7.5%
mortgage with a $100,750, 12.85% mortgage explained:
I did not understand the full cost of the additional
money I received until several weeks later when I finally dis-
cussed the situation with one of my sons. Based on my son's
calculations, American Equity Mortgage317 and their loan of-
ficer thought it was in my best interest:
To pay $8,105 in points and fees to receive $18,645 in
additional funds; to pay an effective interest rate of 44 per-
cent on the . . . additional funds . . . ; and to pay an addi-
tional $201,608 in interest over the life of the loan for the
$18,645 in additional funds.318
Although $8000 in various points and fees for a $100,000 loan did not
appear to warrant shopping for a better price, refraining the compo-
nents of the transaction allowed the borrower to see just how high the
price of the loan was. But this was long after her three-day right of
314. Kenneth R. Harney, Acute Cases of Refi Fever, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2002, at Hi (ex-
plaining that transaction fees are paid by borrowers on "zero cost" loans in the form of
settlement costs rolled up into a higher interest rate or added to the principal of the loan).
315. Further, a refinancing is in first-lien position rather than second, which puts the
lender in a more favorable position at any foreclosure.
316. See Transcript of Record, Day 4-Vol. I, at 91, Official Joint Borrowers Comm. v.
Lehman Commercial Paper, Inc., No. SACV 01-0971-DOC (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2003) (testi-
mony of TerenceJ. LaFrankie) (loan officers were trained to refinance first mortgages into
a new, larger mortgage rather than selling smaller second mortgages because "[y] ou would
never be able to get the size fees you could get by lending that small of an amount").
Lenders try to convince borrowers to borrow more money than they need to borrow, so
that the origination fee does not "look so bad." LaFrankie Testimony Day 1-Vol. II, supra
note 79, at 99-100.
317. American Equity Mortgage originated over $1.3 billion in loan volume in 2002.
News Release, American Equity Mortgage, Consumer Choice Award (May 8, 2003), availa-
ble at http://www.americanequity.com/award.html.
318. 2001 Sen. Hrg., supra note 77, at 12-13 (statement of Carol Mackey).
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rescission had expired; to refinance elsewhere, she will have to pay
another set of origination fees and costs, plus a prepayment penalty to
the first lender. 19
d. Exploiting Borrower Reliance on the Monthly Payment.-A sim-
plifying heuristic used by subprime borrowers for deciding whether to
take the loan is using the monthly payment as the single price-related
attribute upon which to base the loan decision. The monthly pay-
ment amount, even if higher than prior mortgage payments, is still
close in size to dollar amounts with which most borrowers have famili-
arity. It is a figure that can be assessed by simple addition and subtrac-
tion in calculating monthly budget amounts, rather than requiring
more difficult calculations such as multiplication or working with per-
centages. The salience of the monthly payment is high for all seg-
ments, but perhaps even higher for lower income segments,
frequently the elderly and minorities, because people on a more re-
stricted budget tend to perform household accounting on a weekly or
monthly basis, rather than over longer time intervals.320
If one is going to reduce the loan decision to a single attribute,
the monthly payment is probably the best choice because the af-
fordability of payments is a good way to assess risk of foreclosure. If
you had to pick a single oversimplifying heuristic, this would be it.
However, the monthly payment conveys little information about the
price of the loan. Price shopping based on monthly payment might
have worked when all home loans were comparable thirty-year fully
amortizing products. Today, however, sellers of loans can take advan-
tage of this simplifying heuristic to extract a larger profit from the
borrowers relying solely on the monthly payment, either through
charging a higher interest rate or through packing the loan with more
fees and lucrative but useless credit insurance products.
319. See id. at 13. A similar story is told by judge Posner in Emery v. American General
Finance, wherein a lender, in the course of extending a borrower a $200 personal loan,
refinanced a $2000 personal loan she had taken six months earlier, calculating the finance
charge on the total new loan amount:
By our calculation, the implicit interest rate that she paid for the $200 loan ex-
ceeded 110 percent per annum. This was not disclosed on the Truth in Lending
Act form that Emery received because the Act treats the transaction as a reborrow-
ing of the original amount of the loan plus $200. So much for the Truth in
Lending Act as a protection for borrowers.
71 F.3d 1343, 1346 (7th Cir. 1995).
320. Thaler, supra note 302, at 193. Due to different financial constraints, different con-
sumer segments display systematic differences in their mental accounting: "Poorer fami-
lies .. . tend to have budgets defined over shorter periods (a week or a month), whereas
wealthier families may use annual budgets." Id. at 193-94; accord Richard H. Thaler, Anbma-
lies: Saving, Fungibility, and Mental Accounts, 4J. EcoN. PERSP. 193, 194 (1990).
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Lenders and brokers are well aware that in evaluating the
monthly payment, many borrowers are satisficing, not optimizing.
That is, borrowers are looking for a loan with a monthly payment
amount that will be equal to or less than the maximum monthly pay-
ment amount they think they can afford. Brokers and loan officers
will obtain that figure and then quote a loan price (including interest
and packed-in products and fees) that will bring the monthly payment
to that level, regardless of the borrower's desire or appropriateness for
packed-in credit products, regardless of what the lender or broker has
done to earn the origination fees, and regardless of the monthly inter-
est rate for which the borrower would qualify based on risk.
Studies confirm that borrowers who rely on monthly payments as
a simplifying heuristic are vulnerable to price gouging. Using a mul-
tivariate regression analysis of the home loan search methods of prime
and subprime borrowers, one study found that "borrowers whose
search emphasized affordable monthly payments" were more likely to
end up with a higher interest rate, subprime loan rather than a prime
loan, even controlling for underwriting (risk) factors.32' An AARP
study of older borrowers who had recently obtained refinance loans
found: "Low monthly payments, getting approved, and a quick turn-
around were the loan characteristics more important to subprime
than prime borrowers, while interest rate and mortgage terms were
more important to prime than subprime borrowers. '' 22
4. Disclosures, the Loan Seller's Sword and Shield.-
When my wife and I went in for the closing, they went through
all the paperwork so fast, it was like a barker in a circus-they just
keep talking, you put your money down .... It was over in less
than a half hour.
The basic problem is that when you sit down at that closing
table, the lender knows more than you do. You expect honest deal-
ings, like you have had on past loans.
-2001 Senate Hearing Testimony of borrower
Paul Satriano 2
3
The disclosures currently required by federal and state law do not
help significant numbers of borrowers to price shop and can even af-
firmatively harm borrowers. First, the quantity of disclosures can cre-
321. Courchane et al., supra note 88, at 373.
322. Neal Walters & Sharon Hermanson, Older Subprime Refinance Mortgage Borrowers,
AARP PUBLIC POL'Y INST. DATA DIGEST, July 2002, at 3.
323. 2001 Sen. Hrg., supra note 77, at 15, 17 (statement of Paul Satriano).
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ate an information overload. Second, they are given at a time when
the borrower is no longer in a decisionmaking frame, but is already
psychologically committed to the loan and likely to ignore red flags
under the influence of motivated reasoning. Finally, the disclosures
reinforce a false sense of security about the home borrowing process,
in part through the representativeness heuristic.
a. Information Overload and Stress-Truncated Reasoning,
Again.-As explained above, the disclosures required by federal law
were designed to reduce the problem of information overload, by
placing key pieces of information on a few sheets of paper. But preda-
tory lenders mock disclosure statutes, frequently giving borrowers
more "disclosures" or other paperwork about the home loan than re-
quired by law, with little time to read them. As the HUD-Treasuiy Re-
port explains: "The Federal disclosures under RESPA and TILA
comprise only 3-5 forms out of what can involve up to 50 docu-
ments . ",324 Although some of these disclosures are required by
state law, the excess "disclosures" are part of sales tactics designed to
"overload, overwhelm, distract, and. . . fatigue" borrowers.3 25 Settle-
ment officers typically schedule home loan closings every thirty min-
utes, an unrealistic amount of time for even highly literate borrowers
to read through all the fine print.326 By moving through the papers
quickly, the lender sends the message that the borrower is not ex-
pected to read or understand the documents, or, contrariwise, is ex-
pected to understand them easily, but in either case is not expected to
ask questions. Borrowers have frequently reported that this tactic is
successful-they feel too rushed at closing and do not feel they have
324. HUD-TRASURY REPORT, supra note 46, at 63; see also LaFrankie Testimony Day 2-
Vol. II, supra note 309, at 25-26, 40 (explaining that loan officers were trained to present
borrower with fifteen to twenty documents to sign, interspersing the three or four "hot"
federal disclosure documents with mundane documents not required by law); at 45-46 (ex-
plaining that in presenting the GFE, a single document containing an itemization of settle-
ment costs, loan officers were trained to "hit hard on the little insignificant [fees]" so that
by the time the loan officer came to the place on the GFE disclosing the lender's origina-
tion fee, "hopefully the [borrower's] attention span had wandered, and their trust factor
was way up").
325. Deposition Testimony of Jay M. Finkelman at 65-66, Pagter v. First Alliance Mort-
gage Co., No. CV766996 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 1999) [hereinafter Finkelman Testi-
mony]; see also Marsh Testimony, supra note 84, at 69, 71 (describing lender strategy to
"distract[ ] ... borrowers, from the fundamental credit disclosures ... to distract borrow-
ers from the consumer disclosures that matter most"); Henriques & Bergman, supra note
74, at Al ("The [lender's] script, regulators say, is designed to deflect questions about rates
and fees, swamp borrowers under masses of needless detail and foster a trusting atmos-
phere that would encourage customers to lower their guard.").
326. Engel & McCoy, supra note 109, at 1309; Renuart, supra note 202, at 490.
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the time to read and ask questions about all the documents.3 27 The
feeling of being rushed may create a sense of stress, leading to trun-
cated reasoning rather than careful cognition, and consideration of
even fewer loan attributes than might otherwise be considered. 328
The result is that almost 70% of consumers disagree with the state-
ment that "[m]ost people read their Truth-in-Lending Statements
carefully.
329
b. Motivated Reasoning, Decision Process Framing, and the En-
dowment Effect.-In addition to the disclosures coming too late as a
practical matter to use to shop, as a psychological matter they are apt
not to be used well in decisionmaking. The first impediment to using
the disclosures well is "motivated reasoning," the tendency to selec-
tively search and interpret information to justify a desired conclu-
sion. 3 Although the decisionmaker perceives herself as engaging in
an unbiased reasoning process, all the information and logic used are
biased toward the result she wants to arrive at. This form of reasoning
has also been called "elastic justification." '
Reasoning is not infinitely elastic, but it is particularly elastic
when assessing outcomes that are not definite-where there is uncer-
tainty. As discussed above, the GFE can disclose a range of estimated
settlement figures, and the TILA disclosures need only to state
whether the loan "may" have a prepayment penalty. Lenders there-
fore low-ball borrowers in the early price estimates.33 2 Where a range
of values is given, or only uncertain information, the potential elastic-
ity of justification will be high, as the borrower who already wants to
take the loan may engage in motivated reasoning and focus on the
327. E.g., Henriques & Bergman, supra note 74, at Al. One mortgage seller's loan of-
ficer manual instructs: "Now don't stop, hesitate or look [the consumer] in the eye. Keep
your momentum going." and "Don't gear the customer for a slow, relaxed decision."
Marsh Testimony, supra note 84, at 78, 98, 128. By not making eye contact and not paus-
ing, the loan officer creates "a discomfort zone for a potential borrower who then does not
want to challenge the loan officer and say wait a minute, hold it, slow down, I don't under-
stand this . . . " Finkelman Testimony, supra note 325, at 62-63.
328. See, e.g., Bettman et al., supra note 175, at 200 (surveying evidence that time pres-
sure decreases complex thinking and increases reliance on shortcut decision strategies).
329. Durkin & Elliehausen, supra note 163, at 129 tbl.6.
330. Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480 (1990).
331. Christopher K. Hsee, Elastic Justification: How Tempting but Task-Irrelevant Factors In-
fluence Decisions, 62 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 330 (1995).
332. See HOUSEHOLD EXAMINATION, supra note 72, at 6-7 (explaining one lender's prac-
tice of disclosing a broad range of potential settlement costs and origination fees on the
GFE and then repeatedly charging at the high end of that range at closing); cf CIALDINI,
supra note 308, at 84-87 (noting that car salespeople use the same tactic).
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bright side-the low end of the dollar range of settlement costs and
the possibility that a prepayment penalty might not be imposed.
Second, the disclosures are too late because of another framing
effect, the decision stage frame. A decision is a point between two
stages: a predecisional deliberation stage of weighing alternatives, and
an implementation stage of implementing a decision that one has
made.33 ' A decision is often subjectively experienced as a commit-
ment. Once someone has committed to something, she may be reluc-
tant to change and will not pause to reconsider her decision even
when new information comes about during implementation that
would cause her, if she were in the predecisional phase, to weigh op-
tions differently. Instead, motivated reasoning may lead her to misin-
terpret ambiguous evidence as providing further support, and forget,
discount, or reject new evidence that does not support her priorjudg-
ment.334 The sunk costs fallacy can also come into play once she has
spent effort, time, and tangible costs in making the decision. Rather
than appear wasteful and incurring a certain loss by admitting having
made a bad and costly decision and changing course, the deci-
sionmaker may, at least up to a point, mentally inflate the probability
of success and continue with the commitment.335
Most home loan disclosures are given to the borrower at a point
in time when the borrower has already moved to an implementation
mindset and is no longer in a predecisional frame. The GFE is given
three days after the borrower has gathered paperwork, filled out an
application form, and paid an application and/or appraisal fee, and
may be feeling mental commitment stemming from these sunk costs.
A broker may also have convinced the borrower prior to receipt of the
GFE to sign a form promising to pay the broker even if the loan is
never originated.33 6 The HOEPA and TILA disclosures come three
333. See Liberman & Trope, supra note 271, at 7-8 (calling decision framing "temporal
construal theory"); Renuart, supra note 202, at 487-91 (describing the process by which
lenders rush the two stages).
334. This bias has a host of names: e.g., belief perseverance, confirmatory bias, and the
entity effect. Lee Ross & Craig A. Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On the
Origins and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments, inJUU, supra note 166, at 129, 144-
52.
335. Hal R. Arkes & Laura Hutzel, The Role of Probability of Success Estimates in the Sunk Cost
Effect, 13J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 295, 301-05 (2000).
336. Renuart, supra note 202, at 488. More subtly, a lender might require potential
borrowers to place their signature next to a description of their loan at the application
stage because although no loan contract is yet being presented, the act of signing creates a
feeling of commitment, that the potential borrowers are "putting in full faith and word
that they want to continue the process" of obtaining the loan. LaFrankie Testimony Day 2-
Vol. III, supra note 309, at 18; see also Walling Aff., supra note 251, 13 (describing meth-
ods used by loan officers to "get the consumer emotionally committed to the loan").
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days before and at closing, when the borrower is even more likely to
have moved to a psychologically committed implementation mindset.
HOEPA recognizes something close to this phenomenon for
high-cost loan borrowers and gives them a disclosure explaining that
they are not obligated to accept a loan once they have signed the ap-
plication. But even high-cost borrowers will usually know that they are
not obligated to accept the loan until they sign the papers at closing;
decision framing, sunk costs, motivated reasoning, and financial re-
source limits all operate despite the absence of a legal commitment to
the loan. In the words of one borrower who was quoted a fixed APR
of 8% from Wells Fargo, but found herself at closing signing papers
for a loan with an adjustable APR of over 9%, "At the point we were
sitting at the table, we were just so desperate. 337
Finally, the three-day right of rescission is very unlikely to be re-
sorted to due to the endowment effect. Once people perceive them-
selves as being endowed with or having ownership over something
they value it more highly-and will demand more to give it up than
something they do not perceive themselves as possessing. 338 It is thus
unsurprising that the three-day right of rescission is virtually never ex-
ercised within three days of the loan closing.
3 3 9
c. Representativeness and the Veneer of Legality.-People often
take one event or thing to be representative of others that are only
somewhat similar.34 ° This "representativeness heuristic" leads to the
fallacy of the "law of small numbers," by which people confidently pre-
dict based on a small sample of experience that the entire population
will behave in the same manner as the sample even when the sample is
337. Larry Rulison, "Predatory" Propositions: Regulators Scrutinize Mortgage Loan Tactics,
PHILADELPHIA Bus. J., Mar. 11, 2005, available at http://philadelphia.bizjournals.com/phil-
adelphia/stories/2005/03/14/storyl.html.
338. Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status
Quo Bias, in CVF, supra note 112, at 159, 160-63. The endowment effect is sometimes called
the willingness-to-pay (WTP) versus willingness-to-accept (WTA) or offer-asking gap. Rus-
sell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and LegalAnalysis, 97 Nw. U. L. Rrv. 1227, 1228, 1231
(2003).
339. Federal Reserve Board Governor Donald Kohn has testified: "With regard to [the]
right of rescission, let me say that virtually every outreach meeting that we've had bankers
stand up and say, 'I've been in the banking business for 35 years, I've been lending money
that entire time. No one has ever asked to exercise their right of rescission.'" Financial
Services Regulatory Relief: The Regulators' View: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institu-
tions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 109th Cong. 26 (2005) (state-
ment of Donald L. Kohn, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
340. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 166, at 4-7.
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not representative of the population along the relevant dimension.34'
In the consumer setting, the representativeness heuristic can lead con-
sumers with prior knowledge of a type of product to assume that a
new similar product will mirror their prior experience if the new
product does not have sufficient cues that it is different from past
products.3 42
Sellers invoke the representativeness heuristic to calm borrower
feelings of overload and worry about signing a raft of documents they
have not read and/or do not understand. One lender training man-
ual directed its loan officers, when they placed a stack of paperwork in
front of the borrowers to sign, to announce: "Okay, folks, we have
about fifteen papers to okay. Now, most of these papers are the same
ones you signed when you took out your last mortgage. 343 Because
predatory loans are refinancings or second mortgages, not purchase
money loans, the borrowers are already familiar with the process.
Even if the format of the note or deed is different from the last loan,
the federally required disclosures will have a familiar, reassuring look.
Although ordinarily, the stakes of the home loan decision would moti-
vate borrowers to examine the documents carefully, the reassurance
that this loan is no different than the last gives borrowers a reason to
let down their guard.
Compounding the problem is that the disclosures give the veneer
of legality and authority to the loan process, both to borrowers at the
time they take the loan and to regulatory agencies and courts who
may review the transaction down the line. By seeing the many govern-
ment-required disclosures, some borrowers may be led to believe that
the government regulates the home loan process to a greater degree
than it does. This "lulling effect" of the disclosures can result in bor-
rowers failing to be as self-protective during the process as they should
be. Loan sellers like to point out to borrowers that these are "disclo-
sure forms from the federal government" because it "sounds real offi-
cial .... It sounds comfy, cozy .... Gives somebody confidence." 44
341. Id at 7-8; accord Richard E. Nisbett et al., Popular Induction: Information Is Not Necessa-
rily Informative, inJUU, supra note 166, at 109-10.
342. Stacy L. Wood & John G. Lynch, Jr., Prior Knowledge and Complacency in New Product
Learning, 29J. CONSUMER RES. 416, 424 (2002).
343. Marsh Testimony, supra note 84, at 113-14; see also Walling Aff., supra note 251, at
Ex. 2, Part II, p. 29 (quoting same from loan officer training manual); LaFrankie Testi-
mony Day 2-Vol. III, supra note 309, at 35 (explaining that by describing documents this
way, the loan officer put the borrowers "at ease").
344. LaFrankie Testimony Day 2-Vol. II, supra note 309, at 79; see also LaFrankie Testi-
mony Day 2-Vol. III, supra note 277, at 36 (noting that in conjunction with disclosures,
"[y]ou always want to use the word 'federal' because this made the people feel safe").
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As one borrower stated in describing the settlement of his home loan,
at which he signed the papers quickly, without taking the time to read
them: "I was under the impression that the settlement officer is a neu-
tral party and the D.C. government had some oversight over all settle-
ments." '345 Over the years since TILA was passed, about 70% of
consumers surveyed have agreed with the statement that TILA "makes
people more confident when dealing with creditors." '346 This is a posi-
tive outcome when that confidence leads to decisions in the con-
sumer's best interests. However, it is a negative one where it leads to
acceptance of terms that are not in the borrower's best interests.
The unwarranted comfort that some borrowers take from their
prior borrowing experience and from the federal disclosure forms is
exacerbated by a surprisingly prevalent myth. According to the 2003
National Housing Survey, just over 40% of all American adults think
that "[h] ousing lenders are required by law to give you the best possi-
ble rates."347 This erroneous belief is even more widespread among
minority communities targeted by predatory lenders. Two-thirds of all
blacks and over half of all English-language-dominant Latinos and
three-quarters of all Spanish-language-dominant Latinos responding
to the survey agreed with the statement.
The source of this myth is unclear-perhaps overoptimism about
the extent of government protection or motivated reasoning on the
part of borrowers who have obtained loans at high rates but want to
convince themselves that the rate they received was a good one.348 It
may partly be an artifact of consumer familiarity with both Biblical
prohibitions and formerly existing legal usury caps on home loans.
The higher incidence of this misperception among minorities is
not surprising, given that they are rarely given any information from
lending professionals that would alert them to the fact that loan prices
345. Quarles Declaration 17, FIC Capital City Mortgage Corp., Civ. A. No. 98CV-237
(GK/AK) (D.D.C. 2004) (on file with author). Other borrowers think the settlement agent
works for the borrower, an unsurprising belief given that the borrower usually pays the
closing agent's fee. However, the settlement agent works for the lender. Renuart, supra
note 202, at 471 & n.7.
346. Durkin & Elliehausen, supra note 163, at 129 tbl.6.
347. FANNIE MAE FOUND., UNDERSTANDING AMERICA'S HOMEOWNERSHIP GAPS: 2003 NA-
TIONAL HOUSING SURVEY 7 (2004). The 2002 National Housing Survey reported similar re-
sults for the same question. 2002 NAT'L Hous. SURVEY, supra note 249, at 9.
348. Many U.S. employees hold a similar myth about the extent of government protec-
tion in the workplace. Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of
Worker Perceptions of Legal Protections in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 105, 134-47
(1997) (relating that most at-will employees believe they are protected from many arbitrary
firings that are perfectly legal and think that something closer to a for-cause standard
applies).
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can vary. In the recent testing of mortgage loan brokers described
above, white applicants were told that they could qualify elsewhere for
better, prime loan rates, but the more-creditworthy African-American
and Latino applicants were offered only higher rate subprime
loans.349 Similarly, real estate agents have been found to more fre-
quently offer to white than minority homebuyers "reduced closing
costs or lower mortgage rates through affiliated lending and service
companies," thus suggesting that rates are not required by the govern-
ment to be as low as possible and are instead negotiable."'
d. Disclosures Blame the Borrower.-Predatory lenders have an
added reason to be meticulous in giving the required disclosures, as
borrowers who receive overpriced and overly risky loans are more
likely to challenge the loans in litigation or foreclosure proceed-
ings. 351 Borrowers who claim that they did not understand the cost
and terms of their loans when they agreed to them will face a lender
brandishing the disclosures as a shield from any liability.3 52 When one
borrower thought she was borrowing about $51,000 at 8.5%, but dis-
covered some time after closing that a 26% loan origination fee had
been added to the principal, bringing it to over $64,000, her lender's
response emphasized that she was responsible for her own undoing:
"Well, Ms. Durney, the contract is signed. You signed a contract, and I
thought seniors honored their contracts."3 3  The borrower re-
sponded as the lender intended: "I felt so stupid . . .I couldn't tell
349. Harney, supra note 55, at Fl.
350. See Kenneth R. Harney, Agents Steer Home Buyers Based on Race, Study Says, L.A. TIMES
(April 16, 2006); cf. Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Nego-
tiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 856 (1991) (finding that car salespeople were more likely to
invite price negotiations with white customers than black customers, and citing nationwide
survey results that 61% of black consumers and 31% of white consumers did not realize
that car sticker prices are negotiable).
351. Cf Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behav-
ioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 627, 682-85
(1996) (explaining that securities brokers view prospectus disclosure as immunizing).
352. Federal Reserve Board Governor Edward M. Gramlich has been quoted as saying:
"When you hear these predatory lending stories, my initial reaction is 'Gee, why couldn't
the borrower get someone to review the papers before they signed them?'" Paul D. Davies,
Fighting the Predators, PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, Feb. 7, 2001, at 10.
353. Transcript of Record at Day 4, Vol. 1, p. 43, Official Joint Borrowers Comm. v.
Lehman Commercial Paper, Inc., No. SACV 01-0971-DOC (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2003) (testi-
mony of Velda Durney) [hereinafter Durney Testimony]. Her lender later explained to
the New York Times- "All borrowers are given two separate three-day periods to reject the
terms of the loan. She decided not to." Henriques & Bergman, supra note 74, at Al (refer-
ring to the three-day period after receiving the HOEPA disclosure, because it was a high-
cost loan, and TILA's three-day right of rescission).
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anybody." '54 Courts and regulators have been sympathetic to the ar-
gument that borrowers who are given disclosures are responsible for
their own predation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit recently agreed with the district court that
no reasonable jury could find that a borrower did not understand that
credit insurance was optional when the borrower had signed a form
disclosing that fact.355 This despite the court's description of the bor-
rower as follows:
Williams testified that he had only a sixth-grade education
from the segregated schools of Savannah, Georgia, that he
could read no more than 40 percent of a newspaper, . .. that
he thought an interest rate of 13.90 percent exceeded 13.9
percent, and that when he bought his house in 1970, he "de-
pended on [his wife] basically to do most of [his] reading [at
the closing] 'cause she had an l1th grade education." Wil-
liams also testified that during his 20-minute meeting with
[the lender] to settle the loan, the loan officers neither ex-
plained the papers he signed nor gave him time to review the
papers or any papers to take home.356
Courts have rejected any argument that borrowers have the right to a
federal mortgage price disclosure they can understand; lenders are
free to provide non-English speakers with disclosures exclusively in
English.357 Employing reasoning that could effectively prohibit the
majority of home loan borrowers, particularly subprime borrowers,
from collecting actual damages for violations of TILA, more than one
court has held that borrowers who could not read their lender's En-
glish-language TILA disclosures could not collect damages: "Because
Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that they either read the disclosure
statement or that they understood the charges being disclosed, they
cannot show that they relied on the inaccurate disclosure."3 58
354. Durney Testimony, supra note 353, at 45.
355. Williams v. First Gov't Mortgage & Investors Corp., 225 F.3d 738, 750-51 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
356. Id. at 744-45 (internal citations omitted). The court did, however, remand for fur-
ther review by the trial court of the entire loan transaction for unconscionability. Id. at
752; see also Harrison v. Commercial Credit Corp., No. Civ.A.4:O1CV151LN, 2003 WL
1844464, at *4-*5 (S.D. Miss. 2003) (unpublished decision) (holding that where borrowers
did not read their loan documents, but could have done so or found someone with good
eyesight to do so, they could not claim lack of knowledge that the credit insurance ob-
tained with their loans was optional).
357. E.g., Nevarez v. O'Connor Chevrolet, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 927, 936 (2004).
358. Id.; accord Turner v. Beneficial Corp., 242 F.3d 1023 (11 th Cir. 2001); Rugumbwa v.
Betten Motor Sales, 200 F.R.D. 358, 364-65 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (same).
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The Washington State Department of Financial Institutions has
admitted that when it first received complaints from borrowers about
one large subprime lender, Household, a lender it ultimately found to
have been engaging in widespread predatory practices, it relied on
Household's claims that "borrowers were mistaken and had not
availed themselves of the . . . disclosures provided during the transac-
tion process." 5 ' The HUD-Treasury Report is uncharacteristically blunt
on this point: "The fact is that written disclosure requirements, with-
out other protections, can have the unintended effect of insulating
predatory lenders where fraud or deception may have occurred.1
360
5. The Ultimate Escape from Decision Difficulty: Overreliance on In-
termediaries ... Who Can Manipulate More Framing Effects?-
According to the brokers, [a] major determinant of profit per loan is
the sophistication of the borrower relative to the sales skills of the loan
officer.
-Jack Guttentag, a.k.a. The Mortgage Professor
361
When faced with a difficult decision involving specialized knowl-
edge, a normally quite appropriate response is to seek the advice of an
expert such as a mortgage broker or loan officer. 362 But even without
engaging in actual fraud or misrepresentation of loan terms, loan
salespeople are able to frame the choices available to potential bor-
rowers so as to exploit borrowers' cognitive and emotional responses
through individualized sales techniques.3 6 3 Sellers can shape bor-
rower decisionmaking through a range of means, from taking advan-
tage of the affect heuristic or befriending the borrower, to portraying
359. HOUSEHOLD EXAMINATION, supra note 72, at 39.
360. HUD-TREAsuRv REPORT, supra note 46, at 67.
361. Guttentag, supra note 51, at 8; see also The Mortgage Professor's Website, http://
www.mtgprofessor.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
362. Cf CILDINI, supra note 308, at 9 n.5 ("When feeling overwhelmed by a complicated
and consequential choice, we still want a fully considered, point-by-point analysis of it-an
analysis we may not be able to achieve except, ironically enough, through a shortcut: reli-
ance on an expert."); Latin, supra note 195, at 1209 & nn.55-57 (cataloguing situations in
which people ignore written information and instead rely on explanations provided by
doctors, supervisors, and salespeople). In some situations, the use of a third party for ad-
vice can decrease or eliminate framing effects. James N. Druckman, Using Credible Advice to
Overcome Framing Effects, 17J.L. ECON. & ORG. 62, 77 (2001);JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, The Uncer-
tain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1165, 1216-17 (2003) (suggesting
that reliance on intermediaries such as attorneys to reframe decision problems will protect
people from the harms that might otherwise flow from heuristics and biases).
363. See Alan Schwartz, How Much Irrationality Does the Market Permit? 25 (Am. Law &
Econ. Ass'n Annual Meeting, Working Paper No. 29, 2005) (remarking that "dickering"
over terms allows sellers to identify consumers who are prone to heuristics and biases and
exploit those consumers).
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loan pricing as an objective or expert matter, to engaging in pressure
sales tactics.
The seller is limited to using goals that the potential borrower has
or accepts during the process, but the one-on-one interaction facili-
tates the seller's ability to find and influence those goals and exploit
them.364 For example, the lender could help a borrower meet her
decision process goal of minimizing internal transaction costs by di-
recting the borrower's attention away from unpleasant thoughts about
the burden of repaying the loan. Loan seller behavior need not be
consciously manipulative, but the role of the broker as currently struc-
tured is not merely to assist the borrower, but also to shape de-
mand.365 The problem is particularly acute because loan salespeople
have financial incentives to. convince borrowers to agree to loans that
are overpriced.
At the mild end of the spectrum, loan salespeople take advantage
of automatic and often subconscious influences of the "affect heuris-
tic" and the "reciprocity effect." The affect heuristic is a frequently
subconscious tendency to confuse an emotional response felt during
decisionmaking with a cognitive appraisal of the choice presented.3 66
Most advertising, including the 'Yes!" marketing described above,
aims for a positive affective consumer response. Salespeople fre-
quently attempt to invoke the affect heuristic. A former loan broker
explains the first minutes of a consumer's interaction with a loan
salesperson:
[W]hile the opening conversation may seem to be idle
chit-chat, rest assured-it's not. Your unguarded comments
will be used to the salesperson's advantage .... For exam-
ple, you tell the loan salesperson you want the loan to up-
grade a room. He or she will ask you why, and you
innocently will say that you want your daughter to have a
nice new room. "Oh really, what color?" asks the loan ar-
ranger. Purple, you say.
364. Consumers are only responsive to priming (exposing consumers to a mood or be-
havior message so as to influence consumers' purchase decisions) when it is congruent
with their current goals and needs. John A. Bargh, Losing Consciousness: Automatic Influences
on ConsumerJudgment, Behavior, and Motivation, 29 J. CONSUMER RES. 280, 282-83 (2002).
365. Cf Langevoort, supra note 351, at 634 (noting stockbrokers' role in shaping
demand).
366. Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13J.
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1, 3 (2000); Loewenstein et al., supra note 182, at 271; Paul Slovic,
Rational Actors and Rational Fools: The Influence of Affect on Judgment and Decision-Making, 6
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 163, 167-71 (2000).
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Rest assured, as the process moves along, the salesper-
son will keep you focused and will continuously remind you
that your goal is to "paint a nice new purple room." The
salesman seems to understand your deepest needs, to truly
care that the room is done professionally to ensure your
daughter's complete happiness.
It's easy to forget that your goal is not a purple room, it's
a loan at the best price and terms possible.
367
The reciprocity effect is invoked when the seller "befriends" the
borrower, who then reciprocates for the seller's "kindness" with her
trust and her business.36 Conventional social mores will inhibit the
customer from challenging the credibility of this new "friend." '369 Lin-
guistic conventions play into the lender's hands; we say that the
lender "gives" and the borrower "receives" the loan, as if the loan were
a gift, rather than being clear that the lender "sells" and the borrower
"buys" the loan product. Moreover, the borrower who perceives the
seller as a friend will be more likely to reveal personal information,
thus giving the seller additional opportunities to manipulate framing
effects.170 As a former loan officer explains: "It's a dog-eat-dog world
out there, and you do what you have to, to get loans .... You don't lie
to your client, but you make them feel like you're their best friend
and can be trusted." '371 Not all borrowers will be open to receiving the
"friendship" of a broker and thus susceptible to this type of influence,
367. Brunner, supra note 146. One predatory lender trained its loan officers to engage
in ancillary discussions about the borrower's family, her positive feelings about being able
to pay off other debts with this loan, and her plans for what she would do with the cash she
was taking out of the transaction, rather than the terms of the loan: "Build on love of
family, show concern for their future. This gives you emotional leverage." Marsh Testi-
mony, supra note 84, at 70 (quoting from lender training manual).
368. CIALDINI, supra note 308, at 20-50.
369. Finkelman Testimony, supra note 325, at 63 ("[I]t's difficult to imagine that this
new found friend is acting in bad faith or is trying to deceive you into doing something
that is not in your best interests."); CIALDINI, supra note 308, at 22-26; Langevoort, supra
note 351, at 654.
370. Lenders may ask potential borrowers for detailed personal information irrelevant
to the loan origination decision, precisely to use that information to create a sense of
rapport and to discover the sales pitches to which the borrowers are most likely to respond.
See LaFrankie Testimony Day 1-Vol. II, supra note 156, at 59-60; Walling Aff., supra note
251, 13.
371. Michael Moss, Erase Debt Now. (Lose Your House Later.), N.Y. TIMES, Oct 10, 2004, at
C1 (quoting former loan officer for Aames Financial, a mid-sized lender); see also
LaFrankie Testimony Day 1-Vol. II, supra note 156, at 72-73 (explaining that first steps of
loan sales process are "feel good, relationship building, trust steps," followed by encourag-
ing the borrower to "bare their soul" as to "where the pain was, " i.e., why they needed a
loan).
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but some segments are, particularly elderly isolated borrowers or bor-
rowers who fear discrimination. 72
Loan salespeople can also exploit borrower deference to their ex-
pertise and the common belief that the salesperson has no discretion
in the loan process. Borrowers will defer to the expertise of the bro-
ker or loan officer, in part due to a desire not to expose their own
inexperience and lack of understanding.3 73 Although the reality is
that sellers can set an individualized price for each loan to each bor-
rower, the process is shrouded in an aura of mysterious objectivity,
rather than as an open auction, so borrowers do not receive the mes-
sage that they should shop for the best rate. 74 By viewing the loan
offer as scientifically determined, the borrower is less likely to ques-
tion the price of a loan, or shop with other lenders.3 75 If loan prices
are objective, then there is little variation in the marketplace, so why
372. About 40% of U.S. adults, and about half of all blacks and Latinos surveyed, errone-
ously believe that "[n]eighborhood mortgage brokers will give you a better deal than large
banks and housing lenders." 2002 NAT'L HOUS. SURVEY, supra note 249, at 9.
373. Cf Langevoort, supra note 351, at 653-54 (explaining that investors are unwilling to
expose their inferior knowledge and avoid this by agreeing with the broker rather than
challenging him).
374. Loan sellers encourage the idea that loan prices are objectively determined. One
seller's sales script includes:
Well, let me explain to you how they go ahead and determine ... the amount of
interest that you're going to pay. It's based on what we call the three C's. The
three C's are: One "C" is for credit. And your credit is pretty much what it is
when you arrived at my office. It's your credit report.
The second "C" is your capability to repay. And what that is is your job, how
is your income coming in; or if you're retired, your investments.
Your third "C" is your collateral-your house, your castle. What they do is
they put all these things together and they come up, based on the three C's with a
rate...
[Tlhe lending institution has a right, depending on the three C's to gain
some type of interest.
LaFrankie Testimony Day 1-Vol. I, supra note 156, at 93, 95. While this is how loan pricing
would work in a price-competitive market, it is not how predatory loan pricing actually
works.
375. When people perceive the offers as coming from a computer rather than from
another person, Sally Blount, When Social Outcomes Aren't Fair: The Effect of Causal Attribution
on Preferences, 63 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 131, 134-35 (1995), or even
from another person who is playing the role of an expert student loan officer, Jared R.
Curhan et al., Dynamic Valuation: Preference Changes in the Context of Face-to-Face Negotiation, 40
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 142, 148 (2004), they are less likely to demand that the
offer be fair. Similarly, people tend to accept higher prices when they are described as
being offered by a monopoly seller. See Camerer et al., supra note 169, at 18. To the extent
that borrowers believe that the seller they have found is the only one who will sell to them,
perhaps due to poor credit history unacceptable to other lenders, they may accept loan
terms as being monopolistically set.
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incur the costs of shopping?3 76 Similarly, if the loan officer or broker
is the expert, how would the borrower find a better loan?
Loan sellers play on this belief; about a third of all borrowers in
an industry study said their lender did not give them loan options or
discuss the pros and cons of various options. 77 Again, salespeople
frequently disadvantage minority loan applicants on this score; in the
2004-2006 study testing mortgage broker treatment of white and mi-
nority home loan shoppers, "[w] hite applicants were presented twice
the number of loan options-different rates, fees and structures-than
were presented to African-American and Hispanic shoppers, who were
often steered toward high-cost subprime mortgages." 378 In previous
studies as well, borrowers who reported that they did not have choices
in mortgage options when they obtained their loan had a significantly
greater likelihood of ending up with a high rate subprime loan, rather
than a prime loan, ceteris paribus.
3 79
Further, once she has chosen a seller with whom to deal, a bor-
rower may tend to believe that her chosen third party will act fairly so
as to maintain a sense of herself as having chosen the third party
well.38° Again, linguistic conventions contribute to role confusion; al-
though consumers do not usually refer to the sellers they frequent as
"my department store" or "my restaurant," they do say "my broker,"
"my lender," and "my loan officer."
For a significant number of borrowers, a single broker or lender
has control over the entire choice set of loan options presented to the
borrower. In the 1997 Survey of Consumer Finances, only about half of
the consumers surveyed who had recently obtained home equity loans
reported that they had searched for information about other creditors
or other credit terms before obtaining credit. 81  Even this figure
probably overstates the proportion of borrowers who engaged in
meaningful price shopping-not all of those who reported that they
had searched said that they did so by contacting other lenders or re-
viewing published information to discover competing rates; some re-
ported that they consulted friends, relatives, or financial advisers, i.e.,
376. Howard Beales et al., Consumer Search and Public Policy, 8J. CONSUMER RES. 11, 12
(1981).
377. 2001 NAT'L Hous. SURVEY, supra note 53, at 6.
378. Harney, supra note 55, at Fl.
379. Courchane et al., supra note 88, at 372.
380. Cf Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the
Market, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 728, 737 & n.2 (1986) (illustrating the often unwarranted de-
gree of trust consumers have in their own auto mechanics).
381. Canner et al., supra note 165, at 245.
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brokers. 82 For recent refinance loan borrowers, about 15% said they
contacted only one lender and did not seek any other sources of infor-
mation. 3  While the failure to shop is partly caused by borrower be-
liefs that shopping is unnecessary and rude to do to the first seller
contacted, and partly due to an unwillingness to incur the costs of
shopping, it is also caused by loan seller enforcement of an unwritten
industry code forbidding price shopping. When a borrower actually
attempts to shop for the best price, brokers and lenders will often
retaliate with anger, or even by terminating their relationship with the
borrower.3
84
Finally, a loan salesperson can try to create and take advantage of
consumer "hot" states to convince the consumer to take the loan with-
out price shopping. 85 Under the influence of "projection bias," re-
lated to the myopia or present-biased preferences discussed above,
people overpredict the extent to which their future preferences will
be the same as their current preferences. They can therefore be con-
vinced to buy something when induced by present circumstances to
highly value it, because they believe they will continue to value it in
the future.38 6
Because the loan sale transaction is typically face-to-face,387 sellers
can try different approaches-perhaps at first emphasizing the imme-
diate benefit that the loan will provide, trying to trade in on myopia or
382. Id.
383. Jinkook Lee & Jeanne M. Hogarth, Consumer Information Search for Home Mortgages:
Who, What, How Much, and What Else, 9 FIN. SERV. REv. 277, 285 (2000).
384. As Guttentag explains, the borrower who submits applications to multiple lenders
and then takes the best offer is viewed by lenders and mortgage brokers as "the lowest form
of animal life, because receipt of an application initiates a set of costly tasks on their part
for which they will not be compensated if they lose the loan. If they discover what is going
on, they may simply terminate their relationship with the borrower." Guttentag, supra note
51, at 20. A friend of mine recently defied this norm by shopping with several brokers for a
mortgage. The first broker she had gone to, when he discovered she had gone to other
brokers, began yelling at her: "You're shopping me! You're shopping me! I can't believe
you're shopping me!" as if she had done something nefarious. When she replied that if he
could offer her better terms than the package she had been offered elsewhere, she would
do business with him, he tried to manipulate her into agreeing to trust him and stop price
shopping by saying: "I can get you a better price. But I don't know if we can work to-
gether. I can't really trust you if you're shopping me."
385. Loan officers may use the "Hearse Close" to sell loans: "Put a scare into the cus-
tomer. Look what might happen to you if you don't act." Marsh Testimony, supra note 84,
at 124 (quoting from lender training manual).
386. George Loewenstein et al., Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility, 118 Q.J. ECON.
1209, 1226-30 (2003).
387. On-line sellers such as LendingTree sell loans to prime borrowers only, and in any
case, many borrowers who are likely to end up with predatory loans are on the other side of
the digital divide.
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time discounting, but then if the consumer does not seem responsive,
instead stressing the invasive loan application process and possible dis-
crimination a borrower might experience from another lender, trad-
ing in on ego threats. As one loan officer testified: "It was my job to
find out where [the potential customer's] hot buttons were. Was he
interest-rate conscious? Or was he pain conscious about wanting the
money out badly and he will pay anything, a get-me-down, so to speak.
It was a matter of where his mindset was."
3 88
A consumer who does know that prices vary might reasonably be-
lieve that she is paying her broker to price shop for her, and may even
think that a loan officer plays a similar role.38 9 Unfortunately, the
compensation scheme for loan officers and brokers can reward behav-
ior that is not always in the borrower's best interests.39 ° Some loan
officers earn only commissions, which may be explicitly tied to the size
of the loan origination fees the officer can pack into the loan. 91
Others may receive a base salary but also bonuses when they sell ancil-
lary products that are particularly profitable for lenders, such as sin-
gle-premium credit insurance.3 92
Brokers-used today in over 60% of all mortgage transac-
tions3 93-have compensation schemes even more obviously bound to
overpricing. 'Yield spread premiums" (YSPs) are a payment to the
broker from the lender for upselling the consumer to a higher inter-
est rate than the lowest rate at which the lender would be willing to
388. LaFrankie Testimony Day 2-Vol. II, supra note 309, at 32. One lender even had a
response planned for any borrower who did not want to decide whether to take the loan
until she prayed about it: "Do you think you were sent here by accident?" Marsh Testi-
mony, supra note 84, at 124 (quoting from loan officer training manual).
389. Simplifying and Improving the Process of Obtaining Mortgages to Reduce Settle-
ment Costs to Consumers, 67 Fed. Reg. 49,134, 49,141 (proposedJuly 29, 2002) (codified
at 24 C.F.R. pt. 3500) [hereinafter, Simplifying RESPA] (borrowers believe their broker is
price shopping for them). Even a loan officer working for a single lender may portray
himself as looking out for the borrower's best interests in the loan origination process. See
Marsh Testimony, supra note 84, at 81 (quoting loan officer training manual: "Identifying
the real purpose [for the loan] and problem [the borrower seeks to solve with the loan]
puts us in partnership with the customer. We are all working together to solve the prob-
lem .... We're not sales people. We're problem solvers.").
390. Predatory Mortgage Lending Practices: Abusive Uses of Yield Spread Premiums Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 55-56 (2002) (statement of
Howell E. Jackson, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research and Special Pro-
grams, Harvard University School of Law) [hereinafter Jackson Statement].
391. Walling Aff., supra note 251, 10 (explaining that loan officer salary was calculated
primarily based on selling loans with origination fees exceeding fifteen points for small
loans and eleven points for larger loans).
392. 2001 Sen. Hrg., supra note 77, at 265-66 (statement of Mike Shea, executive director,
ACORN Housing) (explaining that lenders have incentive to profit from add-ons).
393. Simplifying RESPA, supra note 389, at 49,140.
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extend the loan.3 94 YSPs give brokers an incentive to sell the borrower
loans at the highest interest rate possible, rather than helping the bor-
rower shop for the lowest interest rate.39' No nationwide data on YSPs
is available, although several sources indicate that they are com-
mon. 96 One study found that, for the lenders analyzed, YSPs oc-
curred in about 85% of the loans, averaged about 1.5% of the loan
amount or just over $1800, and were by far the largest component of
broker compensation, larger than the combined total of average origi-
nation fees and average loan processing fees collected by brokers.397
Moreover, for the loans analyzed, African-American and Latino bor-
rowers paid about five to six hundred dollars more in YSPs than all
borrowers on average.398
That brokers and lenders charge borrowers through YSPs rather
than through up-front fees-in effect, re-framing the loan price
through the loan structure-shows that they are aware of and seek to
exploit the behavior of borrowers to attend to interest costs over time.
Myopic loss aversion, time discounting, the evaluability bias, and a
poor facility with percentages result in some borrowers weighting an
up-front broker fee more heavily than a larger price increase ex-
tracted through the interest rate. Such a borrower might find, for
example, a $1000 up-front broker fee on a thirty-year, $100,000 mort-
gage at 7% more salient than the extra $1000 due every year on a
394. The lowest rate at which the lender would be willing to originate the loan, called
the "par rate," is the rate that the lender's modeling of the borrower's risk and cost levels
indicates is necessary for the loan to generate the lender's expected return. Sometimes
the "par" rate already includes a YSP, but the broker can sell up or down from that rate and
receive a smaller or larger YSP.
395. These are frequently "disclosed" to the borrower on the HUD-1, among dozens of
lines of items, through a notation "POC" followed by "YSP" and a dollar amount. The
borrower would have few ways of knowing what any of these mean-the settlement costs
booklet that RESPA requires borrowers be given and the commonly used on-line glossaries
for mortgage terms at fanniemae.com, freddiemac.com, or hud.gov do not explain them-
and if she asks about them, the settlement agent can truthfully explain that they are not
listed as items on the seller's side of the ledger sheet, not coming out of the borrower's
pocket. SeeJackson Statement, supra note 390, at 74 & n.112 (recounting how difficult it is
to locate YSPs on HUD-1 Settlement Statements, where they are disclosed at all).
396. Guttentag, based on data collected from brokers who were willing to share records
from about 800 loans they originated in December 2000 and January 2001, found that
about 60% of these loans carried YSPs. Guttentag, supra note 51, at 7 & 16 n.13. (Note
that he calls YSPs "rebates" and the rate increases formulated based on YSPs "rebate
pricing.")
397. Jackson Statement, supra note 390, at 73-80 (analyzing comprehensively a number
of lenders' files obtained through litigation). Jackson does find, on average, some offset-
ting compensation to these borrowers in the form of about $0.25 in reduced costs for every
dollar paid in YSPs, such that the actual average additional cost to a borrower with a loan
with a YSP in the sample was closer to $1000 to $1100. Id. at 127.
398. Id. at 125 fig.23, 128.
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thirty-year $100,000 mortgage at 8.22%. 311 YSPs are some indication
that borrowers do pay some attention to origination fees and costs,
even when these are financed directly, and thus a broker may use the
interest rate to hide what might otherwise be an objectionable fee.4 ° °
But brokers might also prefer to receive a YSP over a financed fee
not because borrowers would price shop over the fee amount per se,
but because a disclosed fee would undermine the fiction that the bro-
ker is the borrower's friend, acting to help the borrower rather than
for his own financial gain. A borrower who realizes that the broker
has financial motives not aligned with the borrower's best interests
might look the purported gift horse in the mouth and realize she
should shop not only for a lower broker fee, but for the total price of
the loan.
IV. SOLVING THE PRICE PROBLEM
A. Why the Market Will Not Solve the Price Problem
1. Exploiting Information Asymmetries: The Profitability of Price Dis-
crimination.-In some market transactions, only a minority of consum-
ers need to act in accordance with the postulates of rational choice
theory for the entire market to function close to efficiently, with most
transaction surplus going to consumers.40 Where the cost to the
seller of engaging in price discrimination between customers is higher
than the benefits to be gained from that discrimination, the result will
be goods and services of uniform price and quality, set by the choices
399. A $100,000, thirty-year fully amortizing loan at a fixed rate of 7% requires monthly
payments of about $665, whereas the same loan at 8.22% requires monthly payments of
about $750 for an annual difference of about $1000. A similar phenomenon has been
observed in credit card pricing; lenders charge high interest rates rather than up-front
annual fees or per-transaction fees to consumers, even though lenders incur up-front and
per-transaction costs, because borrowers are sensitive to these fees, but insensitive to inter-
est rates. Bar-Gill, supra note 6, at 1392-93.
400. A recent FTC study supports the wisdom for the broker of hiding his fee in the
interest rate through a YSP. The study found that when consumers were faced with one
loan disclosure in which the broker fee was disclosed as a dollar figure and another in
which it was hidden by a YSP, consumers were more likely to choose the latter loan, and to
state that it had a lower price, even when the price of the latter loan was higher! In effect,
disclosing the broker's compensation as a dollar figure caused borrowers to make price
decision errors and choose the loan with the higher APR. LACKO & PAPPALARDO, supra
note 224, at 49. If loans with YSPs in the real world have higher prices, then this "error"
could lead to good loan decisions. However, if brokered loans have lower prices, then the
disclosure would hurt borrowers.
401. For a fuller account than is possible here, see Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde,
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979); GeorgeJ. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69J. POL. EcoN.
213 (1961).
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of a few rational price shoppers. When the products are reasonably
homogeneous in their pricing and terms, consumers who have not
engaged in rational decisionmaking can shop in the wake of those
consumers who have, and can benefit from the prices and terms that
the minority of shoppers have set. To the extent that the wake-riding
consumers share the same utility functions as the price shoppers, the
wake-riding consumers will also engage in efficient transactions and
keep any transaction surplus, plus the costs they have saved by not
engaging in comparative shopping. The prime home loan market ap-
pears to have traditionally functioned this way. 4 0 2
In the subprime home loan context today, however, the benefits
to the loan sellers of engaging in price discrimination based not only
on cost factors such as the default and prepayment risk presented by
the borrower, but also on borrower vulnerability to taking overpriced
loans, outweigh the costs of price discrimination. 40 3 A lender who can
sell a borrower an overpriced loan has no financial incentive to sell
that borrower a competitively priced loan. The "informed minority"
of rational price shopping borrowers has no effect on any of the terms
a vulnerable borrower receives because the benefit to the lender of
setting individualized contract terms outweighs the costs. Therefore,
lenders and brokers carefully differentiate among borrowers. ° 4
Lenders today are able to discriminate between vulnerable bor-
rowers and price shoppers in part due to the same technological ad-
vances in data mining and information processing that make objective
risk-based pricing possible and that help to widen the availability of
competitively priced credit to previously excluded groups. 0 5 Lenders
402. HUD-TRE.hsuRv REPORT, supra note 46, at 17. It is thus unsurprising that prime
rates are highly competitive, even though there is nowhere near universal price shopping
by prime borrowers. Of those consumers who had recently obtained second mortgage
loans in the 1997 Survey of Consumer Finance, only about half reported trying to do any
price or term shopping. Only about half of those claimed to have "shopped other institu-
tions" and less than half said they consulted "media or printed sources." Durkin & El-
liehausen, supra note 163, at 131, 132 tbl.7. Note, however, that the prime market may be
becoming more like the subprime market. See supra note 50.
403. Cf R. Ted Cruz &JeffreyJ. Hinck, Not My Brother's Keeper: The Inability of an Informed
Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 672-74 (1996) (explaining
how even in the market for less profitable items, sellers are often able to differentiate
among buyers and provide them with different terms, such that the "informed minority" of
savvy shoppers does not set the terms that will be offered to the more vulnerable buyers).
404. Cf Ayres, supra note 350, at 845 ("If a [car] dealership can infer that a black or a
woman is less likely to search at other dealerships, it may rationally attempt to charge him
or her more. If a consumer's cost of searching at more than one dealership is prohibitively
expensive, the dealership may realize that, as far as that consumer is concerned, it has a
virtual monopoly."); Cruz & Hinck, supra note 403, at 672-74.
405. For a fuller description of these technological advances, see supra Part I.A.2.
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now have the capability to know more than most borrowers about the
price that a borrower is likely to pay for any given loan over time, the
costs the lender is likely to incur, and the borrower's risk of default
and prepayment. That individual borrowers frequently know less
about their own risk of default than lenders do in part due to the
heuristics, biases, and emotional coping mechanisms, explained
above. But it is also due to the frailty of subjective human forecasts of
risk and future performance generally and the more accurate assess-
ments made by data-driven regression analyses. As described above,
such analyses are used by lenders in their objective credit scoring
models for assessing risk. In every test that pits subjective human
judgment of manual loan underwriters against automated objective
credit scoring models, the objective models win.40 6
While the law now requires that consumers be given access to
their credit reports,4" 7 and consumers today can buy their credit
scores, 40 8 borrowers, unlike lenders, have no way of translating their
score into a determination of future risk and costs for any particular
loan. The models that transform credit score and other borrower,
loan, and collateral information into a prediction of loan perform-
ance are proprietary to the lenders.40 9
Thus, asymmetric information and adverse selection assumptions
have begun to run in the opposite direction from the Stiglitz-Weiss
credit rationing model explained above. With access to greater infor-
mation, originating lenders now have the ability to do the "selecting"
by hunting for borrowers who are particularly vulnerable to taking
loans that are profitable to the lender but not necessarily in the bor-
rowers' best interests.41 0 Lenders search for borrowers who have good
credit histories but have taken loans from high-cost lenders in the
past, 411 who are under stress due to past due credit card, property tax,
406. Straka, supra note 20, at 219-21; see also Robyn M. Dawes & Bernard Corrigan, Lin-
ear Models in Decision Making, 81 PSYCHOL. BULL. 95 (1974) (finding that objective modeling
consistently produces better predictions of performance than subjective human
judgment).
407. This is required by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 168lg
(2000).
408. E.g., myFICO, http://www.myfico.com/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
409. See Ross & YINGER, supra note 17, at 23 (calling prediction of loan performance an
"origination score").
410. That risk in the home loan market is better understood by lenders than by borrow-
ers parallels Kunreuther's insight that risk in the flood insurance market is better under-
stood by insurers than by insureds, such that adverse selection on the part of insureds is
unlikely to occur. See Mark J. Browne & Robert E. Hoyt, The Demand for lood Insurance:
Empirical Evidence, 20 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 291, 296 (2000) (explaining Kunreuther's
insight).
411. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
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and medical bills,41 2 or who are members of vulnerable groups.4" 3 In
the process of deciding to provide financial backing to a lender, Leh-
man Brothers described that lender's marketing practices as follows:
The true value of this firm . . . is its ability to find its cus-
tomer. [The firm] is absolutely amazing at ferreting through
large databases in order to find its target customer ....
Using information purchased from tax assessors, munic-
ipalities, recordation offices, Data Quick, and Multiple List-
ing Service ("MLS") they identify the subset of borrowers
who have been in their home greater than five or ten years
and have an inferred value of between $85,000 and $350,000.
The value can be inferred through prior sales or through
extrapolation of the property tax rate.
Next using information from the major credit reposito-
ries (Trans Union, Equifax, Experian) the subset above is
screened for high consumer debt and the existence of a
competitor's loan.
At the end of this process [the firm] has a list of poten-
tial borrowers with high consumer debt and significant eq-
uity in their properties.
Based on the algorithm presented above,... [t] he aver-
age age of the borrowers ... is fifty-eight years old.4 14
By discriminating between rational price shoppers and vulnerable
borrowers, lenders can sell more expensive loans to the latter. There-
fore, a significant portion of the home loan borrowing market cannot
shop in the wake of price terms set by other shoppers. Each of these
consumers must engage in comparative price shopping on their own
to be assured of obtaining a loan that is not overpriced.
2. Lack of Price Advertising.-Prime borrowers are assisted in the
price shopping process by the advertising of prime lender rates, but
412. See supra Part III.B.1.b.
413. As researchers at the Federal Reserve Board have opined:
Technological advances have ... increased the capacity for targeted marketing to
consumers, with robust databases of consumer information making it possible to
match household characteristics and preferences with product offerings. This ap-
plication of technology can promote competition and improve customer service.
However, its misuse can increase consumer vulnerability to unscrupulous lenders.
Questionable marketing and sales tactics may induce consumers to acquire prod-
ucts that they do not need or that are inappropriate for their circumstances.
Braunstein & Welch, supra note 108, at 446; see also Paul D. Davies, Anything for a Deal,
PHILADELPHIA DALY NEWS, Feb. 6, 2001, at 8 ("Rather than cold calls, brokers can buy
customized lists of potential borrowers . . . by ZIP code, age, race and income.").
414. Lehman Brothers Inc., Lehman Brothers' Report on First Alliance Mortgage Co. 4
(Feb. 1, 1999) (on file with author).
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there is little price advertising in the subprime market. This is be-
cause, as explained in Part I above, subprime loan pricing, even if it
were price competitive, would still be too complicated to convey in an
advertisement. A subprime borrower, or someone who thinks she is a
subprime borrower, is left without good price reference points to use
for price shopping.4 15 Although a subprime borrower can discover
prime rates in the newspaper, she has no idea how much more than
prime she should have to pay. When people do not have the means to
directly evaluate alternatives, a common decisionmaking strategy is to
appraise their own relative location in the population's distribution
and then choose an alternative that corresponds to that same relative
location.4" 6 The only reference point subprime borrowers have is
prime rates, not a menu of subprime rates. Even within social groups
of subprime borrowers, many people do not discuss finances, and
even when they do, their own understanding of their loans may be so
faulty that the information is not useful for another borrower.
Advertising that touts "low rates," "low fees," "guaranteed lowest
price," or even "we'll beat any price," rather than particular APRs, can-
not generate price competition because lenders cannot be held to
these promises. For a subprime loan applicant to prove that she had
been offered a loan that was not the lowest priced, she must reach the
point in the transaction when all components of the price are dis-
closed in a legally binding document. For refinance loans not cov-
ered by HOEPA, this does not occur until the borrower reaches the
settlement table; for high-cost HOEPA loans or purchase money
loans, it happens only three days earlier.41 v Our borrower would also
have to reach or nearly reach the settlement table with another seller
at the same time, because prices change rapidly. All the reasons bor-
rowers do not currently apply to multiple lenders to price shop pre-
vent this from occurring. No lender will find it in its interest to assist
our borrower shopping by giving her complete and binding price in-
formation about the loan early in the process because that would only
open up the possibility that the borrower will find a cheaper loan
elsewhere.
415. Cf Dan Ariely et al., "Coherent Arbitrariness". Stable Demand Curves Without Stable Pref-
erences, 118 Q.J. ECON. 73, 100 (2003) (explaining parallel situation for wage earners, who
have little internal valuation of their time, little idea what competing wage rates are availa-
ble, and so must judge their wages primarily in relationship to their own past wages).
416. See, e.g., Drazen Prelec et al., The Role of Inference in Context Effects: Inferring What You
Want from What Is Available, 24J. CONSUMER RES. 118, 118 (1997); Birger Wernerfeld, A
Rational Reconstruction of the Compromise Effect: Using Market Data to Infer Utilities, 21 J. CON-
SUMER RES. 627, 628 (1995).
417. See supra Part I.B.
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Sellers know that price is not a top concern for significant market
segments.4 " More importantly, sellers benefit from keeping borrow-
ers in the dark about subprime loan prices. Without reference points
for what loan price to expect, subprime borrowers generally must rely
on the loan prices offered to them by lenders, who know much more
about what prices are available in the marketplace for each borrower's
risk and cost profile. In a sense, adverse selection is turned on its
head-the lenders are doing the adverse selection here, picking buy-
ers who will generate the highest surplus to the lenders. No lender or
broker will find it in its interest to advertise and then offer low prices
to vulnerable borrowers, because these borrowers will accept higher
prices. Further, because broker and loan officer compensation is tied
to selling overpriced loans, they have an incentive to sell borrowers a
larger loan than the borrower needs, at a higher price than otherwise
available on the market.419
3. Competitive Pricing Unnecessary to Keep Customer.-In theory,
lender anticipation that borrowers with overpriced loans will refi-
nance elsewhere could lead to interest rate competition. In practice,
however, up-front fees, prepayment penalties, and borrower
nonresponsiveness to interest rate changes all prevent refinancing
from taming the overpricing problem.
First, fear of refinancing will not lead to competition over prices
for up-front fees, because fees are not refunded if the borrower refi-
nances.420 As explained above, such fees can be a large share of the
price of the loan in the subprime market.
Second, large prepayment penalties-a certain loss that can be
conveyed by the lender to the borrower in an easily understood whole
dollar amount-can deter refinancing. This particularly has been
used as a tool to trap borrowers in high-interest rate loans in the sub-
prime market, where, as explained above, prepayment penalties are
dramatically more common.4 21
Third, subprime refinancings are not very responsive to interest
rates. Although prime refinancings mirror market rate changes, sub-
prime refinancing activity is fairly flat, driven by cash-out refinancings
418. Recall that in a list of areas of competition among subprime lenders, one lender
listed loan price components last, after, e.g., "convenience in obtaining the loan" and
"marketing and distribution channels." NEW CENTURY FIN. CORP., supra note 278, at 18.
419. See supra Part III.B.5.
420. See Guttentag, supra note 275, at K5 ("[L]enders never refund fees to borrowers.").
421. See supra text accompanying note 202.
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rather than by rate refinancings.4 2 2 This is also true of low-income,
black and Latino borrowers generally-they are less likely to prepay
and refinance when it is in the money to do so 423 than white or
higher-income borrowers.4 24 Blacks are only one-fifth as likely as
whites to prepay when prepayment is in the money or one-half as
likely after controlling for, e.g., credit history and LTV ratios.4 2 5 Bor-
rowers with lower credit scores are both less likely to prepay when
interest rates decrease and more likely to prepay even when facing a
higher interest rate environment than borrowers with higher
scores.
426
The dearth of rate refinancing may in part be due to the preda-
tory servicing practices of some subprime lenders, who refuse to give
borrowers payoff statements or to report borrowers' positive credit his-
tories to the credit reporting agencies to prevent refinancing. More
mundane switching costs may also play a role. But it is also no doubt
due to the same reasons that lead some of these borrowers to take
overpriced loans in the first place-e.g., an unwillingness to be sub-
jected to another financial strip search in applying to a new lender, a
low level of knowledge about available interest rates, and lack of an
appreciation of the effect of small changes in interest rates.
4. Financial Education Is a "Public Good. "-Finally, no lender has
an incentive to provide consumers with the financial education
needed to enable price shopping. Any seller that educates a potential
borrower who would otherwise agree to an overpriced loan will find
itself with one less opportunity to extract rents in the form of a higher
price from that borrower. Consumers' dearth of financial education
422. OCC Working Paper, supra note 43, at 11; see also Amy Crews Cutts & Robert A. Van
Order, On the Economics of Sulbpime Lending, 30 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 167, 171 tbl.1
(2005) (charting prepayment rate data for prime and subprime loans against thirty-year
fixed mortgage prime interest rate); Anthony Pennington-Cross, Credit History and the Per-
formance of Prime and Nonprime Mortgages, 27J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 279, 292-94 (2003)
(discussing refinancing rates of subprime loans).
423. Meaning interest rates have fallen sufficiently that the borrower will save more
money on interest after refinancing than she will spend on the costs of refinancing.
424. See Robert Van Order & Peter Zorn, Performance of Low-Income and Minority Mort-
gages, in Low INCOME HOMEOWNERSHIP 322, 323-24 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky
eds., 2002) [hereinafter LIHO] (discussing the financial importance to the lender or loan
investor of prepayment risk in addition to default risk).
425. Id. at 330 & tbl.11-1, 336-37 & tbl.11-5.
426. See Yongheng Deng & Stuart Gabriel, Enhancing Mortgage Credit Availability Among
Underserved and Higher Credit-Risk Populations: An Assessment of Default and Prepayment Option
Exercise AmongFHA-Insured Borrowers 13-14, 17-19 (U.S.C. Fin. & Bus. Econ., Working Paper
No. 02-10, 2002) (documenting lower prepayment speeds for high-risk, low-FICO score
borrowers, particularly black, Latino, and female borrowers in this group).
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adds to the seller's temptation to price gouge. People can be strongly
influenced in how they judge and decide when they are in learning
situations, and so the potential for both helping and manipulating
people in such situations is enormous. 427 Lack of pre-existing knowl-
edge means the loan shopping process is a learning situation in which
consumers are particularly vulnerable to influence by the way in which
the seller of the loan presents information and advice.
Financial education is also a "public good" in the economic
sense. If one lender were to provide financial education to consum-
ers, those consumers would not be required to give the teaching
lender their business. Instead, those consumers could-and with
their newfound education presumably would-go to a rival lender
that, not having spent its resources on consumer education, would
have lower costs of production and could therefore undercut the loan
price being offered by the teaching lender.
Yet any entity other than the loan seller, such as the government
or consumer groups, will have difficulty reaching the borrower at the
"teachable moment" when financial education could have any ef-
fect.4 28 Financial education is notoriously difficult to do effectively in
the abstract. Studies repeatedly show little long-term positive effect of
financial education on consumer behaviors.429 Small positive effects
in the home loan education area have only been shown for in-person
pre-loan counseling-even telephone counseling was ineffective.4
The amount of resources that the government or nonprofits would
have to provide to achieve this education would be enormous. Provid-
ing a personal loan shopper to assist every borrower in the market
might work to assure price shopping, but we lack the resources to pub-
427. See HillelJ. Einhorn, Learning from Experience and Suboptimal Rules in Decision Making,
inJUU, supra note 166, at 268, 269.
428. Although requiring home loan applicants to receive pre-loan financial counseling
at the time of loan decisionmaking would help some borrowers, it would be a waste of
resources for other borrowers. Voluntary counseling from community groups is already
available in many communities, but many of those for whom it might be most helpful are
likely to opt out so as to use that time for, e.g., working more hours to meet loan payment
requirements. See Hilgert et al., supra note 93, at 319 (finding that financial learning
through courses or seminars was less popular with consumers with lower financial knowl-
edge than with those with more knowledge).
429. For an overview of recent research, see Braunstein & Welch, supra note 108, at 450-
53.
430. Abdighani Hirad & Peter Zorn, Prepurchase Homeownership Counseling: A Little Knowl-
edge Is a Good Thing, in LIHO, supra note 424, at 146, 146-47. Note that although this study
kept all observable borrower characteristics constant, it could not keep the most important
variable constant-borrower motivation and time to devote to having a successful loan
experience-because borrowers self-selected as to whether they wished to receive the pre-
loan counseling.
2006] 813
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
licly fund such services, and the provision of this service in the private
market-brokers-has thus far proven to be unreliable.
Borrowers are unlikely to learn price shopping skills on their
own. Consumers know that high financial and personal stakes are in-
volved, thus motivating them to exercise a high degree of care in the
decision. But learning requires more than high stakes and motiva-
tion; it requires accurate information at a level of specificity such that
the decisionmaker will recognize how to apply the lesson to the loan
price shopping situation. The home loan borrowing process is not a
frequently repeated game for most. Lessons learned even a few years
ago may no longer be useful-or could even be counterproductive-
to consumers facing a new loan market today. With few opportunities
to learn decision strategies from the process, consumers are unlikely
to reach an equilibrium maximizing decision strategy.43'
The single most important source of learning is a difficult finan-
cial experience." 2 But even a borrower who is "flipped" from preda-
tory loan to predatory loan may not learn. Because the ultimate bad
outcome is delayed by refinancing, it is difficult for the borrower to
attribute the problem to any particular aspect of the loan choice, and
the lender will give misleading feedback to the borrower to indicate
that the borrower has not made a bad decision. 433
A 2003 focus group study of African-American and Latino high-
and middle-income households that had recently applied for a home
mortgage found that "[those [borrowers] who thought that some-
thing was not fair about their mortgages had a hard time identifying
particular elements that were not fair, since [these borrowers] tended
to be those with the least expertise and general knowledge about the
[home loan] process. ''431 Without being able to pinpoint what was
unfair, these borrowers will have difficulty learning how to modify
431. See Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein, Introduction to ADVANCES IN BEHAV-
IORAL ECONOMICS 3, 8 (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2003) (noting that important aspects
of economic life are often more like the first few rounds of an experiment rather than the
last).
432. See id. at 8-9.
433. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 112, at 221-22 (listing factors that prevent the
learning needed to counteract biases and over-reliance on heuristics); Rabin, supra note
167, at 31-32 (discussing evidence that people do not easily or quickly overcome biases
through learning); see alsoJason J. Kilborn, Behavioral Economics, Overindebtedness, and Com-
parative Consumer Bankruptcy: Searching for Causes and Evaluating Solutions, 22 BANK. DEV. J.
13, 23-24 (2005) (arguing that consumer education is not a useful policy device to prevent
borrowers from entering into credit transactions that result in more indebtedness than is
in the consumers' best interests).
434. RIHA, supra note 205, at 9.
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their home loan decisionmaking in the future to avoid whatever the
problem was with their prior loans.
B. Why Should We Care About Overpriced Home Loans?
One story that could be told about overpriced home loans is that
they may not be competitively priced, but they are still welfare-enhanc-
ing transactions for the borrowers. The hypothesis would be that the
issue on the price side is just a question of who gets the transaction
surplus-the lender would sell the loan at 8%, the buyer would buy at
20%, so if the loan is originated at 12% the borrower is capturing
most of the surplus. But to say that the borrower's reservation price is
20% is difficult to do. As explained above, we have reason to think
that the borrower does not understand the price of the loan, so we
cannot use her assent to the loan as a measure of her preferences. So
we must suspect that some borrowers are paying more than their res-
ervation prices, resulting in an inefficient allocation of resources.435
Moreover, to the extent that the issue is a question of distribution
of the transaction surplus, giving the surplus to lenders results in re-
gressive income redistribution. As explained above, victims of preda-
tory lending are disproportionately African-American, Latino, and
low- to moderate-income households that already have fewer financial
resources to spare and lower homeownership rates. It is distribution-
ally unfair across borrowers to say that prime borrowers get to keep
transaction surplus and subprime borrowers do not. While we might
not care who gets the surplus on a box of breakfast cereal or a tube of
toothpaste-other overpriced products that come in an infinite and
dizzying array of choices-home equity is too important a component
of wealth for us not to care distributionally that the lender gets it. As
cited above, the median wealth of an African-American family in the
2000 Census was $7500, with over 60% held in home equity. Preda-
tory loan overpricing is estimated to cost households annually $3800,
enough to reduce that wealth to zero in two years.436
Finally, we have the same socially inefficient costs as we find in
monopoly pricing: the deadweight loss of consumers who borrow less
than they efficiently should because they see inflated prices in their
435. This could be true in theory for a competitively priced loan too, but there is even
more reason to suspect it for a high priced loan.
436. See supra Part I.A.3.
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communities,4 3 7 and the costs of rent-seeking, expensive ploys to grab
market share despite rather than because of loan prices." 8
The rent-seeking costs in this market are particularly absurd. All
of the methods described above that lenders use to find vulnerable
borrowers are expensive. The archetypal predatory lending market-
ing plan is to buy a truck and supplies and go around neighborhoods
of older housing stock selling home repairs-and home loans to cover
those repairs-to little old ladies. Other "search costs" include live
check gimmicks, befriending socially isolated potential borrowers
such as the elderly, searching courthouse records for homeowners
who are in foreclosure or behind on paying taxes, and buying lists of
homeowners who owe medical debt or who recently have been turned
down for credit.4 3 9 "Push marketing" like this is expensive, and not
only to the sellers; the targeted consumers who do not take the bait
are put to the annoyance of a high volume of telemarketing calls, junk
mail advertising, and even door-to-door sales calls.4 4 ° The extensive
one-on-one interactions with potential borrowers that loan sales-
people use to manipulate borrower decisionmaking require signifi-
cant time, and therefore money.44 1 A sales training manual for one
predatory lender explains: "These loans are sold, not bought.
442
C. Why Not...
1. Why Not Price Controls?-Price controls, whether the old usury
caps or a more modern floating cap that moves with an index, are
437. Cf Ayres, supra note 350, at 850-51 (explaining one effect of the fact that car deal-
ers fail to offer black consumers prices that are competitive with the prices they offer white
consumers: "[I]f sellers refuse to bargain seriously with blacks because they believe that
blacks generally are too poor to purchase cars, then in equilibrium blacks will continue to
fail to purchase cars-because of inflated, nonbargained prices. That failure will only reaf-
firm the sellers' original mistaken belief.").
438. See generally Gordon Tullock, Rent Seeking, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICrION RY OF
ECONOMICS 147-49 (John Eatwell et al. ed., 1998); Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of
Monopoly and Regulation, 83J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975); Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of
Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967).
439. See supra Part IIl.B.l.b, Part III.B.2.a; see also Renuart, supra note 202, at 480.
440. One homeowner targeted for subprime loans relates her experience:
After the second home equity loan, I kept getting things in the mail from this
company, as well as phone calls. It seemed like every time I opened the mailbox,
there was something from them. They sent me these checks, telling me I was
cleared for $3,000 in credit or $1,500 in credit, and all I had to do was cash the
check. They were always telling me that I was a good customer and my credit was
good with them.
1998 Sen. Hrg., supra note 1, at 17 (statement of borrower Gael M. Carter).
441. See supra Part III.B.5.
442. See Gene A. Marsh, The Hard Sell in Consumer Credit: How the Folks in Marketing Can
Put You in Court, 52 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 295, 298 (1998).
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problematic for a number of reasons. First, substantive limits on inter-
est rates are not an appropriate remedy for the problem of overpriced
loans because loan instruments are so malleable that any limit on one
aspect of price can be evaded through restructuring the loan. Sec-
ond, the price of home loan money will vary with many
macroeconomic factors over time, such that an absolute limit could
constrain appropriately priced lending when interest rates rise.
Third, even if an indexed rate were chosen as a price limit, some loans
at high prices in comparison to indexed rates can be appropriately
priced, depending on the specific situation; for example, a small loan
would, due to the cost of making and servicing the loan, be appropri-
ately priced at a rate higher than a large loan. That is, some high-
priced home loans are not overpriced, are not predatory, and serve a
valuable role for consumers who would otherwise be forced to use
even higher-priced credit sources such as credit cards or payday
loans.4 4 3 A fairly high indexed price limit-for example, 10% over
the comparable Treasury bill rate-would stop the grossest overpriced
loans without preventing appropriate loans from being made, because
there are probably few if any home loans at this high a rate that are
not predatory.4 44 But this cap would not protect borrowers from over-
pricing below the worst cases.
Any attempt by the government to create a pricing cap matrix
tailored to different loan, collateral, and borrower characteristics is
doomed to create bizarre marketplace distortions. The conditions
supporting each element in the matrix and the marketplace's knowl-
edge about those conditions will vary from the government's assump-
tions, particularly over time. The government, with its cumbersome
notice and comment process for every rulemaking, is simply incapable
of acting with the swiftness and agility of today's consumer credit mar-
kets. It also lacks the necessary data and political incentives to do so
well.
2. Why Not Suitability Standards, Unconscionability, Fraud, or Broker
Fiduciary Duties?-Obvious possible solutions for the problem of pred-
443. Cf Collins et al., supra note 36, at 5 (listing the benefits of home mortgage loans
versus other types of financing).
444. A small home loan might be competitively priced this high, because many of the
costs of lending are fixed. Such a small home loan is unlikely to be appropriate, however,
because the high fixed costs of home loans means it makes more financial sense to obtain
that amount of credit through unsecured short-term credit card or payday loans. If the
truly competitive market rate for a reasonably sized home loan is this high, then my sense
is that the risk of default is also very high, making this too risky a loan. The problem of
overly risky loans will be more fully addressed in a future article.
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atory overpricing would include unconscionability doctrines, suitabil-
ity standards, or broker or lender fiduciary duties. Even if a defendant
could not defeat any of these claims by presenting the federally re-
quired loan disclosures, they all suffer from similar flaws. First, they
are all enforceable only through the back end, after the borrower has
taken the loan. Second, none gives the secondary market any reason
to discipline lender behavior. Third, all are indeterminate subjective
standards that are often prohibitively expensive to pursue legally.
Some predatory home loans have been found unconscionable,
but based on being overly risky rather than being overpriced.445
Weighing against a finding of procedural unconscionability will be the
fact that most of these borrowers have been through the home loan
transaction at least once before when they purchased their homes and
are thus not utterly unsophisticated parties.446 Weighing against sub-
stantive unconscionability will be the fact that high prices are wide-
spread, rather than outside the norm in the market."47 But even
where unconscionability or even fraud is found, they are only reme-
dies at the back end, thus only available to borrowers who have the
fortitude to pursue them after the loan transaction has been com-
pleted and typically when the borrower is being threatened with fore-
closure. 448 Further, the investors fueling this lending are given no
stake in the matter-no "skin in the game"-because the holder in
due course doctrine will protect most from any unconscionability
claims.
With the modem home loan having so many of the attributes of
an investment in a security-complicated and difficult-to-assess risks
and costs, yet also capable of growing savings for retirement or other
needs in the form of a gradual increase in equity-an elegant fix
would be to borrow from the suitability standards applicable to securi-
445. E.g., Besta v. Beneficial Loan Co., 855 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1988); Beneficial Mort-
gage Co. v. Leach, 2002 WL 926759 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002). But see Cheshire Mortgage
Servs., Inc. v. Montes, 612 A.2d 1130 (Conn. 1992) (holding that a home loan that would
leave borrowers with $97/month after mortgage payments according to the income dis-
closed on their loan application is not unconscionable).
446. Montes, 612 A.2d at 1136.
447. See, e.g., id. at 1137-38 (finding ten points charged to originate a home loan and
another ten points charged to refinance that loan a year later not unconscionable because
ten points per home loan is not beyond prevailing market rates); Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding that the substantive
unconscionability test is "whether the terms are 'so extreme as to appear unconscionable
according to the mores and business practices of the time and place.'" (quoting I ARTHUR
LINTON CORBIN, CONTRAcrs § 128 (rev. ed. 1963)).
448. See generally Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967).
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ties brokers, as suggested by a number of commentators.449 A suitabil-
ity violation occurs when an investment made by a broker is
inconsistent with the investor's objectives, and the broker knows or
should know the investment is inappropriate. Know-your-customer
rules are implicit in the suitability doctrine, in that the broker must
know the investor's experience level, risk-preferences, and capacity for
risk in selecting appropriate investments to make for the investor.
Parallel to the securities context, Patricia Engel and Kathleen McCoy
have suggested that a suitability doctrine be developed for home lend-
ing using an administrative body. This body would establish guide-
lines for what price levels are suitable for different borrowers, and to
what lengths brokers and lenders must go in getting to know their
borrowers before advising them on which home loan, if any, to select.
Decisions would be better made at the administrative level rather than
through price caps enacted by legislation, because an agency can be
more flexible and responsive to changes in the market.
But a suitability standard would pose numerous hurdles: (1) the
borrower must realize the loan was overpriced and initiate enforce-
ment; (2) enforcing the standard would consume significant judicial
or administrative resources in determining the "correct" price for the
loan; and (3) a standard, rather than ex ante disclosure rules, is more
difficult to use in passing liability on to the secondary market. Fur-
ther, the political will to form what might plausibly be described as an
SEC for vulnerable, disproportionately low- and moderate-income and
nonwhite borrowers, seems lacking. Even if HUD, for example, were
to create a sub-agency to perform this function, there is the risk that
suitability would, like unconscionability, remain too undefined a term
for tractability.450
Placing a fiduciary duty on brokers or originating lenders-a step
that has been taken in some jurisdictions already451 -suffers from
many of the same problems as a suitability standard. Imposing the
duty on the brokers and originating lenders alone will not work, be-
449. E.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 67, at 1337-39; Daniel S. Ehrenberg, If the Loan
Doesn't Fit, Don't Take It: Applying the Suitability Doctrine to the Mortgage Industry Eliminate
Predatory Lending, 10J. AFFoRDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNiT'w DEv. L. 117 (2001).
450. Susan Wachter, Price Revelation and Efficient Mortgage Markets, 82 TEX. L. REv. 413,
416 (2003) ("The solution is not to create an ill-defined national legal standard that, in its
uncertainty, may chill the willingness of lenders to lend to any but the most creditworthy of
subprime borrowers.").
451. See, e.g., Barker v. Altegra Credit Co., 251 B.R. 250, 259-60 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000)
(holding that a mortgage broker owes a borrower a fiduciary duty to use her best efforts to
find a loan in the best interests of the borrower); Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp.,
511 S.E.2d 854, 865 (W. Va. 1998) (finding that whether broker owed a fiduciary duty to
borrowers is a question of fact).
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cause they can set up shop and move at will. But passing liability on to
the secondary market will be barred by the holder in due course doc-
trine. It would be difficult legally to abrogate the doctrine with a fidu-
ciary duty, because investors have little means to discover whether the
duty has been met. Even if liability were passed on, imposition of fidu-
ciary duties will not take us all the way home-courts must then ask
what price a fiduciary can charge.452 While fees far out of the norm
for the area might be found a violation of the duty, judges abhor such
line-drawing. Finally, it is difficult to imagine how a borrower would
know that the fiduciary duty had been violated and bring suit, prior to
some kind of crisis with the loan.
D. A Proposal to Facilitate Price Shopping
The success of stores like Kmart and Wal-Mart is ample evidence
that consumers in the United States, even those with low incomes and
little education, will price shop, if enabled and encouraged to do so.
To do this, the practical, cognitive, and emotional transaction costs of
price shopping must be radically reduced.
Home loans need to be simplified and standardized, and disclo-
sures need to be provided earlier in the process, such that the vast
majority of home loan borrowers would price shop. We need to move
to simpler and more standardized loan products because only easily
understood pricing, in conjunction with disclosures that make that
pricing easily observable early in the process, can lead to effective
price shopping.
My proposal, for home loans other than purchase money loans
and in-the-money refinancings' 453 is to:
(1) provide a simplified price shopping disclosure to the
borrower early in the shopping process;
(2) substantively limit the structure of these loans such that
the simplified disclosure would provide all the informa-
tion needed to price shop; and
452. See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciay Obligation, 1988
DUKE LJ. 879, 923-24 (explaining that imposition of a fiduciary duty means nothing with-
out further substantive rules about actions the fiduciary should and should not take).
453. Because more creative financing may be reasonable to get someone into a home
purchase, and because creative loan structuring tends to be predatory only in the nonpur-
chase money market, my price proposal would not apply to purchase money loans. In-the-
money refinancings-refinancings where the total finance charge remaining to be paid on
the old loan exceeds the total finance charge to be paid on the new loan plus any prepay-
ment penalty on the old loan-are also unlikely to be predatory. Further, such refinanc-
ings might legitimately need to be engaged in more quickly than my proposal would allow,
to take quick advantage of a change in market rates.
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(3) bring the market to the buyer to facilitate price shop-
ping through a centralized process through which lend-
ers could submit competing loan offers to borrowers.
Through these steps, the marketplace would be transformed into one
in which consumers could make good price decisions despite heuris-
tics, biases, and emotional coping mechanisms.4 54
1. Radical Transparency: Simplification of Loan Products to Achieve
Meaningful Transparency Through Simple, Timely Disclosures.-The disclo-
sure would contain only four loan terms, few enough attributes that
most borrowers could effectively use them in decisionmaking. These
attributes would be:
(1) total loan proceeds;
(2) total up-front fees, points, and costs (whether financed
or not financed);
(3) maximum monthly payment;455 and
(4) loan length in years.456
A sample "Loan Price Tag" may be found in the Appendix. To en-
sure that loan applicants direct their attention to the Loan Price Tag,
lenders would be required to give it to applicants before and apart
from any other disclosures or other distracting papers.
For the Loan Price Tag to be widely used for price shopping, all
of the figures would have to be in a format that most borrowers under-
stand well and can compare easily. The first three figures would be
expressed as a dollar amount, because, as previously explained, con-
sumers generally understand whole dollar figures better than percent-
ages. Admittedly, the total proceeds and total costs would be large
numbers beyond the facility of many borrowers, but these could be
directly compared to another loan's price shopping disclosure. Com-
paring figures on two Loan Price Tags would highlight the relevance
of digits beyond the first few, even to a consumer who ordinarily
truncates.
The Loan Price Tag would in effect transmit a locked price offer,
just as loans currently can be offered with locked rates. Tolerances for
estimates on the Loan Price Tags would be very narrow. The aim
454. 1 thus take up Alan Schwartz's suggestion to "ask whether the market is ameliorat-
ing cognitive error or could be helped to do so." Schwartz, supra note 363, at 8.
455. Alongside the maximum monthly payment figure should be a statement "plus taxes
and insurance" because the borrower must budget for that total, a concern on the risk side
of the predatory lending problem.
456. People are more familiar with and have better facility with an expression of long
time periods in years, rather than TILA's disclosure of the loan period in months (e.g.,
people understand what is meant by a "20 year" loan better than a "240 month" loan).
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would be to prevent lenders from exploiting motivated reasoning, de-
cision process framing, and the endowment effect by hooking borrow-
ers through an initially disclosed broad range of possible prices or a
low-balled price.
The up-front cost figure would include every kind of fee and cost,
including single premium credit insurance and similar products bun-
dled into loan packages, such that the total up-front fee figure added
to the total loan proceeds figure would sum to the total loan amount.
The figure would thereby be a more complete cost measure than the
GFE and TILA disclosures currently provide. Further, the Loan Price
Tag should inform the applicant that this is the component of the
price that is nonrefundable, even if the borrower refinances.4 57
By disclosing only the maximum monthly payment, and not the
initial monthly payment, hidden interest rate and monthly payment
increases would no longer be advantageous.4 58 A borrower engaging
in myopic discounting over time and probability would not be hooked
by an initial monthly payment figure, but instead would be price shop-
ping using the maximum monthly payment.
Why four features? Why not make it five, and include the APR?
Every additional price attribute disclosed adds to the likelihood that
the consumer will fail to focus on another price component, and the
APR disclosure does not add any information to these. As previously
described, only 10% of recent home loan borrowers understand APR
well enough to know that it is higher than the note interest rate, de-
spite the ubiquitous use of this term since TILA's passage in 1968.
The APR is a failed instrument of social policy. The four attributes
given here are few enough, comparable enough, and concrete
enough for most borrowers to use in comparison price shopping
among loans. By structuring loans in simpler and fairly standardized
ways, loans could be meaningfully compared through examination of
these few features.459
457. My proposed language is: "You must pay this nonrefundable amount even if you
pay off or refinance the loan."
458. Prohibiting monthly payment escalations other than those tied to an indexed rate
(a traditional ARM) might be required to prevent lenders from sidestepping this regime by
orally contradicting the disclosure. In the case of an indexed rate, the maximum monthly
payment would have to be disclosed as the "maximum foreseeable monthly payment." The
"maximum foreseeable monthly payment" would be the maximum monthly payment given
the highest interest rate prevailing for the applicable index for any quarter in the number
of years prior to the loan origination equal to the loan term (e.g., for a thirty-year loan, the
thirty years prior to origination).
459. The National Consumer Law Center has proposed nearly the reverse of this propo-
sal, but for many of the same reasons. They have proposed disallowing up-front fees and
limiting prepayment penalties such that most of the price of the loan is bound up in the
[VOL. 65:707
THE PROBLEM OF PREDATORY LENDING: PRICE
For the simplified disclosure to enable price shopping, the four
attributes disclosed must fully reflect the price of the loan. Therefore,
balloons and negative amortization would be prohibited because
these would not be reflected in the above figures.460 While it would
be possible to craft an exception for balloons and negative amortiza-
tion in situations where the borrower has a reasonably certain reason
for expecting to be able to pay the balloon when it comes due, and
from sources other than another mortgage (e.g., maturing trust fund,
plans to sell house), any exception creates opportunities for decep-
tion by unscrupulous lenders. Similarly, prepayment penalties would
not be permitted because these would not be reflected in the above
disclosure.461 The ban on prepayment penalties would create, in ef-
fect, a modified cooling off period for the life of the loan, in that it
would allow borrowers to refinance out of the loan more easily. The
ban would lower the cost of refinancing to allow borrowers whose
creditworthiness has improved to take advantage of that improve-
ment, rather than sticking them with an interest rate based on their
former creditworthiness. Because home purchase money loans are
excluded from the proposal, more creative loan structuring, some-
times useful for helping people achieve homeownership, would not
be affected.
2. Prohibiting Prematurity of Commitment: The Consumer Chilling-Out
Period.-The simplified disclosure would have to be given to the bor-
rower in a manner such that, and at a time when, the borrower could,
as a practical and psychological matter, use the disclosure to price
shop. My suggestion is to require that the disclosure be given before
interest rate, which borrowers could meaningfully shop to compare. This requires borrow-
ers to understand and shop based on interest rates, percentage figures that are poorly
understood. The proposal would give the lender an incentive to keep the borrower rather
than refinancing the borrower to strip more equity out through fees at each flip. However,
it could also lead lenders to avoid borrowers with high origination costs-likely to be low-
and moderate-income borrowers with subprime credit histories-because these borrowers,
once qualified for a loan, would be able to use that paperwork to easily refinance at a lower
rate with another lender.
460. The prohibition on balloons and negative amortization also addresses the risk side
of the equation in that these products tend to be risky because borrowers often do not
have the money to refinance the balloon payments when they come due. My proposal
would exempt reverse mortgages, highly regulated instruments through which senior citi-
zens can extract the equity in their homes for living expenses, yet without fear of foreclo-
sure because the loan instrument must permit the homeowner to stay in the home until
death.
461. The effect of prohibiting prepayment penalties would be to virtually eliminate YSPs
because lenders need prepayment penalties to cover the up-front outlay to brokers on YSPs
if the borrower refinances elsewhere.
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the borrower has sunk anything greater than minimal application fee
costs into the process, such as a $50 application fee. A small enough
fee would allow cash-constrained consumers to apply to several lend-
ers. It would also make the borrower less psychologically committed
to the first loan, because fewer sunk costs would be invested in that
application.
Again for both practical and psychological reasons, the simplified
disclosure should be given no later than one week after application
and between twenty-five and thirty days before closing, so that the bor-
rower has enough time to effectively price shop before becoming fi-
nancially and psychologically committed to the loan. The idea is to
give the borrower a tool to use to shop at a time when the borrower is
still in a decisionmaking frame, rather than at the implementation
stage. This would further provide the borrower with a "chilling out"
period in which to shop for a better loan price, and to decide whether
to take any loan at all. A rash loan application submitted under the
"hot state" influence of a personal crisis or a manipulative loan sales-
person would thereby not lead to a rash loan origination. The disclo-
sure should instruct the borrower to use it to comparison price shop
among lenders and warn the borrower that the loan she is being of-
fered may be overpriced.462
In a sense, this proposal gives every nonpurchase money home
loan borrower a price lock, not just those borrowers savvy enough to
know what a price lock is, and how to truly lock the price of a loan.4 6 3
The proposal brings a thirty-day lock, common now in the prime mar-
ket, to the subprime market.464 But because in-the-money refinanc-
ings are excluded from the proposal, it would not prevent a consumer
from taking quick advantage of a change in market rates.
462. My proposed language is: "It is possible that this loan is not the lowest priced
available. This paper is the Price Tag for this loan. You should use it to shop with other
lenders or brokers for the best loan at the best price, just as you would for any major
purchase."; and a none-too-subtle double entendre, "Time to go shopping!'
463. Not all prime borrowers manage to lock the price of the loan now, even when they
think they are getting a lock. The "lock" often applies to only the note interest rate on the
loan, and not the APR, so the lender can increase the non-interest price components of
the deal to raise the price despite the lock. SeeJack Guttentag, What's Covered by a Lock?
(2004) (unpublished article by Wharton School Professor Jack Guttentag), available at
http://www.mtgprofessor.com/A%20-%2OLocking%20th%2OLoan/what's-covered_bya_
lock.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
464. Even without the loan and disclosure simplification I have proposed, a mandatory
thirty-day waiting period from the day the lender gives the borrower a written locked price
quote to the day of closing would create a useful shopping window.
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3. Bringing Price Competition to the Borrower.-The simplified price
shopping disclosure described above could be even more useful to
borrowers if, once one lender has given the borrower a loan offer in
the form of the Loan Price Tag, other lenders sent the borrower com-
peting offers, the terms of which were disclosed in the same simplified
Loan Price Tag format. To bring price competition to the borrowers,
I propose that a government agency, perhaps the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) or the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC), set up a method to facilitate such a reverse auction
competition.4 6 5
A possible regulatory scheme would be for the agency to act as a
neutral "bidding agent" linking borrowers and lenders. The first
lender to give a borrower an offer would simultaneously transmit the
simplified disclosure, along with all pertinent borrower and loan in-
formation, to the bidding agent. The information transmitted would
consist of anything and everything the lender used to determine its
offer, including the application and supporting documentation, ap-
praisal, and credit score details. The agent would post the terms of
the loan offer 466 and supporting materials on the Internet, at a web-
site accessible only to lenders. Lenders would then submit competing
bids to the bidding agent, who would transmit them to the borrower
during the twenty-five- or thirty-day window. Competing lenders
would have to pay an administrative fee to the bidding agent and a
finder's fee to the first lender, to cover the first lender's costs of
searching for the borrower and qualifying the borrower for the loan.
The borrower would be free to accept the original offer or any com-
465. Cf Paul Milgrom, Auctions and Bidding: A Primer, 3 J. ECON. PERSPECrIVES 3, 18-20
(1989) (explaining some reasons why auctions are often preferable to posted prices or
bargaining for nonstandardized goods, where sufficient competition exists).
466. Whether the price components of the loan offer should be revealed or not (that is,
whether the system should be structured as an open auction or a sealed bidding system)
depends on a number of factors. An open auction is likely to lead to more honesty from
the finding lender because the amount of the finding lender's bid is itself information that
tells competitors about the finding lender's evaluation of the borrower. An open auction
could also lead to a sea of bids, each only slightly lower priced than the last, flooding the
borrower's mailbox and overwhelming her. Because the practicalities here require the
auction to have a hard close (rather than a soft moving close that stays open, for example,
until the last day on which no further bids come in), an open auction could also lead to
"sniping"-submitting bids at the last moment to try to undercut the last, effectively trans-
forming the open auction to a sealed-bid system. Sandy D. Japp, Online Reverse Auctions:
Issues, Themes, and Prospects for the Future, 30 J. ACAD. MARKETING Sci. 506, 508 (2002). A
sealed-bid system plays into the hands of a finding lender who hoards private information,
but would presumably lead to just a single bid from each competitor who wanted to bid.
Of course, even a single bid from every lender in a market might be too many bids for a
borrower to sort through. Some experimentation to sort through these and other logistics
will be necessary.
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peting bid, and the competing bids would not have to go through the
same posting and bidding process.46 v
This system would help borrowers in a number of ways. First, bor-
rowers would not be required to undergo multiple iterations of the
financial strip search or subject themselves to multiple possibilities of
experiencing a discriminatory loan denial. Second, borrowers could
receive competing offers without expending any time, effort, or ex-
pense. Third, borrowers could shop without challenging the trusted
"friendship" with the first loan broker or officer in the same way bor-
rowers challenge that relationship by affirmatively shopping on their
own. Fourth, by receiving competing offers, or even the initial Loan
Price Tag directing borrowers to price shop, borrowers are alerted
that contrary to widespread belief, loan prices do vary, and lenders are
not required to give borrowers the best rate for which they qualify.468
Finally, by eliminating face-to-face interaction between borrowers and
lenders giving subsequent offers, the ability of these lenders to assess
borrower vulnerability to price gouging is decreased.469
Such a system would require careful monitoring by the agency.
Regulations would be needed to prevent gaming of the system, such as
the first lender failing to make all information available to other lend-
ers or engaging in side deals with borrowers or the competing lenders
467. I thus take up Susan Wachter's suggestion to "use the Internet as a fee based price-
revelation facility." Wachter, supra note 450, at 417. The model here is similar to the
service provided to prime borrowers through the on-line home loan broker LendingTree,
but which is currently unavailable to subprime borrowers, because LendingTree does not
arrange for loans to true subprime risk borrowers. Even if a subprime LendingTree were
to be created, many borrowers at risk of experiencing predatory lending would be unable
to effectively use such a service, both because they fall on the other side of the digital
divide (i.e., lack effective access to the Internet), and because they lack the ability to gather
the paperwork and accurately extract and submit the detailed information required for a
subprime lender to make a firm loan offer.
468. Peterson has suggested that lenders be required to disclose their price offers in a
document that also discloses "the average annual percentage rate on comparable credit
within the borrower's geographic location correlated against the borrower's FICO credit
score." PETERSON, supra note 6, at 304. For this data to impel borrowers to price shop
would require far greater understanding of percentages, APR, and FICO scores than bor-
rowers currently possess, apart from any heuristics, biases, or coping mechanisms that
would infect consumer interpretation of the data. I am pessimistic about developing such
understanding through legal regulation of the borrowing process.
469. Subsequent lenders would have some clues on which to base vulnerability assess-
ments; the borrower's address, credit history, and employment may reveal her race, class,
age, and education, and the price of the initial offer may reveal the first lender's vulnera-
bility assessment of the borrower. These are less revealing of vulnerability than face-to-face
negotiations. Cf Fiona Scott Morton et al., Consumer Information and Discrimination: Does the
Internet Affect the Pricing of New Cars to Women and Minorities?, 1 QUANTITATIVE MARKETING &
ECON. 65, 91 (2003) (finding that Internet car shopping reduces race- and gender-based
price discrimination in car sales).
[VOL. 65:707
THE PROBLEM OF PREDATORY LENDING: PRICE
going directly to the borrower rather than paying the finder's and ad-
ministrative fees. Calibrating the right size finder's fee would also be
difficult, because too high a fee would result in too few competing
bids, and too small a fee would make it unprofitable for the first
lender to search for and qualify some borrowers. Because those bor-
rowers who require the greatest assistance from the lender to qualify
tend to be low- and moderate-income borrowers with less established
and documented credit history, the finder's fee might need to be
larger for these borrowers. But if the system worked, then at equilib-
rium, few competing bids would be made because the first lender
would have a much stronger incentive than currently exists to give the
borrower a competitive price.
Through a system of early, simplified Loan Price Tag disclosures
and active price competition, the power to price shop would be
placed in the hands of the borrower, and greater autonomy of con-
sumer decisionmaking would be achieved. The money, time, and ef-
fort required to submit multiple applications to various lenders in the
current market would no longer be a barrier to receiving competing
loan offers. Although fear of the financial strip search and of a loan
denial due to poor credit history or discrimination would probably
continue to lead borrowers to apply to the lender who advertises a
guaranteed yes, that lender would no longer have a monopoly posi-
tion over the applicant. Because the transaction must take place over
the course of a month, borrowers will be less likely to remain in a hot
stressed state and will have time away from the influence of the broker
or loan officer. Real price competition would displace the current
problems of rent seeking by lenders, price inefficiency, and regressive
income redistribution from lower-income (and disproportionately Af-
rican-American and Latino) borrowers to lenders.
The proposal tries to capture some of the benefits enjoyed by the
structure of the prime market and distribute these benefits to the sub-
prime market as well. First, prime borrowers can use Internet services
such as LendingTree to obtain competing price quotes."' This pro-
posal provides the advantages of LendingTree to the other side of the
digital divide. Second, prime borrowers can lock in rates, often for
thirty days, to create firm quotes to use in price shopping. Although
prime borrowers often have to pay for a lock-in, restricted budgets of
subprime borrowers and thus the greater sunk costs effect of paying
470. I have been alerted to the possibility that lenders using LendingTree give low-
balled, nonfirm quotes, and then spring higher prices on consumers after they are practi-
cally and psychologically committed to the loan. Because my proposed system would have
narrow tolerances, low-balling should not be a problem.
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such a fee counsels in favor of eliminating the fee, at least for these
borrowers.
4. Giving Wall Street Some Skin in the Game.-As many others have
also recognized, any regulation of the home loan market must give
the secondary market some skin in the game. The broker or lender
that originates the loan may disappear or lack the capital necessary to
make the borrower whole down the line. Further, only the holder of
the loan can change the terms of the loan as a legal remedy for non-
compliance with the disclosure rules set forth above.
I therefore propose that failure to provide the Loan Price Tag dis-
closure under the loan sales rules outlined above would nullify the
mortgage or result in a comparable deterrence-aimed penalty, such
that the holder of the loan in the secondary market would have an
incentive to police the originating lender and broker. By eliminating
the holder in due course defense for loans that violate the above sales
rules, as has already been done for HOEPA loans, the secondary mar-
ket would have an incentive to police the loan sellers.471 Violations of
the above loan sales rules would generally be discernable on the face
of the Loan Price Tag disclosure and the other loan documents, and
so the secondary market can enforce the sale rules through monitor-
ing of these documents. The secondary market could also place sig-
nificant bonding requirements on the originating brokers and
lenders, so that they would have the resources to pay any penalty re-
quired for violation of these home refinance loan sales rules.
E. Critique of Proposals
Will the above proposals reduce the supply of credit to subprime
customers? Undoubtedly the answer must be yes. These are not
merely process solutions; by requiring loans to be structured in simpli-
fied and standardized ways, and requiring borrowers to wait to obtain
loan proceeds, some choice narrowing will follow.
471. Baher Azmy & David Reiss, Modeling a Response to Predatory Lending: The New Jersey
Home Ownership Security Act of 2002, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 645, 713-16 (2005) (NewJersey's elimi-
nation of holder in due course defense for loans with predatory characteristics caused
secondary markets to stop funding these loans, resulting in subprime borrowers being of-
fered loans with lower costs and better terms); Eggert, supra 45, passim (arguing for abroga-
tion of holder in due course defense for predatory loans); Engel & McCoy, supra note 37,
at 741-44.
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But more choice is not always better.472 The "bewildering ar-
ray"47 3 of home loan products available in today's market has contrib-
uted to the dearth of price shopping by a significant group of
borrowers. Thus, it is unsurprising that part of the solution to mort-
gage overpricing will require reducing loan structure choices.47 4
Some complexly structured nonpurchase money loans that are
not predatory will be eliminated by these changes. There is no way to
perfectly disaggregate predatory and nonpredatory uses of some loan
products, absent a pricing suitability standard applied on a case-by-
case basis in the courts or an administrative body, an infeasible solu-
tion for the reasons discussed above. Weighing in favor of my propo-
sal is its potential to reduce the harm caused by noncompetitively
priced loans, including inefficiencies, money spent capturing rents,
and regressive income redistribution. Weighing against it is the bene-
fit, in the refinance and second mortgage context, of the availability of
complex loan products such as balloons, negative amortization, and
escalating monthly payments. These products allow borrowers to
more completely leverage their equity and to tailor their loan pay-
ments to their projected income stream, where that income stream is
increasing. Note that my proposal would not prevent people from
achieving homeownership through creatively structured financing be-
cause it would not apply to purchase money loans, which tend not to
be predatory.
A further cost is the delay in obtaining loan proceeds that refi-
nance and home equity borrowers would face due to the mandated
shopping period. Although victims of predatory lending are precisely
those with an emergency need for cash, the long-term costs of an over-
priced home loan are too steep to warrant using equity to meet the
emergency that quickly. This seems true even if during the shopping
period some borrowers would have to use credit card and payday
loans to meet the emergency. We use waiting periods in other con-
texts to encourage deliberation about major life decisions.47 5 On bal-
472. E.g., George Loewenstein, SOCIAL SECURITv BRIEF: IS MORE CHOICE ALWAYS BEaYrER?
3-4 (Nat'l Academy of Social Insur. Oct. 1999), available at http://www.nasi.org/usr -doc/ss
_brief_7.pdf ("Expanded choices are inadvisable when they require expertise that people
don't possess. In such situations: (1) the benefits from competition are likely to be mini-
mal; (2) the decisions are likely to take considerable time to make; (3) people are more
likely to make bad decisions; and (4) decision making is likely to be a considerable source
of anxiety and anticipated regret.").
473. APGAR, supra note 58, at 5.
474. Cf Eggert, supra note 96, at 733-35 (recognizing that reducing the home loan op-
tions available to vulnerable consumers may assist their ability to meaningfully exercise
autonomy in choosing a loan).
475. E.g., marriage, adoption, divorce, handgun purchase, and naturalization.
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ance, particularly in light of widespread uniformity of prime loan
terms, and the common practice of rate lock-ins in the prime market,
it seems that the benefits of my proposal outweigh the costs it would
476impose.
A final question is whether the subprime loan industry as a whole
is dependent on price gouging. Does the subprime loan market have
a "hollow core," meaning that there is no core set of viable single
price equilibria for each otherwise identical loan?4 77 It is possible that
the way in which subprime loans are currently made profitable de-
pends on gouging a few customers and giving most customers low
priced loans, similar to the pricing system used in the airline flight
industry. If so, the question is whether eliminating the gouged bor-
rowers from the mix would make the provision of subprime loans un-
profitable and therefore dry up fairly priced subprime lending. The
fact that some subprime lenders do not appear to price gouge in the
current market makes clear that subprime lending can be price com-
petitive and profitable.
It is true that competitive pricing will result in fewer resources
expended on expensive push marketing sales techniques. Such tech-
niques would be unlikely to generate sufficient profit to survive ,price
competition and exist now only due to rents. There is probably some
archetypal little old lady homeowner who will not get her roof fixed
because no lender will be able to afford, in a price competitive envi-
ronment, to go door-to-door selling roofing services packaged with
loans, and she will not otherwise discover that she could leverage her
equity to get the roof fixed. However, that little old lady will also
avoid paying exorbitant rates for that loan, and her neighbors who are
currently inundated with subprime loan marketing will welcome the
change.
CONCLUSION
This Article has deconstructed the homo economicus model im-
puted to consumers engaging in home loan borrowing by current fed-
476. Given that the current "procedural" set of legal rules governing home lending af-
fect the substantive outcomes, there is no escape from "paternalism"; the distinction be-
tween "market facilitative" "procedural" rules and "paternalistic" "substantive rules" lacks
any deep basis. Cf Mark Kelman, Law and Behavioral Science: Conceptual Overviews, 97 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1347, 1347-48 (2003) (noting that people make poor decisions "not just because
information is difficult to obtain, but because they misuse the information they get or
because they misapprehend the task that they are trying to accomplish"); see also Camerer
et al., supra note 181, at 1211-12, 1219; Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian
Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1159, 1162 (2003).
477. Ayres, supra note 350, at 870.
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eral law, and pragmatically applies a recognition of real
decisionmaking behavior to the problem of predatory lending. The
current information-based legal paradigm confuses disclosure with
knowledge, understanding, and rational choice. It is used as a crutch
by the courts to decide whether a loan complies with the law, a crutch
with which the lending industry clobbers vulnerable borrowers. A
thoroughgoing evaluation of borrowers' behaviors in this context
leads to the conclusion that some restriction of the choice set availa-
ble in the market is necessary to prevent harm to vulnerable subprime
borrowers. The most important policy implications, for immediate
use, are that decreasing practical, cognitive, and emotional transac-
tion costs through radical transparency and required home loan price
shopping waiting periods show promise as methods likely to reduce
the current chasm between the behaviors of vulnerable segments of
borrowers and the law.
The solutions proposed here for predatory lending break
through the impasse presented in a number of modern domains in
which consumers are now expected to understand complicated disclo-
sures, such as insurance, investments, and retirement arrangements,
in addition to consumer credit generally. Policymakers preferring a
free market approach generally favor disclosure, and those favoring a
paternalist approach generally favor substantive controls on terms.
My approach is to understand what conditions are necessary for con-
sumers to use disclosures to make good decisions, and to propose a
market intervention to create those conditions. Only decisions made
under these conditions can be truly autonomous, in the senses of re-
flecting the decisionmaker's own meta-preferences and giving the
decisionmaker a feeling of personal control over decisions, actions,
environment, and life path.
Some of the prior legal scholarship examining home loan bor-
rowing through a behavioral decisionmaking lens has failed to recog-
nize the real-world heterogeneity of cognitive and emotional contexts
in which borrowers are-or are not-shopping. These scholars have
argued that the heuristics, biases, and coping mechanisms identified
in psychology call for a weak form of paternalism in legal regulation,
dubbed asymmetric paternalism. Asymmetric paternalism is legal reg-
ulation that procedurally manipulates framing effects to guide con-
sumers' choices in the right directions, without substantive constraints
on choice. The idea is that those who currently make poor decisions
will be assisted by the procedural solution, but those who are doing
well in the current environment will not bear the costs that would be
imposed by substantive regulation.
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Given that autonomy is a necessary component of human flour-
ishing, asymmetric paternalism is a worthwhile goal. But in the area
of consumer lending, some of these authors have erroneously claimed
that the practice of home lending under current federal law provides
support for their theory. They posit that the disclosures required by
TILA and HOEPA pose only minimal costs to society in the form of
small administrative costs to lenders.47 They assert that the TILA
price disclosure "enormously" benefits the vulnerable consumer by
protecting her from unscrupulous lenders through educating her
about the price of the loan, which in turn will help her to "act more
properly in her own best interest."4 9 They base these claims on a
generic understanding of consumer decisionmaking, without analyz-
ing any data about home loan decisionmaking in the real world.
A closer look at borrowing in action paints a very different pic-
ture. The disclosures do not help a significant segment of consumers
to price shop, because these consumers do not understand the disclo-
sures, do not make use of the disclosures to price shop, and even mis-
interpret the price information provided in the disclosures.
Moreover, the costs of disclosures include more than administrative
costs to the lender; the disclosures themselves may create an informa-
tion overload and may cause the borrower to focus on less important
dimensions of the decision. The disclosures give the veneer of legality
to the transaction, falsely assuring some borrowers that they are more
protected in the transaction than they are. Lenders, courts, and the
borrowers themselves are more likely to blame the borrower for ob-
taining an overpriced loan, and to exonerate the seller of the loan,
because the borrower received the disclosures.
The lesson here is that disclosures alone are not a panacea, but
can only work when conditions are right, and substantive intervention
in the market may be needed to create those conditions. Only by ex-
amining the evidence on the ground closely can we know whether
procedural "framing" or substantive "choice narrowing" regulation-
or, as I have proposed here, some combination of both-is likely to
reduce the incidence of a social problem. Although the insights of
behavioral science in one realm can help us form working hypotheses
478. Camerer et al., supra note 181, at 1233.
479. Id. at 1232-33; see also Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law 29
(Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 225, 2005) (positing that by requiring
lenders to disclose the total interest payments over the life of a loan, the law "counteracts
forms of bounded rationality that reduce welfare, but.., does not significantly affect peo-
ple who did not previously exhibit boundedly rational behavior"); Rachlinski, supra note
362, at 1224 & n.296 (asserting that the current home loan disclosure regime works well).
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about how people are making decisions in other realms, we must care-
fully check those hypotheses against data. Solutions depend crucially
upon detailed contextualized analysis, including the experiences of all
affected population segments, rather than abstract theorizing. Just as
parsimonious models of rational actor decisionmakers must give way
to heterogeneous models of consumer decisionmaking behavior, so
too a parsimonious model of asymmetric paternalism must give way to
an admission that one form of solution will not fit all problems.
In a market where heterogeneous decisionmakers are facing indi-
vidualized and opportunistic pricing of multifarious products, no one
solution will perfectly respond to the needs of all. But we have more
sophisticated tools to develop solutions than the scholarship currently
reflects. We can understand the heterogeneity and we can check our
theory against data. Once we have done that, we can make conscious
tradeoffs in developing regulation that will create a nondiscrimina-
tory, price competitive market.
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APPENDIX
Sample GFE 4 8 0 :
[Name of Lender]
The information provided below reflects estimates of the charges which you are likely to incur
at the settlement of your loan. The fees listed are estimates - the actual charges may be more
or less. Your transaction may not involve a fee for every item listed. The numbers listed beside
the estimates generally correspond to the numbered lines contained in the HUD-1 or HUD-
1A settlement statement that you will be receiving at settlement. The HUD-1 or HUD-1A
settlement statement will show you the actual cost for items paid at settlement.
Item
Loan origination fee
Loan discount fee
Appraisal fee
Credit report
Inspection fee
Mortgage broker fee
CLO access fee
Tax related service fee
Interest for [X] days at $XXXX
per day
Mortgage insurance premium
Hazard insurance premiums
Reserves
Settlement fee
Abstract or title search
Title examination
Document preparation fee
Attorney's fee
Title insurance
Recording fees
City/County tax stamps
State tax
Survey
Pest inspection
[Other fees - list here]
HUD-1 or HUD-1A
801
802
803
804
805
[Use blank line in 800 Section]
[Use blank line in 800 Section]
[Use blank line in 800 Section]
901
902
903
1000 - 1005
1101
1102
1103
1105
1107
1108
1201
1202
1203
1301
1302
Amount or range
$XXXx
$XXXX
$XXXX
$XXXx
$XXXX
$XXXX
$XXxX
$XXXX
$XXXx
$XXXX
$XXXX
$XXXX
$XXXX
$XXXX
$XXXx
$XXXX
$XXXx
$XXxx
$XXXX
$XXXX
$XXXX
$xXXX
$XXXX
$XXXX
Applicant: Date: __
Authorized Official: Date:
480. 24 CFR pt. 3500, App. C.
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Sample HUD-146 1:
A. SETFLEMENT STATEMENT U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
B. Type of Loan: 1. __ FHA 6. File Number 7. Loan Number 8. Mortgage Insurance Case
2. - FmHA 3. - Conv. Unins. Number
4. - VA 5. - Conv. Ins.
C. Note: This form is furnished to give you a statement of actual settlement costs. Amounts paid to and by
the settlement agent are shown. Items marked "(p.o.c.)" were paid outside the closing; they are shown here
for informational purposes and are not included in the totals.
D. Name & Address of Borrower E. Name & Address of Seller F. Name & Address of Lender
G. Property Location H. Settlement Agent
Place of Settlement I. Settlement Date
J. Summary of Borrower's Transaction K. Summary of Seller's Transaction
100. Gross Amount Due From Borrower 400, Gross Amount Due to Seller
101. Contract sales price 401. Contract sales price
102. Personal property 402. Personal property
103. Settlement charges to borrower 403.
(line 1400)
Adjustment for items paid by seller in advance Adjustments for items paid by seller in advance
106. City/town taxes to 406. City/town taxes to
107. County taxes to 407. County taxes to
108. Assessments to 408. Assessments to
120. Gross Amount Due from Borrower 420. Gross Amount Due to Seller
200. Amounts Paid by or in Behalf of 500. Reductions in Amount Due to
Borrower Seller
201. Deposit or earnest money 501. Excess deposit (see
instructions)
202. Principal amount of new loan(s) 502. Settlement charges to seller
(line 1400)
203. Existing loans taken subject to 503. Existing loans taken subject to
204. 504. Payoff of first mortgage loan
205. 505. Payoff of second mortgage
loan
481. 24 CFR pt. 3500, App. A (extra lines removed).
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Adjustments for items unpaid by seller Adjustments for items unpaid by seller
210. City/town taxes to 510. City/town taxes to
211. County taxes to 511. County taxes to
212. Assessments to 512. Assessments to
220. Total Paid by/for Borrower 520. Total Reduction Amount Due
Seller
300. Cash at Settlement from/to 600. Cash at Settlement to/from
Borrower Seller
301. Gross amount due from borrower 601. Gross amount due to seller
(line 120) (line 420)
302. Less amounts paid by/for borrower 602. Less reductions in amount (
(line 220) due seller (line 520)
303. Cash From To Borrower 603. Cash To _From Seller
836
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Sample HUDI, cont:
L. Settlement Charges
700. Total Sales/Broker's Commission based on price Paid From Paid From
$ @ % = Borrower's Funds Seller's Funds
Division of Commission (line 700) as follows: at Settlement at Settlement
701. $ to
702. $ to
703. Commission paid at settlement
800. Items Payable in Connection with Loan
801. Loan origination fee %
802. Loan discount %
803. Appraisal fee to
804. Credit report to
805. Lender's inspection fee
806. Mortgage insurance application fee to
807. Assumption fee
900. Items Required by Lender to be Paid in Advance
901. Interest from to @ $ /day
902. Mortgage insurance premium for months to
903. Hazard insurance premium for years to
1000. Reserves Deposited with Lender
1001. Hazard insurance months @ $ per month
1002. Mortgage insurance months @ $ per month
1003. City property taxes months @ $ per month
1004. County property taxes months @ $ per month
1005. Annual assessments months @ $ per month
1100. Title Charges
1101. Settlement or closing fee to
1102. Abstract or title search to
1103. Tide examination to
1104. Title insurance hinder to
1105. Document preparation to
1106. Notary fees to
1107. Attorney's fees to
(includes above items numbers:)
1108. Title insurance to
(includes above items numbers:)
1109. Lender's coverage $
1110. Owner's coverage $
1200. Government Recording and Transfer Charges
1201. Recording fees: Deed $ ; Mortgage $ Releases $
1202. City/county tax/stamps: Deed $ Mortgage $
1203. State tax/stamps: Deed $ Mortgage $
1300. Additional Settlement Charges
1301. Survey to
1302. Pest inspection to
1400. Total Settlement Charges
(enter on lines 103, Section J and 502, Section K)
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, 482Sample TILA Disclosure :
Federal Truth In Lending Disclosure Statement
ANNUAL FINANCE CHARGE Amount Financed
PERCENTAGE RATE The dollar amount The amount of credit
The cost of your the credit will cost provided to you or on
credit as a yearly rate. you. your behalf.
Total of Payments
The amount you will
have paid after you
have made all
payments as
scheduled.
% $$
You have the right to receive at this time an itemization of the Amount Financed.
( I I want an itemization. [ ] I do not want an itemization.
Your payment schedule will be:
Number of Payments Amount of Payments When Payments Are Due
Insurance: Credit life insurance and credit disability insurance are not required to obtain credit,
and will not be provided unless you sign and agree to pay the additional cost.
Type Premium Signature
Credit Life I want credit life insurance:
Credit Disability I want credit disability insurance:
Credit Life and I want credit life and disability insurance:
Disability
You may obtain property insurance from anyone you want that is acceptable to [creditor].
If you get the insurance from [creditor], you will pay $_.-------/year.
Security: You are giving a security interest in: 0 the goods or property being purchased
0 (brief description of other property):
Filing fees $ Non-filing insurance $
Late Charge: If a payment is late, you will be charged $____/-% of the payment.
Prepayment: If you pay off early, 0 may 0 will not have to pay a penalty
you 0 may 0 will not be entitled to a
refund of part of the
finance charge.
Assumption: Someone buying your home
O cannot assume the remainder of the mortgage on the original terms.
O may, subject to conditions, be allowed to assume the remainder of the mortgage on the
original terms.
See your contract documents for any additional information about nonpayment, default, any
required repayment in full before the scheduled date, and prepayment refunds and penalties.
I(we) have received and read a copy of this disclosure:
Applicant Date
482. 12 CFR pt. 226, App. H-2.
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Sample HOEPA Disclosure483
Disclosure Form
You are not required to complete this agreement merely because you have
received these disclosures or have signed a loan application.
If you obtain this loan, the lender will have a mortgage on your home.
You could lose your home, and any money you have put into it, if you do not
meet your obligations under the loan.
You are borrowing $ [Optional credit insurance is [ ] is not
[ ] included in this amount.]
The annual percentage rate on your loan will be: __.%.
Your regular [frequency] payment will be: $ - .
[At the end of your loan, you will still owe us: $ [balloon amount]].
[Your interest rate may increase. Increases in the interest rate could raise your
payment. The highest amount your payment could increase is to
$ - .1
483. No HOEPA disclosure sample appears in the regulations. This sample is copied
from Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta, Changes to Regulation Z Expand Loans Subject to HOEPA, 12
PARTNERS (Summer 2002), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/invoke.cfm?objectid=28
317C62-2D5B-4F40-AFD373F5D77920F5&method=display, and complies with the
requirements listed in 12 CFR § 226.32(c).
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Sample Proposed Price Shopping Disclosure:
LOAN PRICE TAG
These are the terms of the loan that [name of lender or broker] is offering
to sell to you:
Total loan proceeds:
Total up-front fees, points &
costs:
Maximum monthly payment
Loan length:
$ _(You must pay this
nonrefundable amount even
if you pay off or refinance the loan)
$ _ plus taxes and insurance
- years
This offer is good for 30 days from today's date: -. /-_/20_
It is possible that this loan is not the lowest priced available.
This paper is the Price Tag for this loan. You should use it to shop with
other lenders or brokers for the best loan at the best price, just as you would
for any major purchase.
You have 30 days to shop for the best-priced loan, and to decide whether you
want to buy this loan.
Informatiaon about this offer is being given to other lenders and brokers, and
they may contact you by mail to offer you a different price for this loan.
If you decide to purchse this loan, [name of broker or lender] must allow you to
sign the contract for this loan up until -/-_/20- [30 days from date given
to borrower], and cannot allow you to contract for this loan before /__/
20 [25 days from date given to borrower].
Time to go shopping!
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